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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
The idea of perfection has been one of the most 
persistent and influential concepts in western philosophy. 
It has played a leading role in aesthetics, ethics, and 
metaphysics. It is remarkable that only recently has a 
literature emerged which attempts to give the idea special 
criticism. It is the purpose of this dissertation to 
criticize the use of the idea of perfection in metaphysics, 
especial·ly religious metaphysics, where its issues are most 
crucial. An examination of the recent literature will be 
reserved for the fourth chapter, all of which will be 
devoted to an exposition of the present state of the question. 
The primary interest of this dissertation is not 
historical. A historical study is used to obtain the most 
representative and most .influential development of the idea 
as the focus for criticism. Attention will be given to the 
ethical significance of the idea, since we shall discover 
ethical implications in the metaphysical positions which will 
be set forth, and since it is a key contention of the author 
that moral experience presents some of the most decisive data 
for metaphysics. · 
A.. The Nature and Importance of the Problem. 
l 
At an early stage in the history of western philosophy 
Aristotle set forth a definition of perfection which is clear, 
which reveals the issues raised by the idea, and which casts 
it in the terms in which it has been used in the years 
follo~~ng him as well. Such dry clarity of.definition could 
only come from Aristotle. 
What is called perfectfrlA€LO~is (l) that 
outside which it is not possible to find any, 
even one, of its parts ••• (2) that which in 
respect of excellence and goodness cannot be 
excelled in its kind. • • excellence is a per-
fection; for each thing is perfect and every 
substance is perfect, when in respect of the 
form of its proper excellence it lacks no part 
of it proper magnitude. (3) th~ things which 
have attained their end, this being good, are 
called perfect; for things arl perfect in virtue 
of having attained their end. 
The Greek word "({AEtoV is often translated as n completen as 
., 
well as rrperfect. rr That, -which is t"EAElDV is that which has 
attained its'l£J.os, its ttend.n 
The acute importance of the idea of perfection for 
religious metaphysics becomes clearer when religion is 
defined and set against this definition of perfection. In 
this dissertation, religion is understood to be the expressed 
conviction that our most coherently organized ends (purposes 
or values) are in harmony with Reality (the total state of 
l. Aristotle, Metaphysics, l02lb. 
2 
affairs) • Any meta:~hysics which asserts that Reality is 
- I 
perfect has ·made what is in a theoretical sense a religious 
affirmation. (To be properly religious this theoretical 
proposition would have to be held with c·onviction and ex-
pressed.) To assert that Reality is perfect is to assert 
that the total state of affairs is in harmony with ends as 
we know them in ourselves. .Any metaphysics which refuses 
to affirm a complete harmony between our most coherently 
organized ends and Reality is under burd~n t-o account for 
the experience of religious-faith and the status of our 
ends. We must face up to the audacity of the religious 
assert-ion. Obviously, not all values can be in harmony 
with Reality. Logic as well as experience precludes this. 
Many values are- not in harmony with each other. But to 
religious faith the universe cannot be indifferent; values 
cannot be merely subjective. 
The idea of perfection raises, however, an even more 
important problem for a religious metaphysics. Such a meta-
physics must not only make clear the extent to which our 
ends are in harmony with Reality. Even if this were es-
tablished, a religious metaphysics would have further to 
criticize the relationship between the idea of perfection 
and other attrib~tes traditionally assigned to God. Par-
ticularly does perfection appear to contradict the idea of 
infinity, an idea which has been held to be of equal impor-
tance when the ground of Reality is defined as God. This 
3 
contradiction in att-ributes becomes more evident when we 
put them in other words, nunlimited and complete.n 
Aristotle, who is particularly important to the way 
that this dissertation will be developed, was aware of this 
contradiction betw~en perfection and infinity and was anxious 
to do away with the latter as an atnribute of Reality in 
favor of the former. He clearly defines infinity. 
The infinite t~rns out to be the contrary of 
what it is said to be. It is not what has noth~· 
ing outside it!which is in;finite, but which al-
ways has something outside it. • • • tTWhole 11 {]>AoSJ and npeJ;fectn are quite identical or. 
closely akin. ;Nothing is perfect[T("AEl os] 
w1~i~ht ~as no e~d freAc~ and the end is a ~IDJ. • . . 
One_ reason that theologians·have tolerated this con-
tradiction of divine attributes has been the conviction that 
both are discovered in religious experience. The importance 
of the idea of perfection for religious experience has been 
stater. But several distinguished p~ilosophers of religion 
have argued that aisense of the Infinite is of the essence 
of the religious experience. Religious experience is not 
only faith in the predominant goodness of the actual; it is 
also an awakened sensitivity to indefinable possibilities. 
I 
Rudolph Otto, to name one of the most important recent 
thinkers, has argued with great force that some sense of the 
I 
! 
I 
2. Aristot~e, Physics, 206b-207a; Plato agrees, 
·· Philebus , 27 d. 
4 
numinous and indefinable precedes. all moral and rational 
formulation of the nature of God} Otto supports this 
position fram a wide study of comparative anthropology. 
From quite a different philosophical standpoint, H. N. 
Wieman seeks to provide for this experience by defining 
religion as ttman t s acute awareness of the realm of un-
attained possibility and the behavior that results from 
this awareness. tt4 • And from sti 11 ano-ther position, Albert 
C. Knudson contends that the idea of the Infinite is 
e9sential to religious experience. 5 
It will be ~gainst the weight of vdde testimony con-
cerning religious experience if we decide to purchase consistecy 
by surrendering the infinity of the world-ground. But it is 
intolerable to assert _both the perfection and the infinity of 
the world-ground in the sense that they have traditionally 
been asserted. That there is a problem here is indicated by 
the efforts of those who would hold to bqth to mitigate the 
contradic-tion. Thomas Aquinas will appear as the chief case 
in point. To fail to give up either one or the other, or so 
to reconsider them that the contradiction is dissipated, is 
to confess the incompetence of human reason and the uselessness 
3. Otto, IH, passim. See bibliography for abbreviations 
used throughout t~e dissertation. 
4. Wieman, WRT, 135; also cf. John Dewey, QC, 303. 
5. Knudson, DG,· 251-254. 
6 
of metaphysical theology. One of the purposes of this dissertation 
on the idea of perfection is to aid in ending this contradiction. 
B. The Focus of the Criticism 
Analysis of what it means to assert that the Real is 
perfect reveals five logical possibilities. 6 First, the realm 
of appearances may be observed to be so selfcompleting that it 
demands nothing beyond itself to sustain or explain itself. In 
this view, the world is seen to be the realization of ttendsll 
but these ends are simply completions, not conscious purposes. 
Therefore this is not the kingdom of ends envisaged by religion. 
This is :the perfection of the world order affirmed by mechanistic 
materialism. Second, the realm of appearances may be observed 
to be so imperfect that it demands a transcendently perf'ect 
order to give it the sustenance it is incapable of giving itself. 
Such a perfect order, affirmed by an appeal to deductive neces-
sity rather than experience, has been asserted by some idealists 
under Platonic influence. Third, it has been held that, 
while order is not complete within the realm of appearances, 
sufficient perfection of purpose appears to indicate that 
there is a realm of perfection which sustains and is revealed 
by the apparent·· perfections. Particular attention will be 
given to this position. Fourth, the value for metaphysics 
6. A more exhaustive catalog of possibilities is given 
in Hartshorne, MVG,,Ch. I. The classification above seems more 
useful to the purposes of this dissertation. There is merit in 
grouping similar doctrines as well as in analyzing smaller 
differences. 
of such a concept as perfection may be doubted entirely. 
Since it has been asserted that it iB for a religiously 
oriented metaphysics that the idea of perfection becomes 
crucial, those who deny the perfection of the world-ground 
may further be divided on the basis of their religious 
orientation or lack of it. While all who define ends as 
conscious purposes and affirm that they reflect Reality 
are making an implicitly religious affirmation, not all 
denials of perfection are non-religious. There are those 
who deny mants metaphysical competence and the validity of 
\ 
\ 
such rational ideals as perfection in the interest of 
asserting Godts transcendence and infinity. Both mystics 
and advocates of a revelational theology have supported 
this position. On the other hand, the validity of perfec-
tion is also often denied in the interest of a nominalism 
or positivism which :accepts the purposelessness of the world-
ground in default of our ability to prove the matter other-
wise. 
It is upon the basis of this analysis of the logical 
possibilities confronting the idea of perfection that Thomas 
Aquinas has been chosen as the focus for criticism in this 
dissertation. The value of this·focus is readily seen. In 
the first place, the thought of Thomas Aquinas has great 
i 
interest and importa;nce in its own right. In the second 
place, the concept df perfection was of central importance 
7 
in the construction of his thought and his use of it has 
added to its influence upon subsequent thinkers. A third 
reason appears in that, in spite of the importance of the 
idea of perfection for Thomas, surprisingly little special 
and sustained attention has been given to his use of the 
idea, even by Roman Catholic scholars.? Numerous scattered 
references are of course made to the idea in works on 
Thomas, but sustained attention is lacking. In the fourth 
place, Thomas is an important example of one who was aware 
of the tension between the idea of perfection and the idea 
of infinity, and he attempted to reconcile the two ideas. 
In trying to use Greek philosophy as a foundation for the 
Christian religion, he brought into interesting relationship 
reasonts demand for completeness and religionts feeling for 
numinous possibility, (that is, perfection and infinity). 
Fifth, Thomas explored the relationship between the idea of 
perfection in ethics and the idea of perfection in meta-
physics. Finally, there is such an interesting parallel 
between the thought-patterns current in Thomasts day and 
those CLrrrent in our o~m day that, in working out his own 
idea of perfection, he confronted all of the logical 
7. This is especially true of the emphasis upon 
perfection in Thomasts metaphysics. Under the heading of 
"Christian perfectionn sustained analyses have been made 
of Thomas's use of perfection in ethics. The outstanding 
work here is Garrigou-Lagrange, CPC. 
8 
•,. 
9 
possibilities in regard to the idea noted in the paragraph above. 
In criticizing Thomasts treatment of the idea we will be con-
sidering the idea in one of its most important formulations and 
be able to consider other approaches as well. Stressing that 
our real interest is not a historical exposition of Thomas, it 
is to be hoped that points of agreement and disagreement with 
him will give guidance upon the problem of perfection today. 
C. Organization of the Remainder of the Dissertation 
The rest of this chapter will place Thomas Aquinas in 
general relation to the thought of his time, thus supporting 
the choice of a point of departure. Whe next two chapters will 
show the use Thomas made of the concept of perfection in his 
metaphysics and theory of lmowledge, and in his ethics. In 
each of these chapters his use of the idea will be studied 
against the background of the theories: current in his day •. 
These theories are sketched in the next section of the present 
chapter. , The fourth chapter will define the positions taken 
in regard to perfection by thinkers in our own day. The 
final chapter will criticize Thomas's position and, in the 
light of contemporary thought, set forth an original position. 
D. Thomasts Position in Medieval Thought 
The dominant philosophical position during the early 
Middle Ages was a system maintaining an attitude toward 
perfection corresponding to the second possibility noted 
above. This system held that the realm o.f appearances re-
veals such imperfection that it demands a transcendent realm 
o.f perfect order to give it1 the sustenance it is incapable 
o.f giving itself. 
This tradition stemmed ~rom Augustine, who had given 
to Christianity its .first great philosophical .formulation 
by synthesizing it with Nee-Platonism, Manichaeism, and the 
thought o.f Cicero.8 This complex synthesis has great in-
terest in its own right, though, o.f course, an exploration 
o.f it is quite b~side the purpose o.f the present study. 
10 
Two things are to the point, however. The .first is Augustinets 
clear concern .for the problem o.f perfection. Troeltsch as-
serts that Augustiners whole edifice o.f thought fs reared 
on this idea.9 The second point to be noted is the dualism 
to which he was inclined by the Neo-Platonic and Manichaean 
influences. 
There is ample ground .for a sharp dualism between 
imperfect appearance and perfect Reality in the thought of 
Plato itself. First o.f all, there is the Doctrine o.f Ideas, 
which asserted that the reality of an object is not to be 
found in the way it appears to any o.f the senses, noli is it 
to be built up .from a collection of sense impressions. 
8. Best traced in Harnack, HD, IV, passim. 
9· Troeltsch, AUG, 154-158. 
The report of the senses can only give us doxa, opinion. 
Truth is to be discovered in the essence, in the Idea which 
defines a thing for what it really is at all times and 
places. God is the Demiurge, the Divine Artisan. He 
strives to overcome infinity and chaos and so to define 
things that their essence is discovered and they become 
real. Goodness and be.~uty, as well as truth, arise when 
Definition has superseded the jumble of the senses.lO The 
senses do not aid us in our search for truth, goodness, 
and beauty; we progress faster when, freed from their dis-
tortion, we employ our innate rational faculties. 
Another aspect of Plato 1 s dualism was his conception 
of the soul. He held that the soul is a substantial entity, 
here temporarily joined to a body with which it has little 
in common. Socrates is made to question whether death may 
not be more of a joy$ml release than a thing for sorrow.ll 
This dualism was pushed much further in the Neo-
Platoriic interpretations of Plato. Th,inkers l.i_ke Plotinus, 
who was one of the greatest influences upon Augustine, iden-
tified God, not with the Demiurge in the realm between 
perfection and imperfection, as Plato had done, but with a 
10. Plato, Timaeus, and Phile-bus, 23c-27d. 
11. Plato, Apology, 42, Phaedo, 115, and all of the 
Phaedrus. 
ll 
0. -~ 
realm even beyond the Ideas.12 God was seen as dwelling 
beyond the realm of perfect Definition. God had nothing to 
do with the creation and maintenance of the world of matter 
and sense. 
l2 
The influence of this exaggerated dualism upon Augus-
tine1s conception of perfection is evident. Combatting the 
followers of Pyrrho, who had reduced knowledge to the vagaries 
of sensation and been driven to scepticism, Augustine 
disparages empirical knowledge. In the Confessions, n1Jodiesn 
and sensation ar~ the lovvest steps in the scale of knowledge; 
pure thought and intuition are the highes on the scale.l3 
In The Trinity his rationalism is also clearly stated: 
The intellectual cognition of eten1al 
things is one thing, the rational cogni-
tion of temporal things is another; and 
no one doubts that the former is to be 
preferred to the latter.l4 
In the Enchiridion it is God and the soul that he proposes 
to know, that alone. 11Go not outside thyself, but return 
within thyself; for truth resides in the inmost part of 
man.nl5 God has made us for Himself; outside of Him is 
12. Lovejoy, GCB, 42, is mistaken in attributing this 
identification of God and the Idea of the Good to Plato himself. 
. . ~ 
Platots God was a finite deity who had work to do. The 
Neo-Platonists made him self-sufficient. 
13. Augustine, Confessions, pt. VII, ch.xvii, sec. 23. 
14. Augu~tine, The Trinity, pt. XII, ch.xv, sec. 25. 
15. Augustine, Enchiridion, sec. 33. 
unreality and death. Combatting the Pelagians, who stressed 
the natural goodness of man, he sharply distinguished the 
spiritual man from man as a part of nature.16 In The City of 
God this dualism is ·carried into the interpretation of 
society, and the perfect spiritual order is contrasted with 
the imperfect and corrupt terrestial order. 
After Augustinets time, this confidence in a realm 
of perfect order discernible by reason apart from· sense 
became even stronger. Aristotlets work on logic might have 
been an empirical corrective, but the only part of his work 
which was available during the early Middle Ages was that 
part of the Categories devoted to a treatise on deduction. 
This treatise was itself preserved only as the basis for a 
commentary by Boethius upon the Isagoge, which was in its 
turn a commentary upon the Categories by the Nee-Platonist 
Porphyry. Thus the inductive influence of Aristotle was 
not available, and that portion of his thought which was 
available survived only at third hand. 
During this period of Nee-Platonist, Augustinian 
influence the distinction was often not clearly dravrr1 between 
philosophy (or natural theology) and revealed theology. Both 
Augustine and Anselm of Canterbury, an eleventh century 
thinker of the same school, asserted that we must believe in 
16. On the relation of Augustine to Thomas Aquinas 
see McKeon Art. (l92E'l) • 
13 
,. 
order to understand and that we are under obligation to 
understand whatever we believe. Neither distinguished kinds 
of belief. If one must believe in Godts Triune nature as 
well as his existence in order to be saved, then one must 
be able to give philosophical, even deductive, proof of the 
Trinity as well as the existence of God. 
So strong did the confidence grow in the ability of 
reason, apart from experience or revelation, to discover 
the full truth, that in Thomas Aquinasts time he felt it 
necessary to place early in each of his two major works a 
denial that the existence of God can be proved per se notum, 
that is, that the existence of God is known to be proved as 
soon as the meaning of the terms is known.l7 The best known 
proof of the existence of God per se notum is Anselmts 
classic Pntological argument. In this, Anselm argues that 
every normal person can conceive of perfect being ap.d that 
., 
being which exists in fact (in re) is more perfect (that is, 
more completely conforms to its essential Idea, its Defini-
tion) than being which exists merely as ideal possibility. 
Since every normal person conceives of being which is really 
perfect, really perfect being is known to exist.l8 / 
Anselm went even further in trying to give a 
17. SCG, I, 10; ST, I, q.l, a.l, obj. 2. 
18. Anselm, Proslogium, ch. 2 and 3. 
rationalistic basis for revealed theology. In the Cur 
Deus Homo he even ·sought to prove that Christ's 9ubstitu-
tionary atonement for man 1 s sins was not only consistent 
with reason, but that it was a lo9ical neces~ity.l9 The 
idea of a necessary, rational, perfectly realized spiritual 
order apart from time and sense could scarcely be more 
clearly held. 
One of the decisive turns in medieval thought occurred 
with the introduction of a philosophical approach correspon-
ding to the· first of the four possible attitudes which we 
have noted can be taken toward the idea of perfection. This 
approach assumed that the realm of appearances is so self-
completing as to demand nothing beyond itself to explain it-
self. It received its chief impetus from the reintroduction 
of Aristotle 1 s writings in their original sources which 
occurred in the twelfth century. The major agents of this 
reintroduction of Aristotle and of this particular interpre-
tation of him were the Arabian philosophers Avicenna and 
Averroes. 
There were, of course, in Aristotle himself ample 
elements of contrast with Platonic Realism, particularly 
the exaggerated expression given to it by the Neo-Platonists. 
One of Aristotle 1 s principal tapks was to deal with the 
19. Anselm, Cur Deus Homo, bk. I ch. xxv, for one 
example. 
15 
ambiguity in Platots thought regarding the relationship be-
tween universals and particulars. Even Plato recognized 
this ambiguity and the Parmenides is an exercise in self-
criticism regarding it. Aristotle makes the Ideas into 
principles of development immanent within individual things. 
According to him, the things which w~ see about us are not 
faint copies of transcendent Definition. Form and matter 
are joined throughout the course of nature. Eorm can be 
sensuously observed, as well as recognized by a rational 
faculty apart from sense. 
Aristotle speaks much of nature being governed by 
11 ends. n But it is not clear beyond argument that he means 
in every case to imply that ttends 1' are conscious purposes. 
He uses the same word in the Physics in talking about the 
end of a line that he uses in discussing function in biology 
and intention in art. In the Poetics he even repeats the 
./, ' , 
equation of end ('TEAO.S) with limit (11Epa.s) which we have 
already observed in the Physics. ttAn end is that which is 
after something itself, either as its necessary or usual 
consequent, and with nothing after it.n20 The English 
translation reveals the possibility of a confusing equivo-
cation in the phrase 11after somethingn as well as nend.n 
20. Aristotle, Poetics, 1450b 27; Physics, 206b-207a. 
l6 
A number of contemporary naturalists argue that 
Aristotle should be interpreted in· such naturalistic terms. 
One quotation illustrates this interpretation. Harold 
Hantz argues: 
The place of activity in Aristotle 1 s exposition 
can be perhaps most vividly portrayed in one 
of his criticisms of Anaxagoras (De Part. 
687 a 7 ff. ) • Anaxagoras had said that Uthrough 
having hands man is the wisest of the animals, 
but rather it is reasonable that through being the 
wisest_he has hands. For hands are an instrument, 
and nature always distributes, as a prudent man, 
each thing to one capable of using it.n This is 
not a tale of creation. The view expressed can 
be called a nteleology, tr but it is a teleology of 
use, a·natural teleology as distinct from an 
artificial one. Nature--if we wil~ speak of nature 
doing this or that--does not put hands on a worm, 
for that would be in vain, a useless bestowal, 
unless the whole organic structure were such as is 
exhibited by animals which have hands and use 
them. 21 
17 
Hant,z further cautions against the phrase "nature distributesn 
and expresses a preference for 11 growth, 11 rather than nature, 
as the translation of fV <1"1 S • 
On one particular point, an important one, the 
naturalism of Aristotle was explicit. He held that man is 
not unique in possessing a soul. There are plant souls and 
animal souls as well as rational souls. Man 1 s uniqueness 
'21. Hantz, BMA, 18. Also see scattered references 
in the writings of Woodbridge, especially EN. Woodbridge 
never fully developed his naturalistic interpretation of 
Aristotle, but Hantz acknowledges the debt of his own study 
to him. Also note denial of personality to Aristotle's 
God by Fuller, HP, I, 151. 
lies in the fact that he is the only being which possesses, 
in .addition to the other two souls, a rational soul. The 
rational soul is itself divided into two parts, the passive 
reason and the active reason. Passive reason possesses 
sensuous elements which cause it to perish when the body 
perishes. The active reason comes from ~dthout, from what 
is called the divine mind itself. It existed before either 
the particular soul. or the particular body was .constituted. 
Since it is not an individual reason, its survival is not a 
personal immortality.22 
Averroes did not think of himself as the founder of 
a new system; he saw himself as the continuer of the work 
of Aristotle. 23 The first element of his naturalistic in-
terpretation of Aristotle is one of the most important as-
pects of Averroes's philosophy. He appears to carry much 
further the clear implications of Aristotlets theory of the 
soul and immortality. He holds with Aristotle that the 
passive intellect represents the 2n~ividualts capacity for 
knowledge and, like the individual himself, arises and 
perishes as the Form of the individual body. The active 
intellect is simply the generic reason of the human race; 
18 
the only immortality is simply a social or racial immortality. 
22. Aristotle, De Anima, 429-430. 
23. Munk, MPJA, 440. Averroes develops the views 
attributed to him here in De Animae Beatitudine. 
This naturalistic humanism is clearly pointed up by Renan: 
A living and permanent humanity; sucl~ seems to 
be the meaning of the averroistic theory of the 
unity of the intellect. The immortality of the 
active intellect is nothing else but the eter-
nal rebirth of humanity, and the perpetuity of 
civilization. Reason is constituted as something 
absolute, independent of individuals, as an in-
tegral part of the universe, and humanity, which 
~s only the act of this reason2 is constituted as a necessary and eternal being. 4 
Averroes pushed much further into naturalism than 
Aristotle in his assertion of the eternity and potency of 
matter. His position is especially significant as a con-
trast with the Platonism which we noticed was the dominant 
philosophy of the early 1liddle Ages. Averroes argues that 
matter is not merely a void; it is a universal potency co;n;;-. 
taining itself the germ of all forms. The forms arise from, 
and are not anterior to, matter. Matter is eternal. In 
fact, material bodies assume such potency for Averroes that 
God, while often mentioned, seems really unnecessary to his 
system. There is'no providential governance of men and 
events. Celestial bodies determine the destiny of the world. 
These celestial intermediaries are coeternal with God and 
act under necessity.25 
Av~rroes seems to have desired to remain loyal to 
1~ 
24. Renan, AA, l22 (translation my own). For Thomasrs 
refutation on 'this point see ST, I, q.45, a.5;.and q.47, 
a.l; and q.90, a.2. 
25. Thomas challenges these views ST, I, q.46, a.l, 
and q. 66, a.2. 
Isla~ic theology as much as medieval Christian philosophers 
desired to preserve their orthodoxy. His emphasis upon 
prime matter and necessity is not as far from Islamic or-
thodoxy as it is J:-rom the Platonic-tinctured Christian 
orthodoxy. But it is obvious that he does encounter dif-
ficulties with any doctrine of God or immortality. For 
this reason, Averroes had recourse to a third doctrine, 
his famous theory of twofold truth. He clearly distinguishes 
the realms of philosophy and theology. Then he goes on to 
make philosophy the higher realm and leave theology as the 
province of myth and allegory_,_ picture-thinkigg for those 
not so intellectually advanced as to grasp the higher truth. 
He builds his own system, not upon revelation nor deduction, 
but upon an appeal to appearance. He is quoted by Munk as 
follows: 
The only religion for philosophers is to 
make a profound study of whatever exists, 
for we can render unto God no more sublime 
worship than that of knowing his works, 
which ca~ges us to know himself in all .his 
reality. 
In the light of the rest of his system, the phrases "the 
only religion of philosophers,n "study of whatever exists 
Lwhat is in r~" and ttcauses us to know himself in all his 
reality,n take on a particularly naturalistic significance. 
26. Munk, MPJA, 456. 
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Averroism entered directly into the current of 
Scholastic thought with the teaching of Siger de Brabant at 
the University of Paris during the latter hal£ of the 
thirteenth century. As nearly as we can determine his 
teaching, he seems to have supported the principal Averroist 
positions outlined above, especially taking refuge in the 
doctrine of the two-fold truth. 27 It was against Siger in 
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particular that Thomas t s criticisms of .A verroism we-re directed. 
Averro!sm, and with it the scientific works of 
Aristotle, was condemned repeatedly by various universit"ies 
during the latter half of the thirteenth century. Because 
of his extensive use of Aristotle, the writings of Thomas 
were also feared and received censure dur~ng this period. 
Observing that in the Averro!stic interpretation the breach 
betv.reen form and matter was healed by making matter eternal 
and form an emergent, that the breach between appearance and 
Reality was healed by making sense the primary avenue to 
Reality for those mature enough to follow it, and that the 
t.endency toward asceticism and world-denial was checked by 
swallow·ing the indi vid-qal soul to the simple continuance of 
the human race and by abdicating its freedom in favor of 
astrological movements, we can see that the fear of Aristotle 
as he was introduced by Averroes was inspired only in part 
27. The standard treatment of Siger and Latin 
Averroism is Mandonnet, BAL. 
by ignorance and bigotry. The idea of a world-order so 
completely closed in upon itself as to dilute values and 
purposes to natural causation or to make them irrationally 
ttsuper-tr natural is clearly expressed. 
The third basic approach to such general ideas as that 
of perfection was made in Thomasts time both by those working 
from a religious orientation and by those rejecting, or· 
at least ignoring, such an orientation. Both varieties of 
irrationalism were implicit from the earliest Middle Ages. 
They both stemmed from the Augustinian-Platonic Realism 
which we have seen eventuated in a rationalistic natural 
theology. That the same fountain should give forth both 
rationalism and irrationalism appeg.rs less puzzling at a 
second glance. Disparagement of all ttnaturaln reason is 
only a couple of steps beyond a carelessness about saving 
the appearances. If seeing has no influence at all upon 
believing, there is no reason why logical consistency may 
not become suspect as well. Such a swing from an extreme 
emphasis upon reason to irrationalism has several times 
marked the history of philosophy; it will be recalled that 
Hegel had both his Kierkegaard and his Nietzsche. 
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The Platonic Doctrine of Ideas held that particular 
objects are only appearances; Reality lies in the Definition, 
the essence, in which particular objects share. Neo-Platonism 
exaggerated this hierarchical conception until more inclusive 
ideas absorbed particular ones so that at last an Idea of 
ideas was reached, a universal in which every lesser being 
has only a participant existence. Thus Nee-Platonism even-
tuated in pantheism. The source of this mov:ement and the 
«father of western mysticism« was Plotinus (205-270 A.D.). 
Plotinus carried the matter even further than the above 
might indicate. The one is above perfect Definition; the 
realm of ideas is the first emanation from it. Plotinus 
recognized the importance of reason, but his hierar-chy of 
Ideas took him to a stage where reason could not go, where 
only mystical intuition could penetrate. God, the One, is 
so far beyond our fragmentary -und~r$tanding that our highest 
atDributes fall short of picturing h~ Even so comprehen-
sive an attribute as that of perfection loses its meaning 
when applied to him. 2S 
The most influential medieval exponent of religious 
irrationalism, one of the most important writers in the 
Middle Ages, was the enigmatic Dionysius, called the Pseudo-
Areopagite. Now known to have written during the last part 
of the fifth century A~D., this author was thought throughout 
the Middle Ages to be the judge converted by St. Paul on 
Areopagus, and his writings carrie~ an almost apostolic 
authority. As an extreme Realist, the Fseudo- Dionysius did 
- 28. Plotinus, Enneads, V, sec. 3 and 4; also VI, 
sec. 6 and 9. 
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believe that our minds participate in a more comprehensive 
rational order. He did believe that God could be known 
through the perfections or the natural order. But God cannot 
be most adequately known either through nature or rational 
conceptions. Beyond allcwsertive theology, God is lrn.own by 
the via eminentiae. Every perfection which can be ascribed 
to one or God's creatures must be ascribed also to him,. but 
.. 29 
in a supereminent way. And beyond even the via eminentiae 
.-. 
is the via negativa, wherein you see that even to ascribe 
supereminent perfections to God is not enough; God is 
beyond all perfections and all conceptio~ 
There is, besides, that most divine knowledge 
of God which takes place through ignorance, in 
the _union which is above intelligence, when the 
intellect, quitting all things that are, and 
then leaving itself also, is united to the su-
perlucent rays, being illuminated thence and 
therein by the unsearchable depth or wisdom.30 
Thomas made more extensive use or the Pseudo-
Dionysius than of any other writer, save Aristotle. Di-
onysius is quoted throughout the major works and Thomas 
wrote a commentary on the Divine Names. Because or the 
Pseudo-Dionysius 1 s authoritative, almost apostolic,status 
he is treated rather gingel"'ly. We shall note in a later 
29. The ambiguity of Pseudo-Dionysius 1 s use,of the 
idea of perfeqtion should be watched •. Just what an ninf'imi te 
excess11 of perfection (if perfection is .a synonym for com-
pleteness) would be is.hard·to grasp. 
. . 
30. Pseudo-Dionysius, Divine Names, VII, sec. 3. 
. ~ . . --~----- --·--·- -\:· ~ - - ---------- ··---
connection the extent of their agreements. But Xhomas does 
often take issue with him. 11Dionysius says that negations 
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about God are true; but ·affirmations are vague.n Thomas 
argues that affirmative propositions ean be :formed, a cen-
tral contribution, as will appear, of hi~ system •. Again 
Pseudo-Dionysius is quoted as saying, n4:.+1 such names as 
good, wise, and the like are more truly denied of God than 
given to him. 11 Thomas counters by an appeal to the via 
eminentiae. These p:e.rfections are inappropriate to God 
only in the ordinary sense; they can be asserted uin a 
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more eminent way. 11 
~ 
This influence upon the tholll.ght of Xhomas was also 
' 
derived in part from elements in the thought of John Scotus 
Erigena (ninth century) and Hugh of St. Victor (early 
- 1 
twelfth century), though it would be unf'air to give this 
meaning to either of their systems as a whole. But E'rigena 
speaks of uthe excellent naught, 11 beyond all limitation and 
r_elation, and Hugh's mysticism is in unstable tension with 
rational constructions. Like Pseudo-Dionysius, each pre-
fers evocative and religiously emotions;!. e:a-tegories like 
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infinity over pi!a;i.1osophical categories like :Pe.n~~o:bion. 
The other variety of irrationalism challenging 
31. ST, I, q. 13 a. 12. Rather weakly, Thomas 
objects to th€'. charge of frva~eness,n sug~esting instead 
that such assertions may be 1 ineongruous. 1 
32. ST, I, q. 13, a. 12; also q. 56, a. 3. 
I, wf. 
33- John Scotus Erigena, On the Division ef Nature, 
25 
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philosophers in Thomas's day was the tradition eventuating 
in nominal~sm. Nominalism, of course, did not receive its 
full development until after Thomasts time. But the logical 
possibility of nominalism is evident in any clear enunciation 
of the realism which we have already sketched. If it is pos-
sible to assert that only universals are real, the contra-
dictory assertion that only particulars are real is also con-
ceivable. The clear implications were sufficiently developed 
in Thomasts day to cause him.to modify significantly the 
' 
realism of his own system. 
It was evident to the more acute medieval thinkers 
' that nominalifm had implications for an orderly conception 
of physical nature which were potentially as far reaching 
as the implications it more obviously had for religion. 
If universals are but names, simply the subjective labels 
we conveniently attach to things, science as well as religion 
is reduced to probability or less. Therefore the develop-
ment of nominalism was welcomed for at least two very diver-
gent motives. One group of thinkers, probably the more 
considerable at first, saw that religion had both revela-
tion and ecclesiastical authority to fall back upon as 
sources of proof. Science had already begun to show signs 
of independent development and stood to lose more from a 
demonstration of the limits of reason than did religion. 
Thus there was a religiously motivated nominalism which had 
some kinship to the mystical irrationalism of P.seudo-
Dionysius and his follOi'ITers which we have already noted. 
Abelard (1079-1142) whose conceptualism, in spite of his 
sharp attacks upon the nominalism of Rosceliri, gave impetus 
to the nominalist movement, was probably so motivated. 
His Introduction to Theology, condemned at Scissons in 
1121, may perhaps be interpreted (in the words ~dth which 
Immanuel Kant described his own mission) as an attempt 
rtto destroy knowledge in order to make room for faith.u 
However, Abelardts influence, whatever his intentions might 
have been, did give impetus to the spread of a nominalism, 
with different motivation. His Sic et Non, in which he 
sets side by side the teaching of numerous authorities of 
the Church on every kind of topic, S'hov-rs ecclesiastical 
authority to be in such widespread and fundamental contra-
diction that its advantage of proof over the new science 
is dissipated. 
From this point on to the end of the Middle Ages the 
second strand of nominalism becomes more evident. Thinkers 
of this tendency saw in the affirmation of particulars 
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rather than universals an argument for reducing the authority 
of the Church, which had justified its hierarchy by means 
of the doctrine of universals. Nominalism for them was a 
means of securing freedom to study the scrences stimulated 
by the rediscovery of Aristotle. This kind of nominalism 
received its principal culmination with Ockham in the 
fourteenth century. Anticipating a point developed at 
some length in the fourth chapter, it should be noticed 
that nominalists of this tendency do not entirely reject 
such generalized and integrative notions as that of per-
fection. They refuse simply to affirm a system to any con-
siderable body of our experience; they choose a narrow 
and rigidly analytical consistency. This nominalism was, 
in effect, positivism and study of Thomasts theory of 
knowledge will show how he confronted it. 
This, then, is the background against which Thomas 
developed his system. Inte~preting the background from 
the standpoint of the concept of perfection which is our 
major interest, and which played such a major role in 
Thomasts thought, it is seen that, positively, he espoused 
the third of the five major approaches to the question 
delineated early in the chapter. He held that the realm 
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of appearances is not a self-completing order, but that it 
does reveal sufficient perfection to imply that it is sus-
tained by such a self-completing order. Negatively, Thomas 
sought to avoid four major possibilities. On the one hand, 
he defended the competence of reason (and such ideals of rea-
son as that of perfection) in both science and theology 
against both mystical and nominalistic irrationalism. On 
the other hand, he proposed an empirical and modernistic 
------
use of reason rather than the rationalistic logic-chopping 
often found in the Platonic tradition. He sought also 
through the use of reason and experience to avoid a 
naturalism which claimed on the authority of Aristotle 
that the world is li'7ithout tran'scendent aim and can 
perfectly explain itself. 
The next two chapters are devoted to an exposition 
of Thomas's position and must give support to the 
interpretation asserted above. 
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CHAPTER II 
PERFECTION TI~ TH0~1AStS METAPHYSICS 
Most modern philosophers ·seek to establish a theory 
of knowledge before preceding to metaphysics. They feel 
I 
that it is logical that criteria for truth be established 
before launching a discussion of the nature of being. 
This priority of the theory of knowledge is something 
which modern philosophy owes to Descartes, or at least to 
Kant. Although medieval thinkers debated problems of faith 
and reason, their systematic procedure was to begin with 
being itself. 
Thomas Aquinas was true to the medieval emphasis 
upon the primacy of ontology. Both of th,e Summas begin 
with a discussion of the existe,nce of God. Thomas argues 
that all philosophy must begin at this point because being 
· and ~ruth are O?e, thus the source of all $ruth can be 
found only in the source of all. being, that is, God. 
30 
Gilson, the great interpreter of medieval phil-
osophy, c~aims that this was one of the greatest contribu-
tions which Thomas made to philosophy. Wl~ereas the medieval 
I 
thinkers under Platonist influence had separated essence 
and accident and placed existence in the latter category, 
l. SCG, I, ch.l; and III, ch.25r 
I 
I 
l 
Thomas held that essence of God is to exist. God is the 
one being that essentially exists. Essence is merely 
potentiality, but existence is actuality. Since God is 
Pure Actuality, he must exist in virtue of his own essence. 
Gilson claims that Thomas has here replaced Aristotlets 
Pure Act of thought with the Pure Act of existen£e which 
is at the heart of the Christian revelation. He stresses 
the fundamental importance which Thomas attributed to 
God's announcement to Moses, nr am that I am. n 2 Everything 
else in Thomas's system follows from his initial 
establishment of the existence of a Perfect Being. 
A. Arguments for God Rejected by Thomas 
The whole tenor of Thomas's philosophy moved him to 
reject two common arguments for the existence of God, though 
at first glance his defence of the priority of being to 
idea and his assertion of Perfect B~ing might gppear to 
move him toward acceptance of 9ne of themt namely, the 
ontological argument. It was seen in the first chapter 
that Anselm argued that the existence of God can be known 
Eer se notum, as soon as the meaning of the terms is 
understood. But though he fully shared Anselm1 s belief in 
Perfect Being, Thomas placed early in each Summa a careful 
2. Gilson, SMP, 5l. 
J 
I 
I 
31 
disavowal of any attempt to establish its existence from 
merely our idea of it.3 
Thomas had to oppose the ontological argument for 
two reasons, both fundamental to his argument as a whole.4 
In the first place, as will appear in more detail later in 
the chapter, he held that knowledge comes through sense, 
not through deduction from innate principles. We are not 
to confuse our ideas with the thing in itself.5 In the 
second place, Thomas claims that Anselm's position is not 
clear regarding the relationship between essence and 
existence. Of course in God essence and existence perfectly 
coincide. But two things must be kept in mind. Existence 
and the idea of existence are two things and the former is 
prior to the latter, and so far as man's experience is 
concerned essence and existence. do not perfectly coincide. 
We must begin first with the empirical fact that something 
exists and then elucidate its nature and the conditions 
on which its existence can be explained. On this basis 
the existence and perfection of God can be positively 
proved, but proof is needed, and it is gained through a 
rational interpretation of experience, not simply from 
3. ST, I, q.2, a.l; and SCG, I, ch.l0-13. 
4. ST, I, q.2, a.2. 
5. ST, I, q.2, a.l; also q.84, a.l. 
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deduction. It quickly becomes evident that the consistency 
with which Thomas adheres to this experience is not great. 
BuD he does appeal to the same realm of nature described 
by ~·cience and here rebukes the Platonists for not doing 
the same. 
Thomas also found it necessary to deal with the kind 
of nproofn adduced by religious irrationalism, though this 
view may more adequately be styled the antithesis of 
P,hilosophy than a philosophical position itself. This 
approach argues for the existence of God simply because the 
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affirmation of God's existence so outrages our natural reason. 
One of Thomasts major contriP,utions was the founding of a 
system which mad.e religious faith comprehensible to the 
scientifically trained intellects of his day~ He refused 
to allow an argument based upon faith alone just as he 
refused to allow an argument based upon the merely deductive 
reason. He believes that the existence of God can be proved 
with perfect certitude within the realm of experience.6 
B. Arguments for God Which Thomas Accepts 
I 
The nfirst and most manifestn argument for the 
existence of God is the argument from motion.? By motion 
6. ST, I, q.2, a.2. 
?. ST, I, q.2, a.3. 
I 
i 
is meant the reduction of a thing from a state of poten-
tiality to a state of actuality. The conce})t of !"reP.uc-
tiontt is more signif-icant th-an Thomas realizes. More 
things are potential than are ever actual. Some things 
are selected by motion. Nothing can be reduced to a state 
of actuality unle·ss something is already actual. Further, 
it is impossible for a thing to be in the same respect 
both a mover and a thing moved. Ultimately we must come 
to a First Mover, himself unmoved, requiring no reduction 
from potentiality to actuality. This everyone understands 
to be God. 8 
The second argument is from the nature of efficient 
cause. It is both logically impossible, and has in fact 
never been experienced, that a thing should be the ef-
ficient cause of itself. For a thing to be the efficient 
cause of. itself it would be necessary for it to be prior 
to itself, which is of course impossible for anything but 
a being capable of causing all things. Since effects are 
all about us and each must have an efficient cause, and 
since we cannot ·go back to infinity in assigning efficient 
causes, there must be a first efficient c~use, itself un-
caused, ttto which everyone gives t.he name of God.u9 
8. SCG, I, ch.Jl, "In God there is no potentiality." 
9. ST, I, q.2, a.J. 
Each of these first two arguments is readily seen 
to be an instance of the classic cosmological argument. 
Each rests upon the assumption of Aristotle's theory of 
causality. They are the elements in Thomas's argument for 
the existence of God which are most vulnerable to the 
criticisms of Hume and Kant and most affected by the 
changed assumptions of modern science. Since the time of 
Hume we have been more sensitive to the role of the sub-
ject in all descriptions of cause and effect. And modern 
science deals with effects apparently ngreater" than 
their causes. 
The third argument is based upon an assumption re-
garding the nature of possibility and necessity.· We see 
around us things whose existence ffiLd non-existence are 
equally possible. If the non-existence of everything were 
possible, then there would have been a time when nothing 
was in existence. If there were a time when nothing was 
in existence, then nothing could ever come into existence. 
Out of nothing, nothing comes. Therefore there is some 
being which has necessary existence and which has within 
itself the g!;Ound of this necessity. ttThis all men speak 
of as God. nlO 
This interesting argument seems to be a kind of 
10. ST, I, q.2, a.J. 
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bridge between the two arguments which have gone before 
and the two which "V>rill follow it. Like the earlier arguments 
it is concerned with an adequate ground of causation, but 
it differs from all four of the other arguments in making 
its appeal to logical necessity rather than experience. 
It also anticipates the concern for perfection which 
is the essence of the last two arguments by its assertion 
that possibility depends upon actuality. Thomas identifies 
perfection with actuality and necessity, and asserts that 
God is the one Perfect Being because he is Pure Act.11 
Thus every imperfect thing is caused by a thing which is 
perfect.12 This Plato would not agree to and we do not need 
to. Something must be actual for perfection to exist. 
But it does not follow that any being need be purely so. 
It will be argued that what is needed is a realm of ideal 
possibilities and a being aware of them and willing and 
capable of actualizing them, since we do see this much. 
But we do not see Pure Being so do not need pure being to 
explain it. 
The fourth and fifth arguments are instances of the 
familiar teleological argument. The first.of these is built 
upon the gradations found in things. Distinctions of more 
11. ST, I, q.4, a.l. 
12. ST, I, q.44, a.2. 
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or less imply a most. That men argue questions of truth, 
beauty, and goodness implies an actual and necessary 
standard against which all truths., beauties and goodnesses 
are measured. The cause of the~se various perfections, 
and the standard of perfection which they imply, is a 
Perfect Being -whom we call.God.13 
In contrast to the third argument, the fourth 
argument is based upon our experience of perfection 
rather than the logical implications of ~perfection. 
The third argument pointed out the .fact that we see 
about us things which seem to be 'merely possible, not 
necessary, potential rather than actual, imperfect ra·ther 
than perfect. Since every possible, potential and im-
perfect thing must be sustained by a being which is 
necessary, actual, and perfect, such a Perfect Being 
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must exist. The .fourth argument is built upon the assump-
tion that the perfections found in our world could surely 
not have emerged from what is imperfect. As Walter Farrell, 
a contemporary Thomist, points out, the experience to which 
Thomas appeals is not to be confused with that to which 
anotfl.er kind of religious empiricism refers. Thomas does 
not build upon religious faith~states, but upon the same 
kind of public ~xperience to which science appeals.14 
13. ST~ I, q.2, a.3. 
14. Farrell, CS, III, 509. 
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~other recent Thomist, Cardinal Mercier, also de-
fends Thomas from a charge of inconsistency which is quick 
to suggest iuself at this point. Here one is prone to re-
mind Thomas that, for all his stated opposition to Anselm's 
ontologism, these gTtidations which we impute to things may 
be evidence of th~ idea of a perfect standard, not effects 
of Perfect Bei~g itself. Mercier calls Thomas to speak for 
himself: 
~od is the maker of a thing inasmuch as 
He is in act •.••• Now by His actuality 
and per£ection He contains all the per-
fections of things ••• and thus He is 
virtually all things.l5 
This does not seem to be so adequate a defense of Thomas's 
position as Mercier appears to think. It was precisely 
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this same confidence that our ideas give us, not other ideas, 
but the object itself which was the essence of Anselm's 
position. Anselm made no distinction between rational 
necessity and empirical fact. Accepting a P::Latoni,c liier-
achical conception of ideas, he c-ould with greater consis-
tency than Thomas assert that God is virtually the perfec-
tions evident in all things. This obviously tends strongly 
toward pantheism. In discussing Thomas's theory of good 
and evil in the next chapter this tendency will be more 
clearly shown. 
Mercier succeeds in making a sharper dist~nction be~ween 
15. SCG, II, ch.l5. 
Thomas's position and ontologism with another point 
reflecting an interpretation of his own rather than the 
actual words of Thomas. Mercier sharpens the contrast 
between essence and accident. In beings there are graduated 
perfections. The lirni tat ions of these perfections show 
I 
that goodness, virtue, and nobleness do not belong to the 
beings themselves in virtue of their essences. An essence--
that which makes a being what it is--cannot be partly 
verified of a being. A being is a man or not a man, not 
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part of a man. .Anything in a being which admits of more or 
less cannot be of its essence. Thus when we find a perfection 
in a limited degree we know that it does not belong to a 
thing in virtue of its essence, but was communicated to it. 
Barring an infinite regress, we reach a Being which is the 
cause of its own perfections and of all others, possessing 
all perfections in superlative degree.16 
The fiftn argument for God is closely related to the 
fourth and, like it, is based on perfection. One of the 
important elements constituting the perfection of a thing 
is its fitness to an end.17 All things, organic and 
inorganic, act for an end, and apparently the best end 
possible to them. It is evident to Thomas that such 
16. Mercier; :iYlSP, II, 46-49. 
17. ST, I, q.6, a.3; also q.73, a.l, and SCG, 
III, ch.l6. 
purposiveness is not accidental but from a total design 
which includes all lesser purposes. Unconscious beings 
could not accomplish ends unless some intelligence directed 
them. This being we call God. 18 
C. The Nature of God 
Textbooks on the history of-philosophy commonly 
make much of Thomas's contributions to the resolution of 
the conflict between faith and reason. It is often asserted 
that scholastic philosophy establishes the existence of God 
but leaves the nature of God as the province of revealed 
theology. This generalization is not exactly true. 
Thomas extends his knowledge of God's nature at 
precisely the point which proved pivotal in his arguments 
for God's existence. The pivot around which his arguments 
for the existence of God moved is the rational necessity 
for the existence of a Perfect Being to explain motion, 
cause, and possibility, to sustain the imperfections which 
subsist and contain the perfections which complement one 
another in a total perfection of purpose.. The nature of 
perfection makes necessary the existence of God, and it is 
also the key to his nature. 
Thomas takes up the contentions of those who, like 
18. ST, I, q.2, a.J. 
--------------
Pseudo~Dionysius, again at this point deny that affirmative 
propositions can be formulated about God. Thomas once 
more urges an empirical approach. He says that to deny 
that affirmative propositions can be made about Godts 
nature is to project into the intelligibility of the 
Perfect Being himself what is a limitation of our own 
understanding. Real knowledge about God can be gained 
from what scholastic philosophers have since called the 
v~a causalitatis: the argument which establishes his 
existence can indicate his nature.1 9 
. 
However, Thomas does face an obvious problem, a 
problem graver than he himself appears always to realize, 
in explaining just how finite and imperfect intel]_ects 
can comprehend Perfect Being. Thus in order properly to 
evaluate his arguments concerning the nature of God, a 
brief exposition of certain aspects of his theory of know-
ledge is necessary at this point. 
D. ThomasTs Theory of Knowledge 
According to Thomas, knowing is a manner of being. 
In the .. examination of his ethics in the next chapter, the. 
impqrtance which he gives to the life of contemplation will 
be seen. This is due to the fact that he views the life 
19. ST, I, ·q.J, a.J; and q.l3, a.l2 
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of reason as one of the unique aspects of man's being. 
As Carre' succinctly summarizes it, 11The passage from 
ignorance to knowledge is an aspect of the universal 
rhythm of potency and actr: 20 The reason that knowledge 
is still potential to man is that his being is not yet 
perfect, his essence is not completely actualized. But 
like all potentiality, man's potentiality to knowledge 
presupposes an actuality, the pre-existence of Perfect 
Truth and One whose essence 'is to know it perfectly. 
A Platonist could agree 1ri th this basic idea. 
It might appear that a rationalistic theory of knowledge 
would be advanced to support a metaphysics placing such 
emphasis upon pre-existent truths. And Thomas does voice 
approval of many of the points maintained by Platonic 
rationalism. 
In passages like the following Thomas voices support 
for Augustine 1 s understanding of the Platonic Doctrine of 
Ideas: 
The human soul knows all things in the 
eternal exemplars, since by participation 
in these exemplars we know all things. 
For the intellectual light itself, which is 
in us, is nothing else than -a participated 
likeness of the uncreated light, in which 
are contained the eternal exemplars.2l 
20. ITarre: RN, 74; cf. ST, I, q.79, a.2. 
21. ST, I, q.S4, a.5. 
Again, in a statement clear enough to fit into 
' Plato's Meno, Thomas asserts the subjective element in 
each act of knowing. 
Whatever is received into anything must 
be received according to the cond~tion 
of the receiver •••• Further, the thing 
understoQd is in the thing which under-
stands.22 
Because of this all teaching and learning must proceed 
from previous knowledge. 23 Self-lmowledge is the first 
thing which must be accomplished. 
A thing is known as it is in act. Now 
the ultimate perfection o+ the intellect 
consists in its own operation. For this 
is not an act tending to something else 
in which lies the perfection of the work 
accomplished, as building is the perfec-
tion of the thing built; but-it remains 
in the agent as its perfection and act, 
as is said in the Metaphysics, IX [I050~. 
Therefore the first th~ng of the intellect 
that is understood is its own act of under-
standing. This ·occurs in different ways in 
different intellects.24 
However, it was an important purpose of Thomas 
that he should furnish a corrective to Platonic rational-
ism. Regarding Augustine's argument that we know all things 
through the eternal exemplars, Thomas goes on to point out 
with some note of triumph that Augustine does not rule out 
perception. Augustine had to seek for specific information' 
22. ST, I, q.76, a.2. 
23. ST, I, q.ll7, a.l. 
24. ST, I, q.87, a.J. 
from ntimes and places.u25 Going further 
difference between the kinds 
different intellects, Thomas reminds us 
and essence are the same thing, and that 
understanding and essence are not the same 
own essence is the first object of their 
And there is yet another, namely, the 
intellect, which is not its own act of 
standing, no·r is its ovm essence the f 
object.of its act of understanding, f 
object is the nature of the material 
And therefore that which is first 
the human intellect is an object of 
and that which is known secondarily is 
by which that object is known; and thr 
act the intellect itself is known, who 
tion is itself the get of understan 
this reason did the Philosopher assert 
objects ~re known before a~~s and acts 
pow-ers LDe Anima, 415al67. 
Putting it into the language of Kant, we 
mind is not known through the pure reason 
through the practical reason; it can surel 
not as an object of experience understood 
ordered by the categories. Putting it int 
a contemporary philosopher, the past and 
a situation-experienced but a situation-b 
there is ample warrant for treating such 
25. ST, I, q.84, a.5 end. 
26. ST, I, q.87, a.3. 
27. Brightman, POR, 342-369. 
44 
discussing the 
available to 
Godrs understanding 
angels 
still their 
rstanding. 
say that the 
science, but 
but 
phenomena 
language of 
mind is not 
ieved-in, though 
27 
ef as knowledge. 
Thus we :see that for Thomas the u exerhplars,n 
or Ideas, are primarily an ontic rather an epistemic 
necessity. The process of knowledge of the 
process of being and presupposes it. epistemic 
process is the exact reverse of the ontic All 
created being comes from Perfect Being. our 
knowledge is concerned, we proceed from e imperfect to 
the ~erfect, from the particular to the U 
To know a thing in general and not in particular 
is to have an imperfect knowledge of 
our intellect, when it is reduced 
t. Hence 
potentiality 
ed to act, acquires first a universal 
knowledge of things before it knows 
particular; as proceeding from the 
the_perfectz8as is clear from the ~~=== 
to 
I /l84a227. 
In the state of pre-analytic synopsis is 
separated from actuality~ essence ce. In the 
of knowing the universal and the particul are joined. 
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When reliable knowledge actually es place, epist~.mic 
idealism is transcended; nit is the which·is understood 
not the likeness of the stone.n29 
Some have asserted that our intelle 
powers know only the impressions mad 
them •••• 
This is, however, manifestly false f 
reasons. First, because the things 
understand are also the objects of s 
28. ST, I, q.14, a.6. 
29. ST, I, q.76, a.4. 
Therefore, if what we understand is merely the 
intelligible species of the soul, it would 
follovr that every science would be concerned, 
not with things outside the soul, but only with 
intelligible species within the soul; just as, 
according to the platonists, all of the sciences 
are about Ideas, which they hold to be that 
which is actually understood. Secondly, it is 
untrue, because it would lead to the opinion 
of the ancients who maintained that whatever 
seems, is true, and that3sonsequently contradictories are true simultaneously. 
It is of equal importance, however, that Thomas 
goes on in this and other passages to distinguish his 
position from the epiphenomenalistic sensationalism at 
the other pole from Platonism. 
The ancient philosophers •••• said that 
like is known by like. • • • They said that 
the soul knows the earth outside itself by 
the earth within itself •••• If ••• we 
take the species of the earth instead of the 
earth. • • it follows that by means of the 
intelligible species the soul knows the things 
which are outslde of it.31 
Again, in a preceding passage, he says, Hit cannot be 
said that the sensible knowledge is the total and perfect 
cause of intellectual knowledge, but rather that it is 
in a way the material cause.n32 
It is mants unique being as a denizen of two worlds 
which enables him to perform the act of mediation which is 
30. ST, I, q.85, a.2. 
31. ST, I, q.85, a.2. 
32. ST, I, q.84, a.6. 
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lmowledge. Carre/succinctly describes Thomas 1 s position: 
'" 
!Jl.an 1 s mind is intermediaty between organic 
beings whose information extends no further 
than the environment with which they are 
in immediate contact, and the angels who 
are able to know material objects not through 
the senses, but in the immaterial principles.33 
Thomas agrees with Augustine that nthe soul has no matter.n 
. 34 
The soul is the form o:f the body. Therefore the body 
depends upon the soul :for its actuality, while the soul 
is independent of the material order and preserves a 
dualism in regard to it. Sense perception simply provides 
the stimulation whereby the mind can know itself' and the 
ideal principles actualized within the material order .• 
In essence then, Thomas 1 s position may be described 
as a modified realism, an attempt to mediate between nom-
~ 
inalis.m and extreme, rationalistic realism. On the one 
hand, he could never agree with a nominalist that uni-
versal principles are merely :flatus vocis, or subjective 
labels. On the other hand, Thomas did hold that it was 
through particular objects that our awareness of universal 
4-7 
principles is aroused, and that knowledge of a universal 
essence is not perfect unless it is embodied in an existent 
fact. Though Thomas's personal interest in the natural 
sciences was quite meagre, he thus :furnished a philosophical 
.. 
33. Carre-; RN, 81 • 
.. 34. ST, I, q.?5, a.5. 
basis for an investigation of nature. So, while the 
historical importance of the v-rork of the nominalists in 
freeing the study of nature from theological assumptions 
must be recognized, Thomas would appear to give a sounder 
basis for scientific knowledge. 
Thomas derogates conventional and merely probable 
knowledge. He is completely convinced of the competence 
of the mind to reach full metaphysical certainty and holds 
that the mind is in unstable equilibrium until it perfectly 
reaches it. 
Man has a natural desire to know the causes 
of whatever he sees; and so through wondering 
atwhatever they saw, and not knowing its cause, 
men first began to philosophize, and when they 
had discovered the cause they were at rest. 
Nor do they cease inquiring until they come to 
the first cause; and the.n do we deem ourselves 
to know perfectly when we know the first cause 
Liristotle, Metaphysics, 983~· Therefore man 
naturally desires, as his last end, to know the 
first cause. But God is the first cause of all 
things. Therefore mqnts last end is to know 
God.35 
At this point Thomasts system closes in upon itself and 
there is a natural transition to his ethics and the problem 
of the extent to which this last end can be reached in this 
life. The ethics is the subject of the next.· chapter. For 
the present we must turn back to his ontology to see how 
this dialectic at work in the knowing process both re-
enforces Thomasts arguments for.God and serves as an 
35· SGG, III, ch.25. 
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e~lication of God's nature. 
E. TJ:re Doctrine of Analogy 
The particular method by which Thomas establishes 
the nature of God can now be seen against the backdrop of 
I 
the theory of knowledge. This method is the doctrine of 
analogy, one of the most influential instruments in the 
history of metaphysical speculation and felt by many 
contemporary Thomists to be one of Thomas's most important 
eontributions to philosophy. It is thrOugh analogy t~at 
the imperfect can comprehend the perfect. 
Thomas develops the doctrine of analogy at one 
point in refuting an idea of Maimonides, who is considered 
by him to be one of the greatest thinkers in the history 
of philosophy. Maimonides had asked why it ~s necessary 
for God to be good or wise to cause goodness or wisdom, 
any more than it is necessary for God to be matter or a 
plant in order to cause matter and plants. Thomas answers: 
The effects are in their causes virtually, 
as heat is in the sun. But unless the virtual 
power were in some sense of the nature of heat 
the sun acting thrgugh it would not generate 
what was like it. 3 · 
A contemporary Thomist sharpens this point a little bit 
by noting that: 
36. SCG, I, ch.31. 
What Maimonides failed to see is that God 
is not a univocal but a logical cause, some 
of whose effects can be attributed to him 
truly since, in a supereminent mode, he is 
that which they are.j7 
The pantheistic realists and the materialists alike had 
made the transcendence of God impossible by a refusal to 
admit any but univocal causes. The irrationalists, 
especially the nominalists, had undermined any understand-
ing of cause by making its attribution merely a subjective 
and conventional affair. Thomas tries to thread his·way 
between these extremes. 
What an analogical cause is, and how it differs 
from a univocal cause, can be seen more clearly after 
we have noted Thomas's distinction between an analogy 
of proportion and an analogy of proportionality. The 
analogy of proportion rests upon participation in a 
common concept. For example, the relation between 3 and 
6 (its double) and the relation between a particular 
chair and the Idea of what defines a chair are instances 
of the analogy of proportion. It deals ·with univocal 
rather than virtual relationships. Since there is no 
common element between imperfect beings and Perfect Being, 
the analogy between them must be one of proportionality. 
The analogy of proportionality posits a relationship between 
37. Anderson, BB, 186. 
5o 
the attributes of one being similar to the relationship 
between the attributes of another being. Neither of the 
elements being compared need be held in common with the 
other being in tne analogy; only the relationships within 
each being are compared. Thus 6 relates to 3 as 4 relates 
to 2. The analogy of proportionality is a proportion of 
proportion. Thus the perfections of God are in God in 
relation to his perfect essence as they are in man in 
relation td his finite'nature.38 
: With acute use of the analogy of proportionality 
Thomas tries to avoid anthropomorphism by denying that the 
perfections of the creature are in God merely wit-h a 
difference of degree. And he tries to avoid agnosticism 
by asserting that the perfections of the creature are not 
in God merely nominally, that is, equivocally, but really 
and postively, since he is their source.39 He seems to 
have here an instrument quite useful to any theology which 
seeks to be empirical. The metaphysical implications are 
an effort to avoid an excessive monism and a dualism, for 
knowledge would be impossible in either. 
However, in spite of this attempt to avoid nominal-
istic agnosticism, and in spite of the refutation of 
38. ST, I, q.13, a.5; also q.4, a.3. 
I, 449-l~o. Cf. G.M.Sauvage, Art. trAnalogy, 11 Cath. Enc., 
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Pseudo-Dionysius 1 s denial that positive assertions can be 
made about God, noted early in the chapter, Thomas still 
seems to employ some of the arguments which eventuated in 
Pseudo-Dionysius's agnosticism. He pushes hard the point 
that in the analogy of proportionality there need be no · 
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elem~t in common between our being and God 1 s being. He 
commends the via eminentiae, to which he also refers as 
the via excellentiae. The strong element of agnostic 
negation which these devices had for p.seudo-Dionysius was 
observed in the first chapter. Thomas also insists that 
we must begin by assuming that any perfections attributed 
to God on the basis of finite experience must in every case 
be attributed to God in an absolutely excellent· way.4° 
And the final way of knowing God is for Thomas, as it was 
for Pseudo-Dionysius, the via negativa, or the via remotionis. 
When the existence of a thing has been 
ascertained, there remains the further 
question of the manner of its existence, 
in order that we may know its essence. 
Now because we cannot know what God is, 
but rather what he is not, we have n.o 
means for considering how God is, but 
rather how he is not.41 
The key to the understanding of God is the removal from 
him of all defects, limitations, and imperfections which 
are in his effects. Samples of such limitations are change, 
40. ST, I, q.l3, a.3; also q.l3, a.5 and 6. Of. 
SOG, I, a.22-35. 
41. ST, I, q.3; also q.4-13, and SCG, I, ch.l4. 
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time, and space. Thus Thomas gives the basis for the 
oversimplifications of his system which assert that he leaves 
the question of God 1 s nature to revealed theology. While 
this assertion is not exactly true, to the extent that it 
is not he seems inconsistent with passages like that above. 
Arid in many instances Thomas's empiricism, despite the 
vigor with which he urges it at times against fideists, 
rationalists, and nominalists, appears to be vitally 
restricted before it is applied. Thomas's metaphysics 
seems to present us 1.,ri th another sad but common case where 
presuppositions get the better of experience. 
F. The Perfection of God 
When the method of analogy is applied to the task 
of establishing God 1 s nature, both the effectiveness of the 
method and the limitations imposed by its negative character 
are evident. Furthermore, where empiricism is not contradicted 
it is sometimes compromised by a circular relationship between 
the arguments for God's existence and the arguments for God's 
nature. 
Since it is God 1 s essence to exist, his ends are all 
completely actualized, and his nature can best be described 
by calling him perfect. The method of analogy discloses 
five reasons why he is perfect. First, a thing is more 
11 nobletr insofar as it has more being. .As has just 
been noted, God is being itself, and therefore possesses 
every variety of excellence and must becalled perf'ect.42 
Since the Divine Being is not a being received 
in anything, but God is his own subsistent 
being. • • it is clear that God is infinite 
and perf~ct.43 
54 
It may be observed that, so far as this particular argument 
is concerned, God would not need to be perfect in every 
possible aspect, but only in every existing aspect. A 
relative perfection is suggested as possible since all 
that is involved here is that God not lack any perfection 
found in the creatures. Of course Thomas rules out this 
possibility in his discussions of Godts infinity and 
simplicity. 
In the second place, the perfect is prior to the 
i~perfect, as Thomas joins Aristotle in asserting against 
the reported views of the Pythagoreans and Speusippus.44 
A First cause can be proved and it is God; therefore God 
is perfect. Aristot2e had been quite clear on the priority 
of perfection to imperfection: 
If then it is equally impossible not to 
put the good among the first principles 
and to put them in this way, evidently the 
principles are not being correctly described,· · 
nor are the first substances. Nor does 
anyone conceive the matter correctly if he 
compares the principles of the universe to 
that of animals and plants, on the gr.ound 
42. ST, I, q.4, a.2. 
43· ST, I, q.7, a.l; cf. SCG, I, ch.28 and 
44· ST, I, q.4, a.l. 
ch.43. 
that the more complete always comes from the 
indefinite and incom£lete--which is what 
leads this thinker /Speusippus7 tosay that 
this ~s also' true o1! the first principles of 
reality, so that the One itself is not an 
existing thing. This is incorrect, for even 
in the world of animals and plants the 
principle~r· from which they come are complete; for 
it is a man that produces a man, and the seed 
is not first.45 
To which Thomas adds his approval as follows: 
Every imperfect thing is caused by one 
perfect. For the first principle
6
must be 
most perfect, as Aristotle says.4. 
This argument concerning God-'s nature seems simply 
55 
to restate elements of both the third and fourth arguments 
for his existence, arguments which asserted that both 
perfection and imperfection demand a pre-existent perfection~ 
It would also be appropriate to comment that one could 
' 
agree with Thomas and Aristotle here that ~rinciples of 
perfection must be prior to any existence without necessarily 
agreeing with them that these principles are actualized 
throughout all of God's being. Were there no prior ends 
of which God was conscious it would be difficult to explain 
how the movement from potentiality to actua1i ty could take 
place. But also, as will be seen in greater detail when 
w~ tura to Thomas's arguments !dr Godts immutability, the 
movement from potentiality to actuality is equally difficult 
45. · Aristotle, Metaphysics, l092a; also see 
Physics, 265a. 
46. ST, I, q.44, a.2. 
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to explain if all of God 1 s being is perfectly actualized. 
The third evidence for the perfection of God is 
the definition of a thing as perfect insofar as it is 
actual. Thus Thomas again strikes at the Greek materialists 
and the Averrolsts: 
Matter as such is merely potential, the first 
material principle must be absolutely potential, 
and thus most imperfect. Now Hod is the first 
principle, not material, but in the order of 
efficient cause, which must be most perfect. 
For just as matter, as such, is merely potential, 
so an agent, as such, is in a state of actuality. 
Hence the first active principle must be most 
actual, and therefore most perfect.47 
There is some suggestion here again of the possibility of 
a kind of relative perfection, but what is probably 
intended is not a matter of rank but of intrinsic mode of 
being. To say that God is perfect is to assert that he 
possesses all the perfections which his nature implies. 
The question that is raised regarding the «perfections 11 
peculiar to an agent seems more important than the 
a,ssertion that ·God is pure actuality. That question does 
not seem to be answered at this point. 
The fourth argument is also based upon the assumption 
that causality begins with God. As he is the first efficient 
cause all perfections of created things must eXist in a 
more eminent degree in him. 
47. ST, I, q.4, a.2. 
Whatever perfection exists in an effect 
must be found in the producing cause: 
either in the same formality, if it is 
a univocal agent--as when man reproduces 
man; or in a more eminent degree, if it 
is an equivocal agent--thus in the sun 
is the likeness of whatever is generated 
by the sunts power ••.•• Since therefore 
God is the-first producing cause of all 
things, the perfections of all things 
must4~re-exist in God in a more eminent way. 
With some detail added from the use of analogy, this seems 
virtually a restatement of the argument that God exists 
because of his evident effects as First Cause.· 
Finally, God is perfect because in every genus there 
is some member 1"lhich is the most perfect member of that 
genus. It is in relation to this member that all other 
members must be arranged and classified. 
God is not related to creatures as though 
belonging to a different genus, but as 
transcending every genus, and as the 
principle of all genera.Lt-9 
This restates the argument for God 1 s existence on the 
basis of the gradations found in the thingswe experience. 
If it is the nature of God to be perfect, the 
question must still be raised as to the nature of his 
perfection. This question is only in part answered by the 
arguments which establish the fact of God 1 s perfection. 
And it is placed beyond really intelligible solution, 
4B. ST, I, ~-4, a.2. 
49. ST, I, q.4, a.J. 
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because the instrument of analogy is so corrupted by the 
appeal to negation. However, in speaking of the perfection 
of God Thomas seems to have in mind five elements: Godts 
simplicity, immutability, goodness, infinity, and unity. 
Concerning God's simplicity, we must make an 
initial distinction between kinds of simplicity. Whatever 
is simple among material things is a part of something else 
and thus imperfect. This is the simplicity of unactualized 
poten~iality, the simplicity of the idiot or the newborn 
babe. · The simplicity of God is the simplicity of realized 
perfection, of Pure Actuality, and is attended by the 
indepe~dence and freedom which marks such actuality.5° 
Perhaps the distinction ""V>rhich Thomas makes here is similar 
to the distinction which may be made between consistency 
and coherence in judgment. A narrow and rigid system may 
be purchased by excluding data to which it is difficult to 
give adequate organization. Not only does this minimal 
organization mark the personalities of young children whose 
abilities have not yet developed, a rigid system may be 
deliberately imposed as a defensive measure by neurotic 
adults. To say that God is not limited to this kind of 
simplicity is to say that he is a unity within multiplicity. 
This vital simplicity is able to unite the most diverse 
50. ST, I, q.J, a.?. 
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experiences with perfect coherence. 
However, while this interpretation would. make sense of 
Thomas's remarks on Godts simplicity, his :discussion of immutability 
contradicts it. The immutability of God is asserted despite the 
fact that he is the First Mover. 
First, because ••• there is some first being 
whom we call God, and that this being must be 
±n<pure act, without the admixture:of any 
potentiality, for the reason that, absolutely, 
potentiality is posterior to act. Now anything 
which is in anyway changed, is in some way in 
potentiality. Hence it is evident ·that it is 
impossible for God to change in any way. 
Secondly, because ever~thing which is moved 
remains in part as it was and in part passes 
away, as what is moved from whiteness to 
blackness remains the same as to substance •••• 
But it has been shown above that in God there 
is no composition, for he is altogether simple. 
Hence it is manifest that God cannot be moved. 
Thirdly, because everything which is moved 
acquires something by its movement, and attains 
to what it had not attained previously. But 
since God is infinite,· comprehending in himself 
all the plenitude of the perfection of all 
being, he cannot acquire anything new, nor extend 
himself to ~ything whereto he was not extended 
previously. 
If the equation of simplicity and coherence which 
we suggested above is valid, the simplicity of God would 
not demand that he be without composition. In fact, if 
God is conscious, and thus possesses the perfection of 
personality, his unity must be a complex one. Complexity 
would appear to be a defect only to a philesophy which 
seeks to formulate things in terms of substance rather 
thru1 process. The structure of the divine process may 
51. ST, I, q.9, a.l 
remain'constantly good and rational and still make fertile 
improvisations upon new data given to it by free beings 
created by it. If being is defined in terms of activity 
rather than in terms of substantiality, then the Being 
capable of the most coherent activity will be supreme. 
Such a Being would not be immutably simple but infinitel7 
capable of «acquiring something new, and extending himself 
whereto he was not extended previously.n52 
The effect of Thomas 1 s insistence upon the immu-
tability of God is to call into question the whole relation 
of God to the world. Thomas goes so far as to compare 
this relation to·that between an animal and a lifeless 
column. 
Since God i$ therefore outside the whole order 
of creation,-· and all creatures are ordered to 
him, and not conversely, it is manifest that 
creatures are really related to God himself; 
whereas in God there is no real relation to 
creatures, but a relation only in idea 
inasmuch as creatures are related to him. 
Thas there is nothing to prevent such names 
which import relation to the creature, from 
being predicated of God temporally, not by 
reason of any change in him, but by reason of 
the change.in the creature; as a column is on 
the right uo~ an animal , without change in 
itself, but because the animal has moved.53 
52. Hartsporne ~s a contemporary who would agree 
with this criticism, MV~ '· ,p.ll2-ll3, «That a being subject 
to change is therefore §~bject to decay or generation is 
a mere dogma, a non sequitur. It depends upon what kind of 
change is involved, or upon how the being is subject to 
change. 11 
53. ST, I, q.l3, a.?. 
6o 
It is hard to see how Thomas can maintain the changelessness 
of God and any kind of consciousness or personality for him. 
If a column knows the change, it changes. At this point 
Thomas does not seem consistent with his rejections of 
Neo-Platoni-sm. Empiricism would have kept him:·-closer to 
Plato himself, who in the Timaeus identified God with the 
cosmic Artisan. Here. Thomas seems to identify him with 
the Ideas. If involvement with the world costs God so 
little, moral quality would be robbed from it. 
Thomas makes a much stronger case at another point 
where he discusses the happiness of God. Here he sees 
God's operation as a much more ·vital affair: 
An intellectual nature desires and wills 
above all that which is most perfect in it, 
and this is its ··happiness: and the most · 
perfect thing in every being is its most 
perfect operation: for pdwer anq habit are 
perfected by opera~ion; wherefore the 
Philos?pher s~ys that hap~iness is a p~rfect 
operatJ.on LArJ.stotle, EthJ.cs, ll77.ab7. )4 
God thus can experience real happiness because he is 
capable of perfect operation. And in at least one place 
Thomas does not identify perfect operation with the kind 
of abstract simplicity indicated by the compari~on of 
God with,a lifeless column. 
The operation of a thing is twofold, as 
the Philosopher teaches /Aristotle, Metaphysics, 
1017b7; one that abides in the very worker 
and Is a perfection of the worker himself, 
< 
54. SCG, I, ch.lOO. 
61 
Such as to sense, to understand, and 
to will; and another that passes into an 
outward thing, and is a perfection of the 
thing made that results from it, such as 
to heat, to cut, and to build. 
Now both of the aforesaid operations are 
competent to God: the former, in that he 
understands, wills, rejoices., and lov~s; 
the latter, in that he brings forth things 
into being, preserves them, and rules them.55 
However, the 11 lifeless columnn passage is not the 
only one in which Thomas moves close to a block universe 
conception which would deny personality and knowledge to 
God and make natural development inexplicable. In another 
passage he says that since God is perfect and his works 
were completed on the seventh day of creation, there is a 
sense in which the physical world is perfect as well. 
The perfection of a thing is twofpld, the 
first perfection and the second perfection. 
The first perfection is that according to 
which a thing is substantially perfect, and 
this perfection is the form of the whole; 
which results from the whole having its parts 
complete. But the second perfection is the 
end, which is either an operation, qS the 
end of a harpist is to play the harp; or 
something that is atta~ned by an operation, 
as the end of a builder is the house that he 
makes by building. But the first perfection 
is the cause of the second, because the form 
is the principle of operation. Now the final 
perfection which is the end of the whole universe, 
is the perfect beatitude of the saints at the 
consummation of the world; and the first 
perfection is the completeness of the universe 
at its founding, ang6this is.what is ascribed 
to the seventh day. 
55. SCG, II, p~.l. 
56. ST, I, q.l3, ~.7. 
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Such a contention for the ncompleteness· of the universerr 
makes one incline to sympathize with A. 0. Lovejoy's 
criticism of Thomas at this point. He observes that 
Thomas's principles seem 
to be on the point of leading him into the 
heresy of admitting the complete correspondence 
of the realms of the possible and actual, with 
the cosmic determinism which this implies.)'! 
In trying to defend the sovereignty of God he veers close 
to the materialistic reductionism of Averroes. 
The third way in which God is perfect is in his 
goodness. trGoodness and being are really the same and 
differ only logically.n58 Goodness is the root of all 
activity, since it insures to being the element of 
desirability. 
The Philosopher says that is to be considered 
as the end and good of other~· beings, for the 
sake of which something is LAristotle, Physics, 
195.§:7· Therefore goodness has the aspect of a 
final cause. 
I answer that, since goodness is that which 
all things desire, and since this has the aspect 
of an end, a thing is perfect when it can 
reuroduce its like, ZMeteorology, 380aj.59 
Thomas makes an important point here in his claim that 
only goodness is fecund, that evil itself must depend 
upon it. Since God is perfect Thomas must deny that God 
57. Lovejoy, GCB, 81-82. 
58. ST, I, q.5, a.l. 
59. ST, I, q.5, a.4; see also I-II, q.75. a.4. 
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wills evil, ttsave accidentally.n This he urges against 
Pseudo-Dionysius and Hugh of St. Victor. The former had said: 
If things existing desire the Beautiful and 
the Good, and whatever they do they do for 
the sake of that which seems good, and every 
purpose of things existing has the Good for 
its beginning and end (for nothing looking to 
the Evil qua evil, does what it does), how60 shall the Evil be in things existing ••• ? 
Thomas replies that evil does actually exist, though God's 
-· 
willing of it is only permissive. But while this reply is 
a good one it bears strange relation to the equation which 
we have noted between goodness and being and his contention 
for the Divine immutability. He has said that insofar as 
a thing is ttrealn it is good and that all of God's creation-
is perfectly realized save for that final consummation not 
yet temporally apparent but already accomplished from 
eternity. From this we might conclude that evil is only 
apparent; the very thing which he denies in Pseudo-J1ionysius. 
Part of Thomas's difficulty here may be due to his 
failure to distinguish between moral evil and· natural evil. 
The statements that anyone wills evil to be 
and that he wills it not to be, are not 
/opposed as contradictories7 since either is 
affirmative. God therefore neither wills 
evil to be done, nor wills it not to be done; 
but he wills to
6
- permit it, to be done, and 
this is a good. l 
60. Pseudo-Dionysius, Divine Nemes, ch.iv, sec.l9. 
6l. ST, I, q.l9, a.9. 
It must be said, however, that while God's responsibility 
for evil may be mitigated by the ~act that he grants to 
man freedom and responsibility for moral choice, this does 
not relieve God of the responsibility for natural evil. 
If his creation is perfect, then natural evils are only 
illusory or contribute better than any alternative 
possibility to the perfection of the whole. Either reply 
contradicts Thomas 1 s empiricism and, in particular, his 
argument for the existence of God on the basis of the real 
gradations of perfection which we experience. 
As the fourth aspect of God 1 s perfection, Thomas 
joins it with a concept which Aristotle said clearly 
contradicted it, the concept of infinity. Aristotle 
declared that everything which is infinite is imperfect. 
Thomas replies: 
Th~ Philosopher is here speaking of an 
infinity belonging to matter not limited 
by form; ~d such infinity belongs to 
quantity. 2 
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Aristotle also declared that nno body is actually infinite.n63 
Since Thomas repeatedly points out that God is not a body 
this does not affect the infinity of God. Again Aristotle 
said that what is directed to an end is not infinite.64 
62. ST, I, q.25, a.2. 
63. Aristotle, Physics, 206a 8. 
64. Aristotle, Politics, 1257b 27. 
This Thomas does not challenge, but since God is the End 
of all things Thomas can consistently.-maintain that there 
is a sense in which God has no ends of his own: God is 
complete actuality. 
Not only did Aristotle deny that infinity could be 
actual, he also contended that if it is existent it would 
be unknowable. 
Now the infinite qua infinite is unknowable, 
so that what is infinite multitude or size 
is unknowable in quantity, and what is infin:i,:te 
in variety of kind is unknowable in quality.b5 
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Thomas replies that the case is entirely different-~th God. 
God is called infinite because he is a form 
unlimit-ed by matter; whereas in material 
things, the term infinite is applied to that-·· 
which is deprived of any formal termination.66 
He elsewhere sharpens the distinction between the infinity 
which belongs to matter and that which belongs to God by 
noting the distinction already explored between the analogy 
of proportion and the analogy of proportionality. The 
analogy of proportionality compares only the relationship 
betweer+ the elements appropriate to each of the beings in 
the analogy. Since it is through the analogy of 
' 
proportionality that we attain to ,knowledge of God, God is 
not said to be absolutely infinite, but infinite only in 
65. Aristotle, Physics, lB7b 7-10; also see 
Metaphysics, 994;b. 
66. ST, I.,. q.86, a.2. 
regard to those perfections appropriate to himself.67 
It would seem, however, that the analogy of 
proportionality would provide little help in maintaining a 
distinction between the infinity of God and the infinity of 
matter. For one of the arguments for the existence of God 
was that he possesses in superlative degree all of the 
perfections which we experience in gradation, and one of 
the arguments for GodTs perfection was that the possesses 
all ttnobilities.n 
The negativitY stemming from the Pseudo-Dionysian 
influence seems to be the chief element in evidence here. 
Thus all that the analogy goes to mean is that, a priori, 
God must lack all of our imperfections. Since he'possesses 
all perfections in superlative degree a contradiction in 
attributes appears to be possible. God cannot be the sum 
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of all being without his personality, goodness, and rationality 
being drowned in the process. Hindu thinkers like Shankara 
frankly sacrifice personality to the Absolute and approach it 
with aesthetic immediacy and appreciation. But the Hindu 
pantheist is in a position which cannot be disturbed by the 
contradictions produced by this; Thomas is not. 
Thomas succeeds better in giving some meaning to the 
concept of an infinite perfection in another regard. It has 
67. SCG, III, ch~54· 
been seen that God's goodness was one meaning of his 
perfection; Thomas also gives this meaning to Godts 
infinity. 
Infinity cannot be ascribed to God in respect 
of multitude, seeing that it has been proved 
that there is but one God, • • • nor may we say 
that he is infinite in respect of continuous 
quantity, since we have sho-wn that he is 
incorporeal •••• 
Spir{tual magnitude is referable to ti'ITO things: 
namely to power, and to the goodness or perfection 
of a thing's very nature •••• Wherefore spiritual 
things are.said to be great according to their 
degree of perfection,; for Augustin.e says that in 
~hings which are gre~t.not by ?ulk~ tgnbe great 
J.S to be good LDe TrJ.nJ.tate, VJ.~ · ,&! • 0 
Not only does Thomas defend the knowability of an 
! 
Infinite Being, he advances a positive argument for such 
68 
a being on the basis of psychology. Our discussion of his 
theory of knowledge has anticipated this point. There he 
shows the dialectic at work in the process whereby our minds 
grope toward their last end. 69 In the same chapter Thomas 
sets forth two passages which strikingly recall the dialectic 
in Augustine's Confessions, and the·dynamic mot~vation, if 
not the rationalistic framework, of Anselmts ontological 
argument for God. 
Our intellect reaches the infinite in 
understanding: a sign of which is that given. 
any finite quantity our intellect can imagine 
a greater. Now it would be to no purpose for 
the ~tellect to be thus directed to the 
68. sen, I, ch.4J. 
69. SCG, I, ch.43; also see III, ch.50. 
infinite unless there were infinite intelligible 
being. Therefore there must be some infinite 
intelligible thing, which must needs be the 
greatest of all beings: and this we call God. 
Therefore God is infinite. 
Again: 
An effect cannot extend beyond its cause. 
Now our intellect cannot but be from God, 
1~o is the first cause of all things. 
Therefore our intellect cannot think of 
anything greater than God. If then it is 
possible to think of something greater 
than every finite thing, it follows that 
God is not finite. 
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It would seem to be possible to agree with much of 
Thomas's position here without denying the validity of the 
Aristotelian vievrs which he rejects. In--the final chapter 
the possibility that there is in our experience that which 
drives it toward higher and higher levels·of self-completion, 
or coherence, or personality will be exploredat some 
length. But even if that is established, one must continue 
to agree with Aristotle that it transcends our experience 
to conceive a being in whom all levels of completion have 
been actualized. A being perfectly undetermined, unlimitedly 
complete, with unlimited power but no potentiality, may 
exist, but he could be known through none of the usucll 
avenues of knowledge. It is necessary at this point to 
abandon experience as Thomas has done and have recourse 
to the via eminentiae and the via negativa. And it is 
obvious that this leads Thomas back to the apriorism he 
rejected in Anselm, or even the obscurantism of Pseudo-
Dionysius. 
On this basis Thomas 1 s final point on the perfection 
of God, his unity, may be quickly granted. This Thomas 
asserts on the basis that there could exist in the universe 
only one being of such completeness as he has described. 
Plurality implies some ground for difference and since God 
lacks nothing there can be nothing outside him to constitute 
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such difference. This follows quite easily from what 
Thomas has argued before. Thus if it is to be challenged 
it must be by taking issue with the existence of such a 
being in the first place. 
Since Thomas grounds his ethics, as well as the 
rest of his system, upon his metaphysics, the extensive 
implications of this view of God for his ethical philosophy 
will appear in the next chapter. Suggestions of the ways 
that moral experience may support or modify his view of God 
should also be carefully watched for. 
70. ST, q.ll, a.J. 
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CHAPTER III 
PERFECTION IN THO¥~'S ETHICS 
A. Thomasts Definition of the Good 
Study of Thomas's metaphysics revealed that for him 
a thing has more being, more reality, insofar as it is the 
more perfect. The actual and the complete are the same. 
Thomas's ethics is solidly based upon his metaphysics; 
therefore he defines the Good in the same way. A thing is 
good insofar as it·achieves its end and is perfect. 
Conversely, a thing is evil insofar as it ~ails to achieve 
its end, its being, its perfection. 
A thing is evih. not according as it ;i:s ·· in 
act, but according as its potentiality is 
deprived of act; whereas insofar as potentiality 
is perfected by act, it is good, as is stated 
in Metaphysics, IX. Therefore nothing acts 
insofar as it is evil, but only as it is good. 
Therefore every action is good, and none is 
evil. 
Thomas does not provide for the possibility that evil 
also represents the actualization of potentialities. Good, 
as well as evil, may come from the failure to actualize 
potentialities. The failure to «actn is an action and 
carries with it moral responsibility. But sometimes 
acquiescence is the best possible action and therefore is 
good. Thomas does not clarify this point, though it would 
1. ST, I-II, q.l8, a.l, obj.2. 
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·be possible for him to do so and still remain 'in harmony 
with much of the rest· of his thought. If he had made it 
clear that what·he aimed· to perfect was not every act, nor 
simply nBeingtt in general, but, rather, personal beings, he 
could have given clearer guidance as to which acts are good. 
Failure of a gun to fire is neviltt when taken in regard to 
an intended· murder.· Since for Thomas God is the perfection 
of all potentialities, it is "eviltt even for· God. Such are 
the difficulties which arise from a failUre to distinguish 
betwe~n God;· an existent··person, and the Absolute, the 
subsistent sum of all possibilities. Such, also, are the 
difficulties which arise fromnot clearly seeing that 
personality is the pattern of moral perfection. But these 
are things which can better be treated in the constructive 
argument of the last chapter. 
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The ethical and social implications of this gradation 
of being are similar to those of the doctrine of the ttdegrees 
of truthtt espoused by such absolute idealists as .Bosanquet 
and Bradley. Bradley set forth these implications in the 
famous essay tfJJiy Station and Its· Duties. n2 He holds that 
the perfect'ion of the·Absolute is accomplished through the 
necessary realization of vocation by each being. 
Thomas makes a comparable emphasis upon a hierarchy 
2. Bradley, ES, 145. 
of vocations wherein each person derives his Tights from 
God throughthe social orders which God·has·ordained. No 
man can be freewho claims moral autonomy. There can be 
no freedom to error and evil, and no Christian institution 
should recognize claims to the right to commit them. Evil 
is negation and bondage. Freedom is a_positive and 
participative thing. A being is free only so far as it 
has attained· actuality; therefore an evil and untrue being 
in a literal sensedoes not ttexist,n so can scarcelybe 
morally free. Since only God exists perfectly, only God is 
truly good and free. God 1 s goodness is defined by his 
self-sufficiency~3 Mants goodness, on the contrary, is 
defined by his participation in the being of God. Each 
man is sustained by a natural order of law, and ultimately 
by a supernatural order of grace, whether he admits it or 
not. This definition of the Good and moral freedom has 
other consequences which the absolute idealist fully admits 
but which Thomas does not seem to realize. The definition 
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pushes him much further toward thorough monism and even 
pantheism than he recognizes. But the emphasis upon positive 
freedom suggests-a way to transcend the conception of Godts 
perfection as self-sufficiency which will be developed at 
length in the final chapter. 
3· Lovejoy, GCB, p;assim, points out the contradiction 
between the conception of God as self-sufficient and the 
necessity for him to create. 
B. Perfection Attainable in This Life 
Thomas asserted the possibility of moral perfection 
in this life against three positions. First, there were 
the materialists who argued that the present space-time 
order is self-completing and that there is no end beyond 
it. The ends as well as the beginnings. of our choices are 
parts of an unbroken chain of material causes and effects. 
There is a sense in which materialism denies intrinsic· 
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values. J:!;ven man is simply an instrument to the self-
completing whole. Moral values are no 11higher11 thaR any 
other activity wgereby the space-time order completes ttself. 
Thomas denies that our values are without transcendent aim 
.and that the space-time order is so complete as to demand no 
explanation of itself. (Thomas 1 s position here is documented 
ih section D of this chapter.) He holds that some values 
are unique and that na,tural values are for their sake. 
Second, there were ascetic perfectionists who denied 
.. 
that moral values can really be achieved within the natural 
order. {Thomas 1 s defense of the natural virtues appears. in 
section G of this· chapt~;r.) l!:very man has more dutmes than 
he can possibly perform .so long as he is impeded by his 
physical body. In tl)is.life our wisest course is to withdraw 
from the natural order as far as possible and cultivate a 
supernatural, uspiritualnperfection. This attainment of per-
fection by reduction of the scope of values to be cultivated 
is a common goal of religious sects and monastic groups. The 
Platonic denial of the reality of appearance furnished a philosophica 
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basis for such practice. 
Third; there· were those who shared the distrust of 
appearance philosophically fostered by the Platonists and 
who had resort to a total reliance upon God and supernatural 
grace. These antinomians declared it was completely hopeless 
to try to balance merit to our duties. Some revelationists 
in our day as well as in Thomas's abandon good works as well 
as reason to prove their trust in divine grace. 
In common with other advocates of moral perfection, 
Thomas found·it·necessary to define carefully the degree 
and quality of the perfection attainable in this life. 
This problem is faced in Hinduism and Buddhism as well 
as by advocates of ttChristian perfection. tr4 Confronted 
with the three alternatives discriminated above, Thomas 
notes three kinds of perfection. The first·kind of 
perfection is that found in God alone, absolute perfection. 
The second is the total possible· love for God. An eternity 
is necessary for this, and therefore it is an evidence for 
the transcendent end of this life. 
The third perfection refers to the removal 
of obstacles to the movement of love toward 
God. • • • Such perfection may be had in 
this life, and in two ways. First by the 
removal from mants affections of all that 
is contrary to love, such as mortal sin; 
and there can be no love apart from this 
perfection, and therefore it is necessary 
4. Cf. C.A.F. Rhys Davids, Art. uperfection 
(Buddhist) ,n ERE, IX, 727-728. 
for salvation. Secondly, by the removal 
from man 1 s affections, not only what is 
contrary·to love, but also of whatever 
hinders the mindts affections from tending 
wholly to God. Love is possible apart 
from this perfection, for instance in those 
who are beginners, and in those who are 
proficient.5 
Thus it appears that after defining the Good as perfect 
being, Thomas defines the perfection of goodness in this 
life as perfect love. In common with many other advocates 
of a perfection of love it will appear that more emphasis 
is placed upon nthe removal of obstactles 11 such as 
selfishness and sensuous indulgence than apon actualization 
of new areas of expression. Here a closer reliance upon 
Aristotle from whom he got his basic definition of moral 
\,.;,. 
goodness would have saved him from incoherence. 
Thomas's solution is no more unusual to the field of 
religious ethics than was his problem. Hindu ethics as it 
is influenced by the Bhagavad Gita teaches that the holy man 
(sannyasi) can achieve his perfection through devotion and 
love (bhakti) even though he is limited in intellect or 
chooses not to follow the way of works or of extreme 
asceticism. The moral ideal of Hinayana Buddhism is the 
. arhat, who renounces selfish desire in order to know even 
while still in the flesh the bliss of Nirvana. The love 
expressed by the arhat is chiefly confined to the negative 
5. ST, II~II, q.l84, a.2. 
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aspect of overcoming selfishness, which was seen al?ove as 
perfection by reduction and withdrawal. The negative way 
in theology has its parallel in ethics. Thomas seems to 
waver between·this ideal and that of the bodhisattva of 
77 
Mahayana Buddhism, who, having made himself worthy of Nirvana:,. 
renounces it in·order to do positive good for others. 
Within his own Christian tradit·ion, Thomas has clear 
Biblical support for his emphasis upon perfect·love. The 
Sermon on the Mount is climaxed by the injunction to be 
perfect as our Father in Heaven is perfect (Matt. 5:48). 
Since the Heavenly Father has just been described as one 
who makes his rain to fall upon the just and the unjust, 
it seems evident that the New Testament w-riter exhorts to a 
perfection of love, not to the other attributes of Deity. 
Recent Protestant students of perfection, R. Newton Flew 
arid W. E. Sangster, have both felt it unfortunate .,that the 
leading Pro·testant exponent of Christian perfection, John 
Wesley, did not more consistently adhere to the term :perfect 
] ... ove. It is clearly the kind of nperfection" Wesley had in 
mind, but he often used terms implying more than perfection 
of intent and so ha's. been cpicatured· as advocating a sinless 
perfection, or even absolute perfection of judgment and 
charismatic gifts of power. 6 Thomas Aquinas as well as 
6. Sangster, PP, cb..X; Flew, IP, ch.XIX and XXII. 
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others who have employed the concept has. difficulty in keeping 
it in focus. When he moves on to other concepts he severely 
compromises the idea of a perfection of love. This·seems 
regrettabJe,: since a perfection of love allows a great deal of 
development in the content of character. 
C. Defense of the Natural Virtues 
Thomas-makes stout attack upon· those who would push 
Augustinian dualism to ascetic extremes· and achieve r.e rfection 
through reduction and withdrawal. He holds that the flesh is 
not evil. He is far from contempt for the material conditions 
of our existence. ·He admits that the body is occasionally 
an impediment to the perfection of the spirit. But he 
argues that the spirit can attain a higher degree of 
perfection for having had. a body than if it had not had 
one. Thomas seems to be on secure ground here for he can 
call to support t·he creation of the world by the Divine 
Spirit. In his discussion of immortality he places great 
stress upon the necessity for the resurrection of the body. 
A higher degree of perfection will be possible to us in the 
next life just because we shall have bodies and shall not be 
disembodied spirits. 
Now the more perfect a thing is .in being, 
the more perfectly it is able to·operate; 
wherefore the operation of the soul united 
to such a body will be more perfect than 
the operation of a separated soul. But the 
glorified body will be a body of this 
description, being altogether subject to. the 
sp±rit. Therefore, since happiness consists 
in an operation, the soul's happiness after 
its reunion witb the body.will be more perfect 
than before. ·1 
Like the positive freedom doctrine, this high valuation 
of the body should have done much to mitigate the fo·rmalism 
of Thomas's ethics and the self-sufficiency of God's 
perfection. Unfortunately, he neither extends its usage 
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nor consistently holds to his protest against·· the exaggerated 
Augustinian dualism betweBn mind· and body. Reservations 
begin to appear and passages which glorify the monastic, 
contemplative life honor the body much less than passages 
8 such as those above.· 
Thomas had also to defend the natural virtues 
against those who would reject them on antinomian grounds. 
Those who posit an impossibly high standard of perfection 
and use it as an excuse for denying the virtue of all moral 
effort have been in the Christian Church since the time of 
St. Paul. Paul rebuked those who proposed· to "sin that 
grace might more abound." Such extreme abdication of moral 
autonomy was exploited more fully afterThomas Aquinas's 
time by a minority of Protestants who sought to magnify 
n justification by faith" by d:espit·ing the filthy rags of 
7. ST, III, q.93, a.ll. 
8. ST, I-II, q.4, a.6; this inconsisten9y is explored 
at some length in Section E of this chapter. 
works.9 Even to Martin Luther the Epistle of James was, 
because of its stress upon ethical conduct, a trright strawy 
epistle.n 
Thomas detected suggestions of this view in 
Pseudo-Dionysius and Augustine and explicitly refutes it. 
Dionysius says: TTEvil would conduce to the 
perfection of everything," i.e. the universe. 
And Augustine says: nout of all things is 
built up the admirable beauty of the universe, 
wherein even that Which is called evil, properly 
ordered and disposed, co~nends the good the more 
evidently, so that the good be more pleasing and 
praiseworthy when contrasted with evil.n ••• 
I answer that ••• evil does not conduce to 
perfection and beauty of the universe except 
accidentally •••• Therefore in saying that 
evil would conduce to the perfection of the 
universe, Dionysius draws his concl5sion as 
the consequence of false premises. 
Thomas goes on to argue that evil is never sought for its 
So 
own sake, but accidentally, as it accompanies a good. God can 
derive good from even an evil situation. In the words of the 
PsaLmist, he ttmakes the wrath of men to praise him. n One is 
inclined to conclude from Thomas's argument, though he himself does 
not spell out the implication, that it is better to foster the 
perfection of thli1gs about us (do good) though such activity is 
attended with imperfections (evil). The perfection of ourselves 
and our environment is an ideal which is more perfect when 
9. LaPiana, Art. (1952), 404-409, shows how a reaction 
to Protestant overemphasis on grace led Catholic thinkers of 
the Counter-Reformation into a similar antinomianism through an 
overemphasis upon authority. 
10. ST, I, q.l9, a.9, obj.2. 
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joined with existence. ·· This should be true even of God. 
ThomasTs system would have heen stronger if he had made this 
explicit instead of insisting upon Godts·self-sufficiency. 
It is clear that Thomas recognizes the pantheism 
implicit in any blunting of the distinction between good 
and evil. Y~t it is not clear that he can easily free 
himself from the consequences of his o'Wll·espousal of 
· degrees of being. Absolute idealists speak as warmly as 
Pseudo-Dionysius of the rrecess·ity of evil. They can do 
this because they do not consider the realm of appearances 
to be important. But· Thomas draws evidence from the realm 
of appearance and argues that spirit should be materially 
embodied. Since God is perfect in every attribute and nature 
is a necessary expression of his perfection, the natural 
evil which we experience must·be deliberately planned by 
God to contribute to the grace and perfection of the whole. 
Pseudo-Dionysius is more consistent than Thomas is. 
Metaphysically we are confronted with a kind of cosmic 
antinomianism if we insist on the absolute perfection of God. 
Thomas is to·be commended for not drawing these implications 
for his ethics. Considering the Close connect~ons between 
his metaphysics and his ethics it is all the. more remarkable 
that he did not· do so. However, the absoluteness· of God 
does seriously affect his ethics, as further study will 
clearly indicate. 
D. Assertion of an End· Beyond this Life 
Thomas found· it necessary to defend not only the 
attainability of a degree of moral perfection· in this life 
amid the ordina·ry c·onditions of existence, but also the 
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goal of a perfection which extends beyond this space-time 
order. His task here was the refutation of the naturalistic 
interpretation of Aristotle. 
Natural desire cannot be empty, since nature 
does nothing in vain /Aristotle, De Caelo, 
29lb 137. But man's desire would be empty 
if it could never be fulfilled. Therefore 
man's natural desire can be fulfilled. But 
not.in this life, as we have shown. Therefore 
it must be fu+filled after this life. 
Therefore man's ultimate happiness is after 
this life~ll . 
Happiness is elsewhere defined as ttperfect operation 
according to perfect virtue. n12 This of course is close.r 
to the original meaning of the English word "happiness" 
than the connotation it usually receives. It' is the fit, 
the appropriate.l3 Man cannot· perfectly attain that spiritual 
development fitting to his unique status as man until the 
. ~next life.14 
Thomas recognizes a kind of :psychic .. dialectic which 
11. SCG, III, ch.J+8; also see ch.42 and 43. 
12. ST, I-II, q.5l, a.2. 
13. Oxford Dictionary, v, 79-$0. 
14. A good recent Roman Catholic discussion of 
man's last end is Buckley, MLE. 
83 
is reminiscent of Augustine's "our heart.s·are restless 
until they find·rest in Thee.n ·He uses this dialectic both 
~ an ethical doctrine and as a metaphysical argument for 
God and immortality. A c_ontemporary comparison is· the 
dialectic of desire developed by E.Q.gar Sheffield Brightman.1 5 
Like Thoma9, Brightman refutes· the finalities· of the 
naturalistic ethic on grounds avilable to the naturalist's 
own experience. Every man, philosophically naturalistic or 
not, must feel a drive toward the completion and integration 
of his experience. Thomas says: 
Besides, as longas a thing is in motion 
towards perfection, it has not reached its 
last end. Now in the knowledge of truth all 
men are always in motion and tending towards 
perfection, because those who follow make 
discoveries in addition to those made by 
their predecessors, as is also stated in 
the MetkEhysics, II ~93a 317. Therefore 
in the owledge of truth man is not situated 
as though he had arrived at his last end.~6 
It sh-ould be noted that naturalists accept Thomas's 
interpretation of Aristotle no more than they accept 
Thomas's own position. A contemporary naturalist like 
Harold Hantz, quoted in the first chapter, who stre·sses 
nthe biological motivation of .Aristotle,n would not agree 
that the ·contemplation of truth is .Aristotle's conception 
of the last end of man. Man is a biological organism which 
15. Brightman, POR, 251-259· 
16. SCG, III, ch~48. 
simply seeks its "end," its completion, by functioning 
in this space-time order.· Thomas could well f'eel that he 
waged a war on two f'ronts, against those on the one hand 
who would deny the natural values which man shares with the 
rest of' animal creat·ion, and against those on the other 
hand who assert these natural values to be the primary 
values. Thomas's battle was f'or an adequate range of' 
values. 
E. The Distinctions among the Virtues 
In his theory of' knowledge, Thomas divided natural 
theology f'rom revealed theology. The distinction is also 
applicable to his ethics. Our natural reason is competent 
to give us our responsibilities under the natural law which 
binds all men, even those without the light of' revelation. 
Nat ural reason can also mci..ke us aware of' the need f'or the 
gif't of grace necessary to salvation. 
We must say that no one can know the eternal 
law as it is in itself', except God and the 
blessed who see God in his essence. But every 
rational creature knows it according to some 
reflection, greater or less. For every knowledge 
of' truth is a kind of' reflection and participation 
of' the eternal law, which is the unchangeable 
truth, as Augustine says /.Yera Rel. xxxi7. Now 
all men know the truth to a certain extent, at 
least as to the common principles of' the natural 
law.l7 
Thomas of course faces the usual problems in sustaining the 
17. ST, I-II, q.93, a.2. 
generalization contained in the last sentence of this 
quotation. Confronted with evidence that some men are 
confused he must reply npotentially, n or nman qu& man. tt 
The virtues are even more precisely discriminated. 
There are those virtues which are attainable in this life 
and those which are attainable only in an after-life. 
Among those attainable in this life there are the virtues 
attainable by all and there are the counsels of perfection 
(poverty, chastity, and obedience) applicable only to 
.. 
those under religious vows. Among the virtues attainable 
by all there are the theological virtues (faith, hope, and 
love) understood only through revelation and attainable 
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only by those enjoying the sacramental grace of the Church, 
and there are the natural virtues (justice, wisdom, courage 
and temperance) for which all rational enough to comprehend 
the natural law are responsible. The natural virtues will 
be recognized as the familiar cardinal virtues of the Greeks. 
Further, the same virtue may have different merit as it 
appears in the context of a different character, or a 
character at a different level of perfection. Virtues 
considered in this way are called exemplar virtues and a 
distinction is made between perfecting virtues ("virtues 
of men who are on their way and tending towards the divine 
similituden), and perfect virtues ( 11 the virtues ·of those 
who have already attained to the divine likeness11 ). 
A graph may clarify these distinctions:18 
Virtues 
Attainable in 
this li/ 
~ 
.Attainable by all/ 
I'jaturll virtues {wisdom, courage, 
temperance and 
justice) 
Attainable only to 
those under special 
vows (counsels of 
perfection) 
Theological virtues (faith, hope and love) 
Attainable in 
an after-life 
(Perfect love 
_ for God)l9 
Thomas in the main approves of the primacy which he 
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assumes that Aristotle gives to contemplation. But it becomes 
increasingly evident that he admires more the withdrawal which 
it implies than its use of reason as a means to virtue. 
Thomas challenges the assumed Greek equation of knowledge 
and virtue. He remarks that Augustine t s statement that 
"virtue is the rectitude and perfection of reason /~olil. 
I, 67, 11 is based upon the "Socraticrr fallacy of equating 
reason and virtue. 20 Therefore, while he defends the natural 
18. ST, I-II, q.61 and 62. 
19. Thomas does not make it clear whether perfect 
love for God can be attained before the (non-existent) end 
of eternity. Since God has an infinite past as well as an 
infinite future the problem becomes all the more difficult. 
Here again logic seems to point to pantheistic absorption. 
20. ST, I-II, q.58, a.2, obj.J. 
virtues against antinomian and ascetically perfectionistic 
deprecations of them, he resists any simple identification 
of them with the ttnatural light of reasonn if mere prudence 
or jus gentium is intended by this. This he contends would 
make them an end completely attainable in this life. 
Thomas is more suspicious of the identification of 
reason and virtue than he needs to be. He has within his 
own system ample protection against a naturalistic ethic and 
does not need to appeal to revelation for protection against 
it. The psychic dialectic noted in an earlier section o£ 
this chapter transcended the naturalist~s conclusions on 
the naturalist's own terms. One can agree with Thomas that 
to lmoi!-r is not the same as to do and still feel that here 
as elsewhere he is unduly afraid of the empirical use of 
reason which he often so effectively suggests. 
In fact, several points are now obvious which greatly 
neutralize Thomasts corrections upon an other-worldly 
dualism and move him toward a contraction of his conception 
of perfection. Christian perfection becomes for him, as 
it does for so many others who advocate it, not the 
integration of the whole of our experience in reason and 
love, but the intensive and ascetic nspiritualizationtt of 
a narrow range of experience. Thomas, too, is an advocate 
of perfection by reduction and withdrawal, despite evidence 
and even argument to the contrary. 
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The asceticism of Thomas's ethics is the more 
striking in that it comes despite the elements of Aristotelian 
functionalism and evolutionism in his metaphysics. Natural 
law is a more important factor in his ethics than it is in 
the ethics of Aristotle, and this natural law is formalistic-
ally defined and supernaturally justified. This seems clearly 
the result of Thomas's insistence upon the absolute perfection 
of God. It remains to be proved, but in the light of the 
effects upon Thomas's system it may reasonably be doub:t;ed 
that any but a formalistic ethic can be combined with a 
metaphysics maintaining the absolute perfection of God. 
A "self-realizationn or "perfectionisticn interpretation 
of our moral experience seems to be inconsistent with the 
absolute perfection of God. So far as Thomas and Aristotle 
are consistent with the absoluteness of God they are not 
really perfectionistic in their ethics. 
Thomas's advocacy of perfection by reduction becomes 
evident in the first place in the fact that the virtues 
attainable through the natural light of reason have no 
saving merit. Moral autonomy is abandoned. Salvation comes 
only through the grace mediated (substantially) by the 
sacraments of the Church. Participationin the mass-brings 
a literal infusion of the divine substance into the communicant. 
Outside the Church there is no salvation. The theological 
virtues are the fruit of this salvation and are possible 
only to those receiving the enablement of God's revealed Church.21 
In the second place, while salvation is possible apart 
from vows and religious orders, Thomas makes it clear that 
"the religious staten is the way to perfection and the 
only really safe condition.22 '!That man merits more from 
God who acts under vow thfu1 he who is not under any such 
obligation.n23 A hierarchy of perfection is set up by 
Thomas in both the De Perfectione and the Summa Theologica. 
Inconsistent with his stress upon contemplation and monastic 
withdrawal, he sets ecclesiastical officials such as bishops 
first because they are nperfectersn of others. Religious 
orders are second in rank; parish priests and archdeacons 
are third. The layman, pursuing a vocation in the world, 
does not appear at all. Perfection is not possible .for 
him: his activities are outside the scope of what can be 
perfected. This is, of course, inconsistent with the 
.feudal "My Station and Its Duties" motif noted at the first 
of the chapter. More serious is the fact that the counsels 
perfection (poverty, chastity, and obedience), idealizing 
withdrawal, are ranked higher than the theological virtues 
(faith, hope, and love). The essence of the perfection 
21. ST, I-II, q.62 and 63. 
22. ST, II-II, q.l84, a.8. 
23. De Perf., ch.XII. 
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attainable in this life was said to be perfect love, but 
when it comes to distinguishing among the virtues love takes 
second rank to ~( virtue like poverty. This is the secret 
of the strange reinterpret~tion of the nature of love which 
is noted below. 
The ambivalence of Thomas's conception of love merits 
close attention. While he does not disparage the life of 
active social participation in· the way that the Platonic 
dualists had done,., he does see its chief merit as a 
p.reparation for contemplation. 2 4 We· have seen that he 
values contemplation chiefly for the withdrawal afforded 
by it. In some passages he bluntly minimizes active social 
participation.25 In other passages he states that the 
perfect life must have social dimensions. 
A thing is most perfect when it can make 
another like unto itself. That shines " 
perfectly which can illuminate other things.29 
This is most explicit in regard to God, though in view of 
the close metaphysical basis of Thomas's ethics it would 
seem to apply to man as well. 
Love, joy, delight ••• are in God ••• 
Love causes the lover· to wish the beloved 
2Ip ST, II-II, q.l8l, a.l; q.l82, a.2, 
28.. ST, II-II, q.l81, a.ly. 
26 .. SCG, III, ch.21 end. 
and a .. ly. 
' 
good, ••• Love is the unitive force, even 
in God ..... So far love is a binding force 
since it aggregates another to ourselves and 
prefers his good to our own.2~ 
God, the cause of all things, by his abounding 
love and goodness is placed outside him?~lf by 
his providence for all·existing things." ', 
·* "'< ·* It pert~ins to·the nature of the will to· 
communi;cate to others as far as possible 
tb,e goed possessed; and especially does 
this pertain to the· divine will, from which 
all perfe~iion is derived in some kind of 
likeness. : . 
Asceticism would not necessarily have compromised 
Thomas's emphasis upon the.creativity of love if he had 
firmly kept in mind its· instrumental character, inst·ead of 
placing it at the apex of his hierarchy of values. The 
remarks of C. J. Cadoux on the dualism of the modern Roman 
Catholic philosopher Baron von Hugel are relevant here: 
If it had only been recognizee: from the first 
that poverty and·celibacy have no moral value 
apart from the special service they sometimes 
enable the ascetic to render, that close 
communion with God does not demand abstention 
from hard work, and that gentleRess is no 
reckless surrender of human affairs into the 
hands of ruffians but·the only effective way 
of abolishing ruffianism, the whole raison 
dt~tre of this2~ualistic view would never have appeared. · · 
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A measure both ofhis lack of concern for the total person 
and his substitution·of formalism for perfectionism in ethics 
is found in the fact that Thomas gave no teleological 
2(/. ST, I, q.20, a.l. 
2'$. ST, I, q.20, a •. 2·. 
Z@. Cadoux, Art. (1923). 
justification-for asceticism. 
A possible ground of mediation between the ideal of 
monastic withdravral and the so·cial dimension of perfection 
92 
is found in the doctrine of supererogation, with its 
corollary doctrines of the treasury of grace and :i,ncl:ulgences. · 
Withdrawal and social concern might be consistent if the 
excess merit· accruing to an ascetic could be assigned to 
another _person of defective virtue. But the· ·obviously 
substantialistic overtones of such transactionalism present 
even graver problems of their own. This substantialism has 
been noted before, as well as its-tendency to compromise 
the uniqueness of personality. That virtue and grace should 
be a commodity to be invested and reassigned is as immoral 
a conception as antinomianism. Such phrases· as ttthe divine 
will from which all perfection is derivedtt further support 
this substantialistic interpretation. Formalism is the· 
mildest epithet for such a commercial and legalistic 
contretemps. And this·substantial derivation of the Good 
further supports the tendency toward pantheism already noted. 
Other students· of Christian perfection have noted 
this substantialistic tendency among its advocates. Some 
of the figures of speech that the·· Protestant John Wesley and" 
his followers used in describing the tteradicationtt of sin 
strongly suggest a literal thinghood of sin. Sangster has 
to go to great length to make.it clear that the process of 
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replacing sin with goodness is not like ttpulling a tooth.nPO 
Hypostatization- of s·in and virtue do not· appear to be 
necessary to a belief in moral perfection. But it is not 
clear that this has been recognized by some of its leading 
advocates. 
Whatever ambivalence is present· in Thomas ·concerning 
the social nature of the perfection of·love attainable in 
this lifeJ there is no-ambivalence regarding the unsocial 
nature of the perfection in that after-life which is mants 
last end. This perfection is in no way conceived to be 
social. So we read: 
If we speak of the happiness of this life, a 
happy man needs friends. • • that he may do 
good to them; that he may delight in seeing 
them do good; and again that he may be helped 
by them in his goed work. • • • 
But if we speak of perfect happiness which 
will be in our heavenly Fatherland, the 
fellowship of friends is not essential to 
happiness; since man has the entire fulness 
0f his perfection in God. But the fellowship 
of friends conduces to the well being of 
happiness •••• 
Perfection of charity is essential to happiness, 
as to the love of God, but not as to the love 
of our neighbor. Wherefore if there were but 
one soul enjoying God, it WQ~ld be happy, though 
having no neighbor to love. ji' 
A perfection of love complete and happy (nperfect operation 
in accord with perfect· virtuett) rrthough having no neighbor 
_3{J. Sangster, PP, ch .XIV. 
):\1:. ST, I-II, q.4, a.8; Cf. Maritain, DK, 394.. 
to lovetr is a .strange love indeed. This seems to be the 
culminating effect of the attribution of absolute perfection 
to God. ffLovett must become a kind of transcendent carelessness 
if it is to be made compatible with the absoluteness of a 
God related to his creation "as a lifeless column. u 32 It 
taxes one's imagination to understand how a person perfected 
in love could really be happy about God's ethical favoritism 
to him and about God's relatively unloving and anti-social 
nature. 
Such a criticism of the systematic use of the concept 
of perfection by Thomas Aquinas carries with it the 
responsibility for constructive development of the standpoint 
from which it was made. But ffirst we may discover material 
for that reconstruction in contemporary thought affecting 
the concept of perfection. 
CHAPTER IV 
RECENT DEVELOPI~NT OF THE IDEA OF PERFECTION 
It was shown in the first chapter that the thought-
patterns in Thomas Aquinas 1 s day were strikingly similar to 
those of the present. Regarding the concept of perfection, 
there remain the five possibilities which Thomas faced. 
Mechanists expound a perfection without purpose, complete 
within the present space-time order. Rationalistic idealists 
argue for a transcendentally perfect order, of which the 
present space-time order is an imperfect and distorted copy. 
Positivists and pragmatists deny the objective significance 
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of such concepts as that of perfection. Revelational 
theologians doubt the necessity of coherently integrated 
concepts of conduct and world-order. Theists with motivations 
similar to those of Thomas try to find empirical evidence 
for the perfect control of the world by God. Modifying the 
approach of this last group are those who, like the author of 
th:;Ls dissertation, are trying to rethink on an empirical basis 
the concept of perfection and God's relation to the world. 
A. Mechanism: Perfection Without Purpose. 
A fascinatingly recurrent theme in the history of thought 
is the advocacy of perfection[fE Ae.Lo'] without purpose['!Erios}, 
the concept of ttendsn without goals. Considering the way 
that purposes dominate our consciousness, it is striking 
that so many thinkers have purposefully devoted themselves 
to a denial of the ontological significance of their own 
purposes. 
The ascription of mechanistic completeness to the 
present space-time order is interestingly similar to the 
mystic's intuition of that order sub specie aeternitatis. 
It claims as much, but it is really not so coherent as a 
mystic's vision. Any mechanical order is an abstract order. 
To maintain such an order for the whole cosmos, mechanists 
systematically ignore the mysticts sense of transcendental 
~· ~~ 
me~ing, or purpose. Not only that, but the purposive 
character of mechanism's own abstractly ncompleten order 
is ignored. Our subjective quest for perfection is relied 
upon to the extent of claiming an objectively perfect 
world-order and yet the line is arbitrarily drawn at the 
point of giving objective status to purpose. This is done 
despite the classic blow which Kant gave to the claim that 
we can intuit a complete world-order at all. 
When we regard the propositions--the world 
is infinite in quantity, and the world is finite 
in quantity, as contradictory opposites, we are 
assuming .that the -world--the complete series of 
phenomena--is a thing in itself. For it remains 
as a permanent quantity, whether I deny the 
infinite or the finite regress in the series of 
its phenomena. But if we dismiss this assumption--
this transcendental illusion, and deny that it is 
a thing in itself the contradictory proposition 
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is metamorphosed into a merely dialectical one; 
and the 'li'rorld, as not existing in itself--
-independently of the regres-sive series of my 
representations, exists in like manner neither 
as a whole which is infinite nor as a whole which 
is finite in itself. The universe exists for me 
only in the empirical regress of the series of 
phenomena, and not per_se. If, then, it is always 
conditioned, it is never given completely or as a 
whole; and it is, therefore, not an unconditioned 
whole, and does not exist as sych, either with an 
infinite or a finite quantity. 
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Kant thus concludes that so far as the realm of trappearancen 
is concerned the imperfection of the worJ-_9. is as conceivable 
' '·.:~: 
as its perfection, and that the chief impediment to an 
assertion of the imperfection of the world is found in the 
realm of the practical reason. Further mechanism cannot be 
established apart from the moral order, and the inclusion 
of this dimension of experience radically changes the 
character of mechanism. It is possible to conceive a 
purposive order which includes a high degree of mechanism. 
It is impossible to conceive of a mechanistic order which 
can account for the fact of purpose. 2 
Even in the thirteenth century Thomas Aquinas defended 
the integrity of moral and religious experience against 
mechanism. But mechanism crushed to earth always rises 
again. New evidence is adduced in its support today in 
1. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, B533, also 
see B454· 
2. Kant, Critique of Judgment, sec.SO, discusses 
nthe necessary subordination oi' the mechanical to the 
teleological principle in the explanation of a thing as 
a natural purpose.n 
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both the macrocosm and the microcosm. 
To see the force of the arguments in the first instance 
it is necessary to note the particular position which they 
are constructed to answer. The Second La\1-T of Thermodynamics 
has been advanced by many theists in recent years to prove 
the existence of a Creator outside the material process. 3 
In contrast to the First Law, that of the conservation of 
energy, the Second Law points out that energy is available 
for work only when there is a difference in energy levels, 
such as a hot stove acting upon cold water. The Second 
Law points to a process of leveling and diffusion of 
energy taking place throughout the universe. Energy is 
assuming less available forms. The universe is running 
down. From this theists have concluded that matter is 
not self-sufficient. The First Gause must have been far 
greater than any of the material effects we see about us. 
The space-time universe could not be a closed system. 
As a further specification of the same argwrrent, 
the biologist Lecomte du Noiiy has suggested an interesting 
argument for immortality. · He observes that the material 
process and the organic process move in opposite directions. 
Matter appears to be running· down \1-Thile life is engaged 
in the evolutionary process of complicating itself ever 
3. Trueblood, LB, 154-159, is representative. 
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more elaborately. Furthermore, when life reaches a certain 
degree of conscious complexity, it assumes an increasing degree 
of independence from and control over the material mechanism. 
He thinks that this control may be perfect enough in some 
instances to survive separation from the body. Thus 
transcendence of the material process is posited as the 
Final Cause as well as the First Cause of that process.4 
Ho1t>rever, recent astronom·ers, led by the British 
scientists Hoyle and Lyttleton, now argue that the Second 
Law of Thermodynamics is true only of a closed system. It 
is true that from our vantage point the universe is running 
down. .All of the galaxies that ·we can observe are spreading 
away from our own. But Hoyle argues that as these galaxies 
move away from us they gather speed until they ttgo over the· 
edge,tt that is, attain a speed greater than that of light.5 
This he believes occurs at a mathematically discernible 
point about two times further than our present most powerful 
telescopes will reach. In any case nothing could be observed 
which moves at a speed greater than that of light. Hoyle 
argues that at the point where galaxies go over the edge 
they begin to slow down and recongeal into matter. That is, 
matter appears to be a function of space and time. When 
4. Lecomte du Noiiy, HD, 40-52 and 253-256. 
5. Hoyle, NU, 112-125. 
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space is expanded so far and the speed of movement through 
it becomes so great, space contracts and the ubackground 
material1t which has gone· over the edge condenses into new 
galaxies. We happen to have the fortune to be in a galaxy 
which is under the sway of the Second Law of Thermodynamics];, 
elsewhere in the universe new galaxies are ~uilding up. 
Hoyle concludes that the universe cannot be described 
as either evolving or running down if we think of it in 
its entirety. The universe is in a process of ttcontinuous 
creation.n The space-time order has a kind of pulse beat 
about it which is sufficient to explain itself. Matter does 
not need to be produced by some being outside of the 
space-time order and not subject to the laws which govern 
that order. The material processes which seem to degenerate 
in one part of the universe are processes which cause 
renewal in another part. We and all our world are part of 
a complete whole. 
Most people object to ffihe argument· of the 
out-and-out materialists7 for the not very 
good reason that they do not like to think 
of themselves as machines. But taking the 
argument at its face value, I see no point 
that can be actually disproved, except the 
claim of simplicity. The outlook of the 
materialists is ngt simple; it is really 
very complicated.· 
Hoyle even goes on to say that further complications are 
called for. He says that it is definitely up to the 
materialist to explain how .consciousness is evolved in the 
6. Hoyle, NU, 136-137. For formulation of the principle 
of continuous creation see NU, 122. 
human machine.? Further, he finds himself puzzled as to 
why there should be a universe at all. 
In spite of these difficulties, Hoyle feels that 
"religion is but a desperate attempt to find an escape 
from the truly dreadful situation in which we find 
ourselves.n8 Thus the direction in which his position 
pushes him is quite clear. He is restrained only by the 
knowledge that his conclusions are not coercive, and he 
cannot feel that the margin of ignorance is an adequate 
foundation for an alternative. 
More comprehensive criticism is reserved until 
later. It may be sufficient at this point to note that 
Hoyle's theory of "continuous creationn is rejected by 
several distinguished astronomers in favor of an 
evoluti~nary hypothesis.9 And even if Hoyle's hypotheses 
should stand-, Kantts antinomy is still valid. The world 
order is scarcely complete if it does not account for the 
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facts of consciousness, particularly the moral consciousness, 
and if it does take into account these facts the character 
of that order is vastly altered. The persistent unwillingness 
7. If space-time contractions are the source of 
radiant energy, one of the gaps in the mechanistic system 
might be closed by establishing radiation as the source of 
life. See Kelner Art. (1951) 
8. Hoyle, NU, 138-~39. 
9. Gamow, CU, passim, is representative. 
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of men to ttthink of themselves as machines" may be highly 
significant. This unwillingness may be an excellent reason 
for rejecting the materialistic and mechanistic conclusions 
especially if it is based upon non-mechanical experiences. 
No worldorder is complete which does not adequately bridge 
the gaps Hoyle dismisses as minor links in the chain. 
Several contemporary psychologists are trying to 
fill these gaps by treating the origin and nature of 
consciousness on a mechanistic and materialistic basis. 
The first twentieijh century :Vogue for behaviorism was 
initiated by John B. Watson in the nineteen twenties. 
The crudity and lack of empirical verification of this 
first formulation atlength caused its influence to wane. 
The form given to the doctrine by the late Clark Hull and 
his followers has, however, proved to be much more 
sophisticated and operationally useful, and in this form 
behaviorism is one of the most influential positions in 
contemporary psychology. 
Most of Hullts philosophical assumptions are quite 
evident. His conception of scientific method and of the 
social sciences is determinative of his whole position. 
The behavior sciences have been slower than the 
physical sciences to attain this systematic 
status, in part because of the action of the 
oscillation principle, but also in part because10 of the greater persistence of anthropomorphism. 
10. Hull, PB, 382. 
He elsewhere defines the oscillation principle as: 
The qualitative and · quant'itative variability 
of reaction to identical environmental receptor 
stimulation, this variation presumably being .. 
a function of the "law" o'f: probability.!! 
Commenting on Hans Drieschts statement that nmaterial 
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conditions are not the only conditions responsible for 
organic phenomena, 1' Hull italicizes the reply that "Science 
has no use for unverifiable hypotheses.n12 Hullts conception 
of a ttverifiable hypothesisn is clearly one that is deri,ved 
by the methods of physics and statable in quantitative, 
mathematical terms. 
Applying these methods, it is consistent that.Hull 
should conceive of man as a mechanism and of consciousness 
as simply the activity of a physiological organism. 
From the point of view of biological evolution, 
organisms are more or less successfully self-
maintaining mechanisms. In the present context 
a mechanism is defined as a hysical a re ate 
w ose e av~or occurs un er ascerta~na e 
conditions accordi~ to definitely statable 
rules or laws• In iology, the nature of' these 
a~gates is such·that for individuals and species 
that survive, certain optimal conditions must be 
appr,oximated.. When conditions deviate from the 
optimum, equilibrium may as a rule be restored 
by some sort of action on the part of the organism; 
such activity is described as nadaptive.n The 
organs effecting the adaptive activity of animals 
are for the most part glands and muscles. 
In higher organisms the number, variety and 
11. Hull, PB, 45, italics Hullts own. 
12. Hull, PB, 23, Even at this point Hull should be 
reminded that all verification is in, of, and for consciousness. 
Therefore ttscience11 has no use for matter. 
complexity of the aqts required for·protracted 
survival is exceedingly great. The nature of 
the act or action sequence necessary to bring 
about optimal conditions in a given situation 
depends jointly (1) upon the state of 
disequilibrium or need of the organism and (2) 
upon the characteristif~ of the environment, 
external and internal. j 
Of course no intelligent mechanist can ignore those 
numerous data which point away from a simple mechanical 
reaction by the conscious organism. Hull refers again and 
again to "the oscillation principle." He finds it simpler 
to explain spontaneous choices by means of a theoretical 
construct than to resort 1 to the ttanthropomorphism" of 
taking into account the way a choice feels from the inside 
when one makes it. He seems at times to be a little 
uneasy with this device. 
At this point it must be noted at once that 
the full value of sEr fneffective reaction 
potential117 is rarely brought to bear in the 
evocation-of action. Instead it is subject 
to random or chance variability. These 
fluctuations are believed to be due to a 
little-understood physiological process, which 
has the power of reducing action potentials to 
degrees varying from moment to moment. Because 
of this latter characteristic the process is 
called ttos cilla tion, n i·t is represented by the 
symbol sOr. 
Since sOr is not directly observable, it has 
something of the status of a symbolic construct, 
on the other hand, owing to its presumabl¥ constant 
value it has less elusiveness than an ordlnary 
construct.J.4 
13. Hull, PB, 384. 
14. ·Hull, PB, 393. Italics have been added. 
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In spite of this discomfort, the family poltergeist 
always seems less--ominous·when given a friendly nickname. 
The behaviorist sees nothing mysterious·nor unverifiable 
about the Os9illation Principle (familiarly known as sOr). 
Its ancestry is confidently traced within the closed 
system to "a little-understood physiological process71 and 
the family circle is kept mathematically secure. No 
account is taken of Bergson, who argued·that mathematics 
. I 
can accurately deal only with the inorganic.15 No account 
is taken of those who, like Lecomte du Nou~ join Bergson 
in declaring that it is precisely the lack of perfect 
adaptation, a kind of creative instability, which explains 
many of the complications of the evolutionary process.16 
In any ease theOscillation Principle needs itself to be 
explained, and the explanation may reveal something about 
basic, objective :forces at work in nature. It is strange 
science which makes chance variability into a 11 constant. rr 
In the next chapter it will be ar~ed that it is the 
categorical nature of the moral experience·which often 
prevents the full value of the "effective reaction potential11 
from being brought to bear in a given situation. The 
15. Bergson is in a group for whom Hull places the 
title 11philosophern in quotation marks. He receives no 
further attention.-
16. Lecomte du Nouy, HD, 88-94. 
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presence of a dependable psychophysical mechanism is 
necessary to the expression and development of moral purpose, 
but the honest mechanist must admit that' he can scarcely 
explain the behavior of that mechanism at any given time 
apart from something more, v-rhether, 110scillation PrincipleH 
or purpose. 
B. Non-Religious Attacks on the Idea of Perfection 
.. '''" . 
.. . 
Though very dif'ferent in both me'thod and purpose, 
positivists and pragmatists share a common aversion to 
giving ontological status to such concepts as perfection. 
Both positions also share an equally unstable equilibrium 
between metaphysical naturalism {accepted by def~ult, 
of'ten alongside of vigorous attacks on metaphysics) and an 
oddly subjecti-vistic idealism.l7 
The greatestpragmatist of' them all, John Dewey, 
pronounced himself' clearly and characteristically on the 
idea of perfection. 
The process of' growth, of improvement and 
progress, rather than the static outcome 
and result, bec0mes the significant thing. 
Not health as an end f'ixed once and f'or all 
but the needed improvement in health--a 
continual process--is the end and good. 
the end is no longer a terminus or limit 
t0 be reached. It is the active process 
of transforming the·existent situation. 
17. This ambivalence in l?ragmatism is well stated 
by Perry, PPT, 219~226, and 239. The charge of' subjectivism 
has been pressed against positivism by Hartshorne Art. (1941); 
_...,. -and by the Marxist Cornforth, DP, ch.I. 
Not perfection as a final goal, but the 
ever-enduring process of perfecting, 
maturing, refining, is the aim of living. 
Honesty, indus.:try, temperance, justice, 
like health, wealth, and learning, are 
not goods to be possessed as they would 
if they expressed fixed ends to be attained. 
They are directions of change in the quality 
of experienc~~ Growth itself is the only 
moral tt·end. ttl~· 
Further Dewey charge.s.: 
What in effect is love of ease has masqueraded 
morally as love of perfection. A goal of 
finished accomplishment has been set up 
which if it were attained would mean only 
mindless inaction. It has been called complete 
and free activity when in truth it is only 
a treadmill activity or marching in one 
place. The practical impossibility of 
reaching, :in an all around way and all at once 
such a ttperfectiontt has been recognized. 
But nevertheless such a goal has been 
conceived as the ideal, and progress has 
been defined as approximation to it. · Under 
diverse intellectual skies the ideal has 
assumed diverse forms and colors. But all of 
them have involved the concept of a completed 
activity, a static perfection. Desire and 
need have been treated as signs of deficiency, 
and endeavor as proof not of power but of 
insufficiency. 
The fallacy of these versions of the same 
idea is perhaps the most pervasive of all 
fallacies in philosophy. So common is it 
that one questions whether it might not be 
called the philosophical fallacy.l9 
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The idealism which makes the pragmatistic position 
most appealing is, however, the source of its greatest 
embarrassment. Dewey t s ambiguous sanctification of n growthtt 
18. Dewey, RP, 141; cf. QC, passim. 
19. Dewey, HNC, 173-174, 175. 
is similar to Thomas's definition of the good as increase 
of nbeing.rr· It merits a similar criticism. Pragmatists 
must (I) suggest some criterion for·measuring progress 
l08 
and (2) somem~thod by ·which it can be achieved. Growth 
and progress are not ideas which can stand without further 
analysis. Growth is not an abstract entity. We must ask: 
Growth of what? Growth to what? Not all growth is valuable. 
Cancers grow. And when something grows something else dies. 
Not all possibilities can be actualized. 
It is ironic that Dewey should really tend to 
resemble Thomas Aquinas in assuming the good is the actual. 
For he takes the good to be that which the already existent 
indicates is possible. But we must Keep in mind that progress 
can no more be achieved by abandoning the ideal ~~r the 
abstract existent, than it can be achieved through t;tbandoning 
the realm of existent fact for the abstract ideal. One can 
be as sentimental and subjectivistic in his reliance upon 
the existent as another is in his reliance upon the ideal. 
If we assume that what is already working is -t!true11 then 
we are surely not far from idealism. Such idealism is 
dangerous because·, being unrecognized, it is uncritically 
subjectivistic. It need not be such; the idea that progress 
is achieved through reliance upon natural processes implies 
an objective, natural response to human ideals which could 
lead into a systematic idealism. But an incomplete 
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philosophy is an unsatisfactory one. Its positive merits 
are insecure because their assumptions and implications are 
not worked out. 
It is no doubt because he senses these implications 
that Dewey makes his·polemic against·idealism so strong. 
But in this polemic he compromises his concer~ for ideals, 
for novelty, and for progress by falling into naturalism. 
' 
The peculiar strength of naturalism is its description of 
(at least a part of') the existent. Preoccupation with the 
existent alwayspushes naturalism toward reductionism and 
mechanism and leaves it unable to account for progress 
and novelty. If this is the case, all of the criticisms 
0f mechanistic rr completeness11 which were set forth in the 
first section of this chapter bec<:>me applicable. On the 
other hand, if the naturalist loses this preoccupation 
with the existent and expands the idea of nature to include 
the ideal he effaces the distinctive mark of his own position. 
Then his differences from certain kinds of idealism become 
quite verbal. 
Dewey attempts to show why idealism cannot provide 
' 
for progress, and gives us a definition of progress: 
The world in which we could get enlightenment 
and instruction about the direction in which 
we are moving only from-a vague conception 
of an anattainable perfection would be totally 
unlike our present world. • • • We find our 
clews to direction in the projected recollections 
of definite experienced goods not in vague 
anticipations, even when we label the vagueness 
perfection, the Ideal, and proceed to manipulate 
its definition with dry dialectic logic. 
Progress means increase in present meaning, 
which involves multiplications of sensed harmony, 
unification. • • • If history shows progress it 
can hardly be found elsewhere than in this 
complication and ext~8sion of the significance 
found in experience. 
Dewey's remarks appear to be relevant only against an 
idealism which defines the ideal out of all regard for 
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present existence, and which, despite real evidence to the 
contrary contends that that ideal is already perfectly 
realized. This was the· kind of Neo-_P.Latonism which 
Augustine fostered and which Thomas so aptly criticized. 
Dewey does not provide for an idealism which is 
concerned with coherence rather than abstract ideality. 
Coherence demands that we develop a rational conception 
of both the ideal and the material dimensions·of Reality. 
Coherence will lead us to conceive of the perfect because 
of the perfections which are observable within the space-
time order. We should no more disregard the tension which 
is exerted by the integral dimension of the ideal than we 
should jump to the premature conclusion that the ideal has 
been perfectly achieved. 
Dewey's statement that growth is toward rrharmony11 
should be carefully watched. Whether he sees it or not, 
Dewey has made an ontological statement when he asserts that 
20. Devrey, HNC, 282-283. 
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harmony is valuable and that it is recognizable. There is 
something about our being which responds to harmony and 
unification. And surely a nsignificanttr experience is one 
which is the sign·of something. Experience reduced wholly to 
the existent means nothing. We experience anticipations, 
and coherence demands that we take into account nvague 
conceptions of an unattainable perfectionn as well. It 
may be that it is in just this way that the ncomplication 
and extension of the significanceu of present experience 
takes place. 
Regarding the method, Dewey says that the failures 
of the past and pres·ent are due to the fact that the 
nscientific method has not been tried at any time with 
the use of all of the resources which scientific material 
and the experimental method now put at our disposa1.n21 
More specifically he says that the method should be 
patterned after that which has brought success to the physical 
sciences. He opposes social theories which ttpresent a 
watered down version of the Hegelian dialectic 11 and says 
that one who is truly interested in social progress must 
make it clear that 
This LHegelian7 method has nothing in common 
with the procedure of organized cooperative 
·inquiry which has won the triumphs of science 
in the field of physical nature.22 
21. Dewey, LS.A, 51. 
22. Dewey, .LS.A, 71. 
If the model by which progress is to be gauged and 
attained is that which tthas won the triumphs of science 
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in the field of physical nature,n then despite its protests 
this kind of pragmatism does end by being as reductionistic 
as any kind of mechanism. The methods which won most of 
the modern triumphs over physical nature were not designed 
to account for novelty. Their great contribution lay in 
their description of the existent. Beings capable of 
initiating novelty are able to use the mechanisms thus 
developed. to extend· their own freedom and to create 
novelties. In this way the contributions of these sciences 
have been of tremendous value. But the methodology of the 
physical sciences has been criticized for its limitations 
even in the fields where it has·been appropriately tried. 
Even in physics it has been necessary in recent years to 
revise the methods in order to account for new data. In 
the organic realm the need has been even more acute, for 
the whole course of biological evolution is a continuous 
emergence of novelties. Dewey makes a great leap of faith 
when he unqualifiedly calls for an extension of these 
methods into human relations. Surely man's understanding 
and rational control of-himself must be greatly extended, 
but coherence demands that our methods for accomplishing 
this take into account mants capacity for ideal anticipation 
and the initiation of novelty. 
ll3 
Pragmatists are oftenappalled by the tendency of 
the idealistic Absolute to swallow the· mind of man. It may 
be questioned whetherpragmatism does not absorb man in a 
different fashion. For instance, Dewey pictures at some 
length the way in which man 1 s rational capacity is under 
the control of biological n'eeds and cultural conditioning. 23 
The direction of biological needs and the patterns of 
cultural conditioning reveal to him nothing of ontic import. 
Here Dewey resembles to some degree those positivists. who, 
of course,_ carry the point of the subjectivity of man 1 s 
values to a much greater extreme. 
So far as the positivists are concerned, two things 
are important in a discussion of their attitude toward the 
metaphysical idea of perfection. F~rst of all, there is 
their obvious concern for a self-suf£i~ieut completeness 
to each act of knowing. It would, in fact, be difficult 
to car;ry subjectivism much further than Wittgenstein, one 
of the principal leaders of the positivists. He goes so 
far as to say: 
What solipsism means is quite correct, ~nly 
it cannot be said, but it shows itself. 4 
* ~~ ~~ 
23. Dewey, HNC, 4ff. 
24. Wittgenstein, TLP, sec. 5 ... 62 
Here we see that solipsism strictly carried 
out coincides with pure realism. The I in 
solipsism shrinks to an extensionless point 
and ther~5remains the reality coordinated with it. 
Thus there is'in positivism a very real feeling for 
perfection. But it is a drive for completeness which 
makes positivists stop at immediacy and consistency. 
Positivists are unwilling to posit perfection as a 
characteristic of an oojective, universal order, because 
they have no confidence that we can know that much about 
the world. Yet each positivist sees his own immediate 
experience fall into patterns of completeness and order. 
There is even an interesting degree of mysticism 
about the thought of men like Wittgenstein. It may be 
easier to attain the mystical experience if one contains 
within himself all of' the world which can possibly be 
available to him. Wittgenstein says first of all, "The 
totality of existing atomic facts is the world.n26 Then 
he says, "The contemplation of the world sub specie aeterni 
is its contemplation as a limited whole. The feeling of 
the world as a limited whole is the mystical feeli:ng.n27 
It is regrettable that the positivist merely reports that 
our minds are capable of such a mystical sense of wholeness 
25. Wittgenstein, TLP, sec. 5.64. 
26. Wittgenstein, TLP, sec. 2.04. 
27. Wittgenstein, TLP, sec. 6.45. 
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and sees nothing of ontic import in this fact. On 
Wittgenstein 1 s own basis he cannot deny the existence 
of such ontic import, but only our ability to establish 
it. Since positivism is primarily a critical and incomplete 
\philosophy it is not so much subject to criticism for what 
it asserts, as it is a challenge to defend any constructive 
ontology or ethics from its strictures. Therefore the 
point at which it must chiefly be confronted is the 
development of a constructive position which is attempted 
in the next chapter. 
In the second place, close attention should be given 
to the espousal by positivists of the "scientific methodtt, 
particularly of the method successfully employed in the 
physical sciences. When speaking of this, there is less 
emphasis made upon the subjective satisfactions of logical 
completeness. In fact, physics is chiefly praised for its 
objective, impersonal exactness. So Rappaportr.:tells us that 
"physics long ago threw away• •• egocentric, personal~ed 
notions and has substituted for them systems of measur~ment.n28 
Again Rappaport remarks: 
The dealers in absolutes such as good, evil, 
justice, injustice, morality, immorality, honesty 
could learn much from the physicists, if only 
they turned their attention to the fact that 
physicists can understand each other better 
than most people in spite of the seemingly 
28. Rappaport, SGM, 141. 
esoteric character of their language. Theirs 
is a language which keeps replacing elementalistic 
and absolutistic notions by nonelementalistif! 
and relativist ones. In this language things which 
man has rent asunder are joined and idols are 
constantly knocked off of-their pedestals.29 
Science (of which phy~ics is the model) possesses 
a method which is sufficient to answer all meaningful 
questions. There is no province for non-scientific 
inquiry into moral and metaphysical questions. Rappaport 
says: 
The child eventually learns to speak. Some 
philosophers have also learned to speak. 
They are now referred to as scientists. 
• • • The philosopher of today can still 
become respectable by rendering unto the 
scientist what is the scientist's--the 
business of answering questions.about the 
world. This does not mean that a _p.llil.0.s0pher 
cannot at the same time be a scientist:.:too. 
In fact, such a combination is highly 
desirable and should be encouraged. Some 
of our greatest modern philosophers are 
scientists of·the greatest magnitude. 
But it should be admitted by philosophy 
that questions about the world are answered 
by the methods of science, that is, by 
observation, calculation, inference, 
experimentation, etc. There are no other 
effective or reliable methods. Arid most 
important, the philosopher should rid 
himself of the delusion that he still 
harbors sometimes, that his job is to 
provide answ~rs to questions which ~science 
cannot answer.n30 
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The omnicompetence of this method will be challenged in some 
29. Rappaport, SGM, 142. 
30. Rappaport, SGM, 204. 
detail in the next chapter. The chief question which we 
would lodge here is the possible relationship between the 
first and second points which have been observed in our 
exposition o£ positivism. It may well be that (1) the 
method is the uncritical response to a desire to perfect 
the knowing process, and (2) the positivist method could 
not satisfactorily account for the impulses which give rise 
to it.31 
C. Religious Reje·ctions of Perfection 
A leading critic today of a natural theology such 
as that attempted by Thomas Aquinas is Reinhold Niebuhr. 
Niebuhr has been particularly critical of the idea of 
perfection. Deriving his background from like cultural 
117 
forces, such as Marxism and Freudianism, some of his criticisms 
o£ the concept are interestingly similar to those made from 
a very different standpoint by John Dewey. Like Dewey, he 
is particularly opposed to the idea as a pattern for human 
conduct. 32 Also like Dewey, Niebuhr is very suspicious of 
31. Recall Kant's attempt to show that each form of 
the syllogism involves a notion of totality or absolute 
completeness, which in turn involves not the speci£ic 
content of knowledge but the principles whereby any knowledge 
is possible, Critt{ue of Pure Reason, B361. Also observe 
his relation of t s ideal of completeness to the practical 
reason which establishes freedom, the soul, and God, B385. 
cf. Weldon, ICPR, 111-113. An interesting recent defense 
of the ontological basis of logic is Bakan, Art. (1952). 
32. Niebuhr, NDM, I, 185. 
anything which appears to him to be subjectivistic. But 
whereas Dewey revels in the, finite and the existent, 
Niebuhr sees finitude as the source of our sinfulness and 
looks to redemption beyond history.33 
Niebuhr attacks all visions of a primitive realm of 
perfection, whether secular or religious. He holds that 
both are unhistorical and do not see that human bondage 
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is not anything that man did or does, but is an eff'ect of' 
what he is. For instance, Rousseau 1 s appeal to the ngeneral 
willff as the instrument of primordial harmony and perfection 
does not recognize man 1 s ability to transcend both his 
social and his biological environment, and Rousseau also 
fails to see that social harmony is itself so infected by 
sin as to become an instrument of tyranny when pushed too 
hard and without regard to mants finitude.34 The error of 
the religious literalist lies in his overestimation of the 
possibility of transcendence. 
It is important to distinguish between the 
essential nature of man and the virtue and 
P,erfection which would represent the normal 
!normative ?7 expression of that nature. 
~he essential.nature of man contains two 
elements in the original perfection of man. 
To the essential nature of man belong, on 
the one hand, all his natural endowments 
and determinations, his physical and social 
33· Niebuhr, NDM, I, 178-203. 
34. Niebuhr, NDM, I, 105-106. 
impulses, his sexual and racial differentiations, 
in short his character as a creature embecdded in 
the natural order. On the o,ther hand, his 
essential nature also includes the freedom of 
his spirit, his transcendence over natural 
process and finally his self~transcendence. 
The virtue and perfections which correspond 
to the first element is usually designated as 
the natural law •••• The virtues which 
correspond to the second element in his nature, 
that is, to the freedom of his spirit, are 
analogous to the lltheological virtuestr of 
Catholic thought, namely, faith, hope, and 
love.35 
Idealists and literalists alike have not given sufficient 
attention to the element of nvitalityl1.36 They have 
identified man's spirit too simply with reason and reason 
too simply with God.37 
Regarding the freedom of man, Niebuhr sees in it 
both the source of man's transcendence over Nature and 
the source of his anxi'ety and consequent sin. 
Sin is thus the unwillingness of man to acknowledge 
his creatureliness and dependence upon God and 
his effort to make his own life independent 
and secure. 
:0:< )!< ~' 
Sin is the refusal to admit finiteness.38 
Anxiety about perfection and about insecurity 
are thus inexorably bound together in human 
actions and the errors which are made in the 
35. Niebuhr, NDM, I, 270-271. 
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36. Niebuhr evidently overlooks idealists like 
Borden Parker Bowne, to whom Hlife is deeper than logic,n 
and passages in Hegel which lead Royce to remark, SMP, 214, 
that ttHegel r s ·~absolute is a man of warn. 
37. Niebuhr, NDM, 1, 27. 
38. Niebuhr, }Jl)M, II, 218n. 
search for perfection are never due merely to 
the ignorance of not knowing the limits of 
conditioned values. They always exhibit some 
tendency of the agent to hide3his own limits, which he kn0ws only too well. Y 
Thus perfectio:m. is not, according to Niebuhr, the 
total of h~ah conduct. On the contrary, it is man's 
most dangerous delusion. Man realizes his nature most 
fully in the abandonment of his moral autonomy to the 
will of God. The chief end of his moral freedom is the 
admission of its inherent propensity toward sin. 
Without a shattering of the false sense of 
self-sufficiency and universality of spirit, 
the effort would be made (as it is made in 
idealistic philosophy) to.extend the pinnacle 
of self-transcendence in the human spirit 
until it becomes universal spirit, that is, 
God.40 
* * * The highest self-realization of the self is 
therefore not the destruction of its 
particularity but the subjection of it~1 particular will to the universal will.4 
Here we see that Niebuhr adds to his objection 
to the ethics of self-realization, or perfection, on 
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the basis of its instigation of sinful pride, the further 
charge that it leads to pantheism. lle admits that certain 
forms of idealism, which is the usual vehicle for this 
kind of an ethic, challenge pantheistic tendenci~ very 
39. Niebuhr, NDM, I, 185. 
~0. Niebuhr, NDM, II, 2l8n. 
41. Niebuhr, .NDM, I, 252. 
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strongly.42 But yet he presses his charge that any emphaS.is 
upon the centrality and infinite capacity for development 
of mants rational capacities is the first step in an inevitable 
movement toward pantheism. 
Niebuhr's concession to the differences among 
idealists is too grudging. The differences among idealists, 
especially in regard 'to the definition of reason, are at 
least as important as the·ir agreements. Personalists like 
Edgar Sheffield Brightman hold that it is possible to give 
a coherent account even of the irrational.43 There is in 
this position certainly no taint of abstract rationalism. 
Personalists see that the person does contain within himself 
non-rational elements such as those designated as ttvitalitytr 
by Niebuhr. But personalistic idealists disagree with 
Niebuhr in asserting: (1) No non-rational factor can exist 
apart from all ration.al control. In contrast, Niebuhr 
contends that no rational factor exists without the 
counteraction of a non-rational or irrational factor. 
(2) Real advances can be won without being counteracted 
by the intrinsic irrationality of all of man's endeavors. 
This to Niebuhr is, of course, the source of all sinful 
42. Niebuhr, NDM, I, 76, notes in particular the 
personalist James Ward. He takes no account of the most 
influential American tradition stemming from Borden Parker 
Bowne. Thus he does not reckon with one of the most virile 
and widespread elements in contemporary theology and philosophy. 
43· Brightman, POR, 318. 
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pride and a large part of the world t.s ills follow from it. 
·' 
Niebuhr never adequately realizes that, though it is 
a sin to make arrogant and premature claims to moral 
perfection, danger of one of the most virulent kinds of 
immorality also lies in the abandonment of moral autonomy. 
It is a sin to revel in finiteness, just as it may be a 
sin to deny it. Goodness comes not through abdication 
of moral responsibility and autonomy but through growth 
and the perfection of our resources and opportunities. 
Concreteness demands·-that we will in terms of the limits 
of each given situation; but it is rationalism of the 
most viciously deductive sort to assert that man's limits 
are so fixed that it is impius to try to transcend them. 
The charge of pantheism which Niebuhr brings against 
perfectionism shows Niebuhr to be the victim of the 
incompleteness of his theology. It was seen that his chief 
objection to perfection was because of its influence upon 
human cop.duct. The concern of all of his thinking is 
ethical. But many of his ethical judgments spring from 
uncriticized metaphysical assumptions. Yet Niebuhr cannot 
remedy this incompleteness of system, because ·Such system 
as he has derives from his lack of confidence in reason. 
He never .seeks to construct a natural theology, going into 
the existence and nature of God. He takes as given the 
. 
orthodox and Biblical traditions, setting aside as secular 
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or Hellenistic what does not accord with his interpretation 
of them. Since e·ven the Niebuhr-distilled remainder is 
filled with contradictions and cultural conditioning, he 
makes frequent appeal to allegory and paradox. 
The charge of pantheism against those who argue for 
the perfecting of the self has weight only if we assume 
the absolute identification of essence and existence in 
God. It has been seen that this is an interestingly 
Greek, specifically Aristotelian, idea. (Could it be that 
Niebuhr is infected with Hellenism too?) Of course, if 
God's essence is perfectly existentialized, then every 
advance in rationality must be interpreted as a participation 
in not only the essence but even in the very being of God. 
The absolute idealist's doctrine of the degrees of truth 
and Thomas Aquinas's doctrine of the degrees of being seem 
to be liab.Je to such pantheism. But more coherent alternatives 
are possible. One will be developed in the last chapter. 
It is unfortunat~ that, instead of abandoning reason so 
completely, Niebuhr has not sought a more adequate systematic 
conception of.the nature of God. His ideas concerning 
the nature of man might have been happily affected. 
In the constructive argument of this dissertation it 
will be argued that the perfecting of man does not 
contradict the validly conceived perfection in God, and that 
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the infinite perfectability of God makes possible the 
perfecting of man. The pivotal importance given to human 
experience in this argument would of course appall NieiDuhr, 
lirat·,fue argument strives to be empirical rather than simply 
deductive. And it at least assumes the responsibility for 
a coherent view of God. A man need not despair of reason 
and vitiate his ethics simply because he cannot bring 
himself to reconstruct his view of God. 
The sharpness of Niebuhrts criticisms of the 
literalistic interpretations of the Fall of Man have been 
noted. He says that these interpretations err in defining 
perfection as innocency. Despite his criticisms, Niebuhr 
seems to define perfection in precisely the same way. He 
shows that the literalist errs in assuming that like Christ, 
ttthe Second Adam, n we can transcend our environment and go 
back to a primeval innoc~ncy.44 Only God-man can do that. 
The literalist does not see that innocency is impossible 
and sin is inescapable on the level of finite existence. 
God is absolute.45 He stands always in judgment over us 
and therefore our only hope of salvation is in his mercy 
and grace. Thus it appears that Niebuhr joins the literalist 
44. Niebuhr, NDM, II, ch.III. 
45. Niebuhr, NDM, II, ?ln. shows some awareness of an 
alterhati ve po~s'sibility. He gives appreciative notice to 
Hartshorne 1 s definition of the perfection of God in terms 
of self-sur.passibility. This is never developed. 
in conceiving of perfection as a static condition of 
absolute sinlessness. His only important difference lies 
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in the fact that he posits that static innocency in eternity, 
whereas the literalist posits it at the beginning of history. 
Calvinistic literalists and Niebuhr both see the attempt 
to perfect ourselves in the divine image as a danger to 
ourselves and our relationship with God, because God is 
absolutely constant and man is in his essence incapable of 
more than an absolutely limited approach to the perfection 
of God. Anything more than this is Promethean . defiance 
and is the gravest of sins. It is interesting that Niebuhr 
maintains such a view of the relation between God and man 
alongside of a most vigorous defence of democratic social 
policy, a defence which seems to be based upon a radically 
different definition of human nature and its possibilities. 
D. ·Defense of the Absolute Perfection of God 
One of the five possible attitudes toward perfection 
is more widely held in fact than it is in official theory. 
Maintenance of the absolute perfection o£ God on the basis 
of deductive ne-cessity is seldom'if at all admitted today. 
Few philosophers would admit that they establish any 
metaphysical propositions by simple deduction from apriori 
and self-evident assumptions. Any graduate student can 
recite the follies of Anselm. It is generally admitted 
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that logical consistency is not sufficient to save us from 
subjective fancy. 
However, not everyone who ·calls upon the name of 
empiricism is thereby saved from the unfashionable embrace 
of rationalism. This is one of the reasons why a study of 
Thomas Aquinas is so instructive. Thomas also knev-r of the 
follies of Anselmts deductive proofs. But it has been 
shown that his ov-rn attempt to establish the absolute 
perfection of God made it impossible for him to avoid the 
same rationalism. He begins with the principle that forms 
are materially embodied and that knowledge can proceed 
through a perception of things. He ends by denying 
appearances and even some ·.of the reality of moral experience 
in order to maintain the absolute perfection of God. So 
it is with a number of distinguished thinkers today. Instead 
of following through with their empiricism and rethinking 
the meaning of our persistent awareness of Perfect Being, 
they, when confronted with data which indicate that the 
ideal is not yet·perfectly existentialized, have resort to 
the via negativa and abandon experience. They really have 
recourse to the ontological argument and know it not. 
Obscurantism is to pe expected from those who openly 
attack reason. But quite often this deductivistic infection 
vitiates the work of even the ablest and most liberal 
contemporary theologians·.. The dist:i;nguished Albert C. Knudson 
is a case in point. Knudson does not go to great lengths 
f 
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in positive arguments for the absoluteness of God. He states: 
Both the religious quest after redemption 
and the intellectual quest after tr~th lead 
to the affirmation of an Absolute.4b 
He seems to take it for granted that the quest in each case 
leads to the same place, and does not consider the interesting 
suggestion of F. H. Bradley that the Absolute is to bEf 
distinguished from God.· Knudson's own reasons for believing 
in the absoluteness of God emerge principally from his 
criticisms of the idea of a finite-infinite God suggested 
by Edgar Sheffield Brightman. Brightman holds that there 
are intrinsic contradictions in the idea of an absolutely 
perfect God, and that our knowledge of God must derive from 
the data of our ot~ self-experience. If our own self-
experience gives us any clue to the nature of the Divine 
Person, God must be seen as mediating between given rational 
principles and given sense data. To this Knudson replies: 
God in his very essence is a rational Being. 
But this could not be said of the LSensiJ Given. 
There is nothing in the idea of the div~ne 
personality that requires such a non-rational 
and resisting element as ~he Given is said to 
be.47 
In several similar statements, Knudson appears to 
be far more loaded with apriori assumptions than he reali.z-es. 
46. Knudson, DG, 253· 
47. Knudson;- DR, 205 .. 
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He seems to overlook: (1) God could be in his essence a 
rational being and still possess· essential non-rational 
factors also. Here Knudson assumes a very abstract 
c'onception of reason, one which does not see reason as 
coherence, 'b'l!lt as the ideal and the formulable. This is 
more consistent with absolute idealism than with Knudson's 
own staunchly espoused personalism.. The alternative 
definition of reason in terms of coherence allows for 
both pluralism and growth. It sees reason as that to and 
by which all existence must be related and to some degree 
controlled; this definition does not contend that the ideal 
of control has been perfectly achieved. 
(2) The statement that "there is nothing in the idea 
of the divine personality that requires such a non-rational 
and resisting element· as The Given is said to be,n tempts 
us to ask: Whose idea? Certainly the ideas are not self-
evidently. contradictory. Of course the traditional Christian 
idea of God does not require the idea of The Given. But 
metaphysical questions are not to be settled within the 
strict limits of logical entailment alone. That was the 
method of Anselm and the Platonists. Brightman and others 
contend that the idea of The Given and the idea of God are 
not only consistent, but that the goodness necessary for 
worship and the responsiveness necessary for God's 
personality do require such a mitigation of God's absolute 
perfection. 
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Another objection which Knudson brings against 
any mitigation of the absoluteness of God is spec·ifically 
directed against speaking of the perfectibility rather than 
the perfection of God. He wonders if this·perfectibility 
will ultimately bring God nearer to omnipotence and absolute 
perfection.48 Here is revealed once more the tension 
between the traditional views of Godts perfection and 
traditional views of his infinity, which were first noted 
in the first chapter. Many traditional theologians seem 
to find the thought of new resources of creativity 
distressing. Even the ablest advocates of absolute 
perfection do not seem to realize just how finite they 
are making God.49 To contend that the best world now 
possible· is the best that can ever be is to tailor God's 
infinite resources to even less than the boundaries of 
our own present imaginations. And it is surely to deny 
our own experience that each perfection achieved creates 
the possibilities for new actualization of purposes. In 
the light of this experience it is surely odd to think 
that God could do less, and the prospect that perfections 
will destroy new possibilities for perfection reveals a 
very abstract conception of perfection. 
48. Knudson, DR, 211. 
49. McConnell, IGL, 20, develops this criticism. 
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Knudson makes a good point in showing that 
trperfectibilitytt could not be so complete as to deny any 
achieved perfection whatever. This is what Thomas Aquinas 
had in mind in insisting that all potentiality presupposes 
some actuality. Knudson points out: 
The goodness in which religion puts its 
trust is not simply a goodness of intention 
but a goodness linked with power, an ttobjective11 
as distinguished from a merely rrsubjectivert 
goodness. Perfect faith always-says with Jesus, 
trAbba, Father, all things are possible unto thee.n50 
But the critic of Godts absolute perfection not only could, 
but should, agree with this. In the paragraph above it was 
argued that defense of the perfectibility of God is defense 
of his potentiality. While possibility vanishes without 
sufficient actuality, it also vanishes in perfect actuality. 
Religious faith is endangered if God is conceived as 
lacking any coherent possibility.51 Anselm was in s0me 
measure right in linking Perfect Being with existence. But 
possibility is an intermediate term between actuality and 
impossibility. The Being with infinite rational possibility 
must be supremely actual. All persons are foci of both 
possibility and actuality. The Supreme Person must also be 
50. Knudson, DR, 206-207. 
51. It is relevant to recall the definition of 
religion advanced in the first chapter of this dissertation: 
nReligion is the expressed conviction that in predominant 
measure our most coh~rent values are in harmony with the 
Real; that is, that Reality is valuable.n 
conceived as such a focus, especially if he is to be 
evocative of worship. Yet it is one thing to say, "With 
God all things are possible;" it is another thing to say, 
"With God all things are actual." 
Against the view that God has a given store of 
unactualized possibilities, among which he chooses the 
most coherent, Knudson again charges: 
This endows the Deity with something akin to 
an inherited human weakness, a kind of Adamic 
nature. This nature is not sinful, but it does 
limit the divine will, retarding or deflecting 
its activity so that it5~intentionally causes much evil in the world. 
Several things could be noted about this quotation, but 
especially relevant here is the comparison drawn between 
the sense Given and "a kind of Adamic nature." This 
interpretation of the Adamic nature in metaphysical rather 
than moral terms is fraught with grave dangers, which 
Knudson seems to sense but which do not deflect him from 
the assumptionsrevealed in his point here. Niebuhr 1 s 
confusion of finiteness with sin is the source of his 
strictures against moral autonomy. It has been seen that 
Thomas Aquinas became involved in pantheistic difficulties 
through his confusion of evil with a simple lack of being. 
And there does lie here a possibility (which, it is true, 
would horrify Knudson) of corrupting the most ethical 
52. Knudson, DR, 209. 
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philosophy with power worship. 
It is legitimate to stress, as the definition of 
religion which we employ does, the harmony which religion 
asserts obtains between reality and value, between the 
good and the possible. But being, potency, and goodness 
are distinguishable concepts, and just because it is so 
vitally important thatthey be conceived in organic 
relationship we must not take the presence of one for the 
presence of another. To say that there is within the 
infinite resources of Divine Being an element which is 
never perfectly actualized does not necessarily lead us 
to admit that God's goodness is impugned by tta kind of 
Adamic nature.tt And the unintentional evil which is a 
by-product of the creative process assumes a different 
cast if we see that, while evil is real and not to be 
explained away, no evil is final with God. Every creative 
choice is ·a kind of limitation and attended by temporary 
waste products; but-God's goodness is not impugned if we 
see his constant willingness to assume responsibility for 
creating within the structure of things as they are, and 
his evident and tender care that nothing should ever 
finally be lost. 
In a discussion of the dangers of anthropomorphism, 
Knudson goes further to deny that the Given is even 
integral to human personality. 
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In human experience· there is a ttgivenn 
element, but this given element-is due to 
our dependence upon an external environment. 
It is not essential to personality. If it 
were, there could be no independent and 
self-existent Person as th~ theory of the 
Given assumes thatGod is.:>3 
The phrase trindependent and self-existentfl is ambigious 
in this context. Certainly the concept of personality, 
even human personality, implies some transcendence of 
the natural and the social environment. But it is one 
thing to transcend, another to be altogether unrelated. 
The capacity for relations is one of the integral 
elements in personality. Personality is not limited to 
space-time relationships alone, but it surely has the 
capacity for many complex relationships. To deny this 
as an integral element in personality is to lapse into 
a definition of it in terms of substantialistic thinghood. 
Such a static conception of the Divine Person was assumed 
in Thomas Aquinasts arguments for the absolute perfection 
of God. One is inclined to inquire whether static 
substantialism is really tacitly assumed by all advocates 
of absolute perfection. Surely, however empirical our 
aims, to insist upon the absolute perfection of God is to 
ignore all analogy with personality as we experience it. 
l33 
Thomas Aquinasts ethics was criticized in the third 
53. Knudson, DR, 209n. 
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chapter for its formalism and its £requent lack of social 
sensitivity. It was argued that this was due to the fact that 
Thomas had initially posited an absolute and already existent 
ontic perfection. Despite the importance of his major 
contributions, there ,is a certain opacity in some phases 
of Professor Knudson's ethical system which similarly 
seems traceable to the assumption of absolute ontic 
perfection. If perfection is absolute and the relativities 
of history cause us to compromise that absolute perfection, 
then one compromise may tend to seem no less serious than 
another. Morality will not consist in the perfection~bf 
personality or in the perfection of given situations, but 
rather in conformity to a code, though with Knudson as 
with the Thomists the moral code is conceived as a rational 
and personality-enhancing one. 
It seems that there is some failure in ethical 
sensitivity in Knudson's treatment of the most serious 
evil of our day, war. He has recourse to the traditional 
conceptions of ttthe orders 11 and the codified just and 
unjust functions of each. Such formalism seems to 
compromise his personalism. He says, trWar is not an affair 
between individuals; it is an affair of state.tt54 Niebuhr 
can consistently develop a doctrine of «moral man and 
immoral societyn but Knudson cannot. Again he says: 
54· Knudson, PCE, 228. 
If the existence of the state is necessary 
to avoid anarchy and if it is, consequently, 
the duty of the state to defend itself from 
within and without, it is obvious that a just 
war not only is conceivable but has actually 
often taken place. Only on the assumption 
that the state is unnecessary and that the 
use of force is morally wrong could the 
contrary be maintained. With human nature such 
as it is, we must choose between social cha0s 
and the right to resist evil. Jesus's principle 
of nonresistence, if taken literally.and 
applied both to the individual and the 
state, would be an anarchistic doctrine.55 
Against this, it may be commented: (l) On 
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self-realizationist principles, the state is not just a 
necessity to prevent anarchy but rather a natural expression 
of developing personalities. Anarchy is unnatural and 
could never be tolerated very long. (2) It is not logically 
necessary that one be an anarchist in order to condemn war 
and other forms of violence as inherently unjust. There 
are a number of philosophical bases upon which objections 
to violence have been made. The expansion of the techniques 
of warfare in recent years offers new grounds for objections 
which are based upon a teleological ethics. (3) The failure 
to distinguish between violence and other kinds of resistance 
need not be allowed to stand. 
Knudson's formalism is particularly evident in this 
refusal to distinguish between kinds of force and the moral 
quality of each. There seems to be implied on this point 
55. Knudson, PCE, 231. 
a kind of confusion of moral perf'ection with innocency 
similar to that made by Niebuhr. It is seen that any 
exercise of force involves evil; then the conclusion is 
quickly reached that the only alternative to violence is 
in many oases an immoral and untenable refusal to act at 
all. 
The attempt is often made to draw a fundamental 
distinction between an army and a police force. 
But in theory there is no essential difference. 
One seeks to defend the state and its citizens 
against internal enemies, and the other has for 
the most part the task of defending them against 
external enemies. The methods of the army are 
usually and necessarily more violent than those 
of the police. But it is force that is employed 
in both cases, and where violent resistence is 
encountered the extreme penalty may be exacted by 
the policeman as well as the soldier •••• It is, 
indeed, under existing conditions the army and the 
navy that alone make possible the milder and 
more humane use of force represented by the police 
department. Back of every policeman gtands the 
more powerful figure of the soldier.5 
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Against this it must be urged that the rational 
control and direction implicit in the idea of police force 
is a very real and important distinction from the violence 
to which an army is dedicated, particularly under conditions 
of modern total war. The difference is not Ire rely one of 
degree; it is one of quality as well. In contrast to 
formalism, an adequately teleological ethic aims to make 
continual discriminations, and to perfect the best possible 
56. Knudson, PCE, 230-231. 
integration of each given situation. Force of different 
kinds must often be employed in actualizing the ideal. 
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~ut if we resort to a method of arbitrating differences 
which in its essence is committed to violent extermination, 
rational control is by definition and in empirical fact 
ilJ'lol:f>.®iSsible. We thus make an initial choice which makes 
all future choice _virtually impossible until one side has 
succeeded in dominating the other. 
That most of the remainder of Knudsonts ethic is 
not so seriously vitiated may be due to the fact that much 
of his vision of God is happily inconsistent with the 
theory of absolute perfection. 
E. An Empirical Redefinition of Perfection 
One of the most systematic recent efforts to r~think 
the concept of perfection is being made by Charles Hartshorne. 
In order to appreciate Hartshornets contribution it is 
necessary to distinguish his method from his result. They 
are quite different from one another. The method by which 
Hartshorne initiates his snudy is a minute logical analysis 
of traditional conceptions, but his result is a preservation 
of experience, particularly of analogy. This places him 
in interesting contrast to those thinkers who desire to 
construct an empirical theology but are forced to abandon 
experience in order to maintain the absolute perfection 
of God. Discussion of his position will make this contrast 
138 
clearer. 
Hartshorne denies the absolute perfection of God on 
three grounds: (1) It is self-contradictory; (2) it conflicts 
with the requirements of ethics and aesthetics; (3) it fails 
to account for change and time. He calls his demonstration 
of the self-contradictoriness of the concept of absolute 
perf'ection a ttnegati ve ontological argillllent. n57 He restates 
and defends the ontological argument, but he thinks it is 
also valid to say that since we cannot without self-
contradiction conceive of a being perfect in all respects, 
such a being cannot exist. Unless God can naestheticallytr 
experience evil he is less than morally perfect, and his 
moral perfection is more important and more defensible. 
Because God is perfectly good so must he change in joy or 
grief over mants sin and suffering.5B 
Hartshorne is not easily frightened by the common 
charge that such an insistence upon the love of God and 
such a mitigation of his absolute perfection is unduly 
anthropomorphic. 
It is. possible that the idea of God ought 
to be ttanthropomorphic, u not only for 
religious but even for philosophical purposes • 
• • • The only obvious complete alternative 
to anthropomorphism is the doctrine of an 
absolutely unknowable, a nthing in itself.n 
57. Hartshorne, 11VG, ch.III. 
58. Hartshorne, MVG, 110. 
What things are for us, what we can get out 
of them, do ~nth them, enjoy in the experience 
of them, that we can know. Also, what they 
may be as analogous to ourselves, like us, 
knowing, willing, loving beings--though perhaps 
less or more knowing, willing less or more 
powerfully, loving less or more comprehensively--
all this we can conceive. But how can we even 
significantly ask, What can 1 things be, neither 
as values for us nor as beings conceivable by 
analogy to us? Hence if God is the nwholly 
other,'' he is; philosophically regarded, an 
unattractive theme, to say the least.59 
Hartshorne defines Reality, that is, the nature of God, 
as love. Love he defines as social awareness.60 God is 
supreme chiefly in the fact that he is perfectly aware of 
all being. Our experience of social awareness thus gives 
us the key to a reality exceeding our own. 
Hartshorne presses this definition of God in terms 
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of social awareness by speaking of ttthe divine relativity, 11 
and by calling his position ttsurrelativismrt His acknowledged 
debt to Whitehead is obvious, both in his emphasis upon 
process and in the similarity between this relativism and 
Whitehead's doctrine of prehensions. Whitehead insisted 
that every actual occasion 11prehends,n affects and is 
affected by, every other actual occasion.61 Hartshorne means 
much the same when he denies that anything could exist 
59. Hartshorne, MVG, 88. 
60. Hartshorne, DR, 36. 
61. Whitehead, PR, 28-29. 
unless it is related through social awareness. He attacks 
absolute idealism, but evidently much more for its 
absolutism than for its idealism. Whitehead ehose the 
word "prehensionn to make it clear that the awareness which 
binds things together is in most instances below the level 
of ttapprehension •11 Therefore such awareness is usually 
not cognitive and assuredly not ideal. In contrast, 
Hartshornets position is indicated by three rhetorical 
questions: 
How can there be a contradiLion in the idea 
o.f a knowledge of all actuality and of all 
possibility? Could we define all actuality, 
or all poss~bility, in any other way than as 
the content of experience as it would be if 
all vagueness or Unconsciousness of reference 
·were overcome with full and clear awareness? 
.And how can the various lives in the world · 
make one world unless the unity of the world 
is itself li6~ng and sensitive to value 
differences? 
In the light of this, we can understand his praise for 
the emphasis given to internal relations by such absolute 
63 idealists as F. H. Bradley. Hartshornets disagreements 
with the absolute idealists come in what he feels to be 
the betrayal of their insight into the total relatedness 
of things. Bradley pre its an Absolute which contains 
all and is related to nothing. Hartshorne insists that 
62. Hartshorne, MVG, 322. 
63. Hartshorne, DR, 60-67. 
it is the completeness 0f Godts relations which makes 
him supreme.64 
It is relevant to note at this point Hartshornets 
relation to the personal idealism which furnishes the 
framework of the constructive argument advanced in the 
last chapter of this dissertation. Hartshorne labels his 
surrelativism, rrpanentheism.tt He asserts that God includes 
but transcends all of existence. God includes the Absolute 
as well as that part of himself which is constituted by 
social relations. This capacity for social relations is 
what makes God a 11 personaltt God, and is particularly 
demanded by religious experience.65 Personalists would 
not sharply disagree with this analysis of the nature of 
God, althoughtheywill insist on a far more precise definition 
of the relationship between the human person and God than 
Hartshorne has thus far given. Particularly would 
personalists not find it defensible to use the word 11 personal n 
only to apply to that part of God 1 s being defined by his 
social relationships. It is true that it is of the essence 
of all personality to be coherently related. (Gf. the 
criticisms of Thomas Aquinasts substantialism and of 
Knudson's absolutism in the se-ction preceding). But the 
64. Hartshorne, DR, ch.I. 
65. Hartshorne, DR, viii and ch.II. 
Rational Given, in both its ethiqal and its cognitive 
aspects, is a part of every person, human and Divine, as 
much as is our capacity for social relations. 
Failure to understand the personalist definition 
of personality is no doubt the reason for Hartshorne's 
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gratuitous and invalid criticism of Brightman's conception 
of a Finite-Infinite God.66 Brightman, as Hartshorne 
recognizes, is of course trying to develop a conception of 
God which will account for evil and for change, just as 
Hartshorne is. Yet Hartshorne criticizes Brightman's 
conception of the divine perfectibility on the same grounds 
employed by Knudson in defending absolutism. 
Professor Brightman says God's will is perfect, 
though his ability to carry it out is not. But 
on empirical grounds (unless religious experience 
be made the decisive datum) how can we decide 
between this view and the notion that Godts 
ability is perfect, although his intentions are 
not wholly benevolent? Either way we explain 
the facts of evil which Professor Brightman 
has in mind. 
Hartshorne should modify this criticism for two 
reasons. First of all, this criticism overlooks the fact 
that Brightman's analysis of the divine personality proceeds 
from our experience of our o~m personality. Hartshorne 
has himself defended the use of analogy. Brightman points 
out that we do experience not only a predominance of 
66. Hartshorne, MVG, 73-74· 
rational control but also evidence of an evolutionary 
growth of that predominance.67 Second, in his Moral Laws 
Brightman argues that the good is the coherent. Thus it 
would be impossible for the universe to be sustained on 
a predominantly evil principle. Therefore the nature of 
reason and goodness sustains empirical evidence. God's 
will must be good if he not only governs coherently but 
he is committed to a growth in rational control. 
Hartshornets further contention that God's non-
rational Given is simply that element wherein God is 
acted upon by another surely provided some explanation 
of Godts limitations. But since God is responsible for 
creating others and the conditions under which they can 
act, the responsibility ultimately rests upoh God for the 
fact that social good cannot be achieved without attendant 
evil. Reinhold Niebuhr'~$ position is of course even more 
untenable because he compounds his error in holding this 
by-product of social evil to be constant throughout history 
by adding the further error of holding that it is a kind 
of entity outside the volition of God and man. But in 
terms of Hartshorne's thoroughgoing immanentism nothing 
can be intrinsically foreign to the will of God. 
Hartshorne's restatement of the ontological argument 
67. Brightman, POR, 313-324. 
has been mentioned. He first of all feels that the most 
£amous refutations of the ontological argument have been 
unsuccessful and irrelevant. Their lack of relevancy 
springs from the fact that these refutations have been 
directed against an absolutely perfect God. It is true 
that the ontological argument has usually been used to 
establish an absolute God but this represents only one 
of the seven possible conceptions of God delineated by 
Hartshorne. It has been seen that he himself rejects 
this absolutely perfect God by means of a ttnegative on-
tological argument,n which asserts that an absolutely perfect 
God cannot exist because it is so self-contradictory as 
to be inconceivable.68 
In the second place, Hartshorne understandsthe 
ontological argument to deny that God can be merely 
possible. The argument assumes that God's existence is not 
impossible and does not bother to combat such extreme 
allegations. Further, God is conceived to be a necessarily 
existent being, a being upon which all other beings depend. 
-Such a being must be unique. Therefore the assumption that 
if the existence of God is possible it is also necessary 
is not refuted, as Gaunilon am Kant thought, by citing 
other beings which are possible but not actual. 
68. Hartshorne, MVG, 75. 
A clear definition of my own being and of existence as 
I know it shows that some being must exist necessarily. 
This being is God. Logical possibility is not simply 
self-consistency, it makes necessary some being who is 
necessary to there being any consistency or meaning at 
a11. 69 
Justification for calling Hartshornets position an 
empirical redefinition of perfection, in spite of his 
logical method above and his scattered criticisms of 
"empiricists," lies in its results and in its implicit 
appeal to experience. This implicit appeal to experience 
discovers perfection (as Kant did the categories) in experience 
rather than deriving it from experience. Perfection is not 
something to which experience points as its cause of 
fruition, as the cosmological and teleological arguments, 
respectively, assert. These arguments are valid, but only 
because they assume the ontological argument. Existent 
perfection is rather the immanent structUre of every present 
experience. 
Regarding the results of Hartshornets use of the 
ontological argument, it has been seen that he arrives ata 
69. Hartshorne, MVG, ch.IX; cf. Wittgenstein, TLP, 
sec. 3.02: "The thoughtcontains the possibility of the state 
of affairs which it thinks. The thinkable is also the 
possible.n Hartshorne limits his own assertion that the 
possible is then also actual to necessary being, that is, 
to God alone. 
view of God which makes it possible for him to "save the 
appearances,n even when evil is what is apparent. Negatively, 
Hartshorne holds that God, the necessary being, is not 
perfect in all respects because such a conception is self-
contradictory; and yet he opposes those views which deny 
that a being is necessary which is perfect in any resvect. 
He accepts Whiteheadts distinction between the primordial 
and the consequent nature of God, though he thinks of the 
consequent nature in a generic sense and prefers to speak 
of the consequent "naturestt of God. The primordial7° nature 
of God Hartsho;pie holds to be perfect. The consequent 
nature of God always has elements of perfection, but also 
of frustration and lack of attainment. 
From the standpoint of this dissertation, Hartshorne 
may be criticized both for his method and his results. In 
each his failures appear to be more in '@imi:8sion than in 
commission. William E. Hocking, for instance, ~as given 
dialectical support and empirical validation to the 
ontological argument which would add to the convincingness 
of Hartshornets position.71 Regarding the nature of God, 
Hartshorne needs to advance to a conception which has less 
dangers of dualism than his present separation of the 
70. Whitehead, PR, 32 and 36. 
71. Hocking, MGHE, passim; and Art. (1932). 
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primordial and consequent natures of God. If the whole of 
Godts being were defined as personal, both of these elements 
could be coherently related in one being. These suggestions 
will be developed in the constructive argument of the next 
chapter. 
The ethical and social applications which Hartshorne 
has thus far made are contained only in scattered references. 
They are sufficiently incongruous with his metaphysics to 
make it perhaps regrettable that Hartshorne did not altogether 
reserve the consideration of such issues. This is said in 
spite of the fact that his arguments for a God with limited 
perfection would have been made stronger if moral experience 
had really been made integral to his metaphysics. 
The incongruity of Hartshornets ethical and social 
views is revealed by the approval which he indicates of the 
views of Reinhold Niebuhr, who has been shown to be no 
friend to the concept of perfection.72 Hartshorne evidently 
finds affinity with Niebuhrts views on two counts: thEiir 
common distrust of ethical absolutism, and their insistence 
upon a common basis for the sacred and the secular. In 
keeping with the first, both men say harsh things about 
pacifism because of what they take to be its necessary 
interpretation of human nature in terms of innocency and 
72. Hartshorne, DR, 147-155. 
and rationality and its necessarily absolutistic abjuration 
of all force. While it is true that pacifists do not feel 
that normal human natureis purely demonic (the "mad dog" 
theory of war) and do feel that persuasion is the least 
wasteful and most effective way of dealing with it, pacifists 
need not overlook the real sinfulness of human nature.73 
Perfectionistic pacifists simply hold that human personality 
can be perfected by an extension of coherent insight and 
control. Two things are relevant to the absolutistic 
abjuration of all force: first, as was noted in the section 
preceding, much of contemporary pacifism is teleological 
and, to a certain exte~ relativistic in its ethical 
foundations; and second, that distinction between kinds of 
force reveals violence to be the ~rue absolutism. Violence 
is force without rational control and discrimination. It 
settles issues with regard only to the absolute right of one 
side and with no possibmlity of appeal or future modification. 
Regarding the fact that both Niebuhr and Hartshorne 
find a common basis for the sacred and the secular, Hartshorne 
should surely recognize the great difference in the way each 
conceives that basis. Niebuhr conceives the sacred and the 
secular to be related in a common propensity toward sin. 
Attempts to perfect either our souls or our bodies or human 
73. Raven, TCP, 8~ 
societies are all alike infected with sinful pride and the 
refusal to recognize finiteness. The ultimate redemption of 
man lies not in the secular at all, but rather beyond history 
with the divine. Hartshorne, on the other hand, really 
seems to take the identification of the two realms seriously.74 
He feels that knowledge of God can proceed equally well 
through either dimension of experience toward the same goal. 
The perfection of ourselves and our societies is a laboring 
together toward the perfection of the consequent nature of 
God; it is not foredoomed to failure because of its infection 
with sinful pride. This insight is quite consistent ~dth 
the constructive argument of this dissertation. Niebuhrts 
suspicion of reason and experience is not. 
Thus, it can be concluded that Hartshorne has 
presented valuable insights regarding the ontic role of 
perfection. His chief difficulties arise because he fails 
to give an adequate account of personality. He would be 
better prepared to do this if he would give closer attention 
to the data of moral· experience. In its turn, his ethics 
suffers because of this inadequate account of personality. It 
is to be hoped that the constructive argument of the con-
cluding chapter can escape mistakes of similar seriousness. 
74. Hartshorne, MVG, 337. 
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CHAPTER V 
CRITICISM AND CONSTRUCTION 
This chapter will summarize the reasons for the 
failure of attempts to establish empirically the existence 
of an absolutely perfect God. It will, however, maintain 
the value of the idea· of perfection and deny the self-
completeness of the natural order apart from a purposiv.e God. 
It will attempt to establish a view of perfection in regard 
to God which is both self-consistent and supported by three 
major kinds of· experience. Particular attention will be 
given to the ethical implications of such a conception of 
Godts being and to the metaphysical implications of our 
experience of ethical perfection. 
A. The Failure of the Argument for God's Absolute Perfection. 
The absolute perfection of God is an untenable idea 
because: (1) it is based upon apriori assumption rather than 
-
empirical evidence, (2) it is a self-contradictory idea, 
(3) the conclusion is not logically necessary even if we 
grant the assumptions which are made. 
Thomas Aquinas and other supporters of the idea of 
the absolute perfection of God are not empirical both because 
they choose to ignore data which do not point to absolute 
perfection, and because they do not follow through with the 
soundly empirical principle of analogy which they allegedly 
espouse. Regarding the first, they are prone to ignore both 
data presented by physical nature, and our actual experience 
of obligation. It may be recalled that Thomas argued that 
the perfections which we see about us point to the perfection 
of God. But we also observe the frustration of purpose in 
nature}- According to Thomas, these imperfections also prove 
the perfection of God. It is, as we shall argue, possible 
to maintain a position which accounts for both kinds of data. 
But to conclude the existence of an absolutely perfect God 
regardless of the data presented is to be guilty of the 
fallacy of initial predication. One should appeal to 
experience. But one is not entitled.to appeal to experience 
only for confirmatory- instances. Failure in empiricism is 
never very far from (an often unintended) obscurantism. If 
we compromise with experience we have paved the way toward 
playing fast and loose with logic as well. 
This failure to take into account the nonrational 
and even apparently irrational dimensions of our experience 
affects not only our idea of God. It has most unfortunate 
ethical consequences. These consequences are of two degrees 
of seriousness, but the kind of ethically absolutistic 
ttperfectionismn which results is unfortunate in any case and 
John Dewey and Reinhold Niebuhr do well to warn us against it. 
~. Brightman, POR, ch.B-10; and Bertocci, IPR, 
ch. 16-17, treat this problem fully. 
The position is not really perfectionistic at all; it is 
formalistic, even casuistic. It assumes, regardless of any 
evidence to the contrary, that a realm of absolutes is already 
statically existent and needs only to be applied to particular 
cases. No growth and uniqueness can be provided for by this 
approach. 
Of the first degree of seriousness a,re three negative 
consequences. In the first pla:ce, advocates- of such ;, 
nperfectionismtt may naively assume that, since each moral 
decision is one which conforms to an unchanging absolute, an 
ideal (not merely a best) choice can be made in each concrete 
situation and that the ethical life demands much less· 
continuously critical thought than it actually does. This 
sentimentality has inspired, and wrecked, many perfectionistic, 
utopian communities. It ignores the fact that ethical 
thinking demands consideration of content as well as structure. 
In the second place, advocates of nperfectionism" may 
refuse to act i~ complex situations, particularly in those 
1-Tith wide social dimension. This has been the error of many 
holiness sects ·and monastic groups throughout Christian 
history. The most normal acts, and often those with great 
potentiality for good, are condemned as being nworldly.n 
The resulting reductionistic ttperfectionismn devotes itself 
to the elaborate, introspective cultivation of a narrow range 
of virtues. Both virtues and vices are moral habits, and a 
moral habit virtuous in one context may become vicious if it 
is pursued in a different context. Sin is confused with 
natural impulse; emotion is confused with the irrational. 
Thus eradication, rather than perfection, becomes the lot 
of great areas of the personality. Instead of extending 
the scope of our activities and bringing greater areas of 
personality into coherent development, reductionistic 
nperfectionism" places stress upon rigorous discipline for 
its own sake and encourages 1~thdrawal from areas of moral 
possibility. 
In the third place, advocates of rtperfectionismn 
-may identify the best choice in a given situation with the 
ideally perfect choice in all similar situations. The 
vicious possibilities of such arrogant dogmatism have 
already been noted. Here it is seen that bigotry must be 
added to sentimental ineffectuality and otherworld~y. 
withdrawal as logically possible, and empirically notable, 
effects of formalistic nperfectionism.tt Churchmen who 
continued to put central valuation on such hardy virtues 
as thrift and self-sufficiency while in the midst of a 
great economic depression would appear to be the victims 
of this kind of dogmatic irrelevancy. Like the other two 
expressions, dogmatic ttperfectionismtt ignores the fact 
that values cannot be actualized apart from concrete 
situations. It confuses the ultimate structure of the 
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good with its present existence. But morality demands· not 
only the conc~ption of an ideal value structure {a conception 
always implicitly metaphysical); it also demands particular 
' 
data. We must develop a contextualistically objective view 
of values which will neither fall into indifferentism ttd 
the one hand nor absolutism on the other. Both absolutistic 
perfectionism and the scientism to be discussed in the section 
following fail to recognize the complexity of moral experiene.e. 
If science can neither motivate, nor determine norms, nor 
ultimately explain moral obligation, it still must be used 
to guide the concrete actualization of ideals. 
The experience of many religious sects has shown that 
not only are moral possibilities ignored by absolutistic 
ethical perfectionism, but positive evils can result from 
it. This is even more serious than the threefold negative 
result expoundad above. Just as irrationalism can result 
from the effort to establish the absolute perfection of God 
by ignoring experience, so can antinomianism (ethical 
irrationalism) result from the same ruthless disregard of 
the present space-time order. Some antinomians hold that 
since the perfection of the universe is already complete 
{though not now apparent) it is unnecessary to consider 
empirical consequences. Means can be sharply distinguished 
from ttreal, P. transcendent ends and can be casually sacrificed 
to them. Antinomianism is, of course, never the intent of 
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of reputable philosophical exponents of perfectionism. But 
a dead horse is not flayed here, for antinoilllanism has broken 
out again and again in perfectionistic groups .2 Philosophical 
exponents would never have had to defend themselves against 
this misinterpretation if they had been more careful in their 
definition of perfection, and in the arguments by which they 
seek to establish it in Fegard to God. 
Not only do advocates of the absolute perfection of 
God fail to take proper account of physical and moral experience, 
they also fail to go through with the principle of analogy. 
We cannot discuss perfection, defined as the conformity of a 
thing t-rith its purpose, without giving primary consideration 
to purpose and purposers~ Analogy is of the essence of 
empiricism and surely the key to any discussion of perfection. 
Of course, analogy, like all inductive instruments, must be 
closely watched. But failure to confirm one's apriori 
assumptions is not a valid reason for abandoning analogy. 
The only reason for abandoning analogy in arguing about the 
existence and nature of God is that we reach a point where the 
being discovered through the use of the instrument is inadequate 
to account for the world he is conceived to create and sustain. 
It has been seen that Thomas Aquinas and other advocates of 
the absolute perfection of God do not abandon analogy for this 
2. John Wesley had severe difficulties with the 
antinomian tendencies of early Methodism. Cf. Sangster, 
PP, 100-103. 
reason. They employ analogy as long as it points to the 
perfection of God and then they abandon it for the via 
negativa or the via eminentiae. This is argument from 
ignorance and offers no protection from the most fantastic 
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excesses. An absolutist is driven into this position because 
he does not see the possibility of an alternative other than 
an absolutely perfec·t God or no God at all. Therefore he 
must begin by assuming that any imperfection is absent from 
God and that any perfection exists in God in a supereminent 
degree. 
We arrive now at the second major argument against the 
absolute perfection of God: the self-·contradiction of 
traditional views of God, ~mich ascribe to him absolute 
perfection, infinity, and personality as well. It is necessary 
for an absolutist to retreat from analogy not only because 
experience does not point to the absolute pe~fection of God, 
but because the conception of absolute perfection appears to 
contradic-t the idea of personality. No being which does not 
have the capacity for continued perfectibility should be 
called personal. As Martin Foss has recently argued, we can 
speak of a perfect butler, or a perfect cook, but not of a 
perfect man .3 \lfuen we speak of persons we must recognize that 
they are complex beings. When perfection is applied 
3. Foss, IP, 9. 
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to them it must be done specifically. A thing is perfect as 
it corresponds to its purpose. If we make it correspond to 
a purpose outside of itself it has become an instrument, a 
mere thing. Kant gave us enduring warning against such 
abstraction in our treatment of persons. Experienced from the 
inside, as he really is in his uniqueness and complexity, no 
person ever sees the complete correspondence of his ends and 
his actualities, even if he is perfectly committed to the 
task of bringing his whole being under coherent purpose. 
Every moment that this commitment is made creates new 
possibilities to be achieved. If personality is to' grow, 
provisional perfections must be constantly taking place, 
but perf:eet±on is the raw material of perfection. Perfection 
I J 
of one dimension of experience makes possible perfection of 
as yet undetermined experiences. But absolute perfection 
(carrying with it the idea of the coincidence of·the ideally 
possible and the actual) would destroy the meaning of personal 
eA~erience. The very source of life in persons is the tension 
between the ideal and the actual. 4 
This may be applied to our thinking about the Supreme 
Person. To call God absolutely perfect (if it is not to 
indulge in uncrit·ical pfuety) is to think of him from the 
outside as he corresponds to some limited purpose of our own. 
4. Stern, GP, 71-77· 
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God is the means by which every end is possible, but if he is 
personal and worthy of worship he cannot be merely a means. 
God is not a utensil; he is not even an aesthetic object. 
A First Mover Unmoved may be abstractly perfect. It may even 
11 contemplate11 (unconsciously?) its world and be contemplated 
by it, but it is not a religious object nor an adequate 
explanation for the world. That explanation cannot be given 
apart from personality. Personality is a much more significant 
key to the understanding of God than is perfection. Perfection 
(both as an ethical and as a metaphysical concept) is important 
for the role it plays in personal experience. 
The fact that many of the advocates of God's absoluteness 
are today saying that God is Hbeyond personality11 indicates 
that they realize this contradiction between personality 
and absolute perfection.? It is never very clear just what 
it might mean to be ttbeyond personality, tt but the statement 
seems to point to a being who is·less than personal. A being 
nmore than1r conscious or TTbeyondfl coherence seems insufficient 
to sustain the universe, however absolute he may be. Thus 
absolute perfection appears a somewhat doubtful compliment to 
6 God. 
The contradiction between the infinity of God and his 
5:. C. S. Lewis 1 s Beyond Personality gives a popular 
defense 'of the traditional doctrine of' God!t'"s absoluteness and 
of the idea suggested by the title. ' 
6. Cf. Brightman, FOR, 236-237· 
perfection as traditionally held has been noted throughout 
this dissertation. The assertion that God is absolutely 
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perfect makes the actual and the possible completely equivalent. 
Neither Thomas Aquinas nor other advocates of perfection 
seem to realize just how finite this makes God. God thus 
cannot do anything he has not done already. A. 0. Lovejoy 
has demonstrated just how inexplicable the idea of creation 
becomes on this basis.7 Such a view as effectively precludes 
novelty as the most mechanistic materialism. Therefore to 
preserve God's goodness and adequacy every experience of 
imperfection must be denied. The moral and intellectual 
results of such a flight from coherence have already been 
observed. Limitation is not incompatible with infinity; in 
succeeding sections we shall argue that it is one of the 
secrets of it. But absolute perfection is not compatible 
with infinity. To say that all purposes are completely 
actualized but that God possesses limitless potentiality is 
to speak 11l:0I'IS:e:n's:e. 
The third reason for asserting that arguments for the 
absolute perfection of God end in failure is the logical leap 
which seems to be entailed. This will become more obvious in 
the constructive argument of this chapter. Here it is enough 
to note that on our view we do not experience Perfect Being; 
, 7l. Lovejoy, GGB, 81-82. 
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we experience perfectibility. What we actually experience 
is a dialectical tension between the ideally possible and the 
actual. This experience presents us with the most important 
key to the understanding of ourselves and the nature of the 
univer-se. No philosophy can afford to ignore nor misinterpret 
this tension toward perfectibility. However, it is illicit 
to jump from this experience of tension to the conclusion 
that Perfect Being already exists. More careful analysis 
than this is needed. · 
erience Which I ore the 
The real meaning of the idea of perfection as a 
metaphysical principle becomes evident when we examine moral 
experience. Moral experiemze cannot be finally understood 
without reckoning with this i~ea. And here it becomes obvious 
that the idea of perfection·necessarily involves a superphysical 
aim. 
The scientific method by which the perfection of modern 
technology has been achieved is praised by mechanists, 
positivists, and pragmatists alike. It has been shown (in 
chapter four) that representatives of the last two schools 
discount the objective significance of the moral imperative 
toward perfection and join mechanists in reducing this 
experience to an effect of a causally complete material order. 
This assertion that the methods of the physical sciences can 
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be applied without reservation to moral experience reveals 
that like the absolutists, many advocates of scientific method 
fail to realize the complexity of moral experience. 
One should pause to make himself clear when he speaks 
of scientific method. There is a useful distinction between 
a groader and· a narrower meaning of scientific method. - The 
broader sense is set forth by John Dewey when he distinguishes 
five steps in reflective thinking: (1) a felt difficulty, (2) 
. . 
definition of the problem, (3) formulation of proposed solutions, 
{4) working out of the implications of each proposed solution, 
(5) decision upon and verification of the best possible 
solution.& But it is obvious that reflective and systematic 
thinking in this broad sense is not the exclusive property of 
what is usually called science. Even if art is conceived to 
have a large intuitive element, a great deal of such step-by-
step reflection might be employed by an artist. Certainly 
such reflection was practically employed long before the modern 
developments in science. 
The issue lies with scientific method in that narrower 
sense in which it has been employed with such success by the 
physical sciences. It has been seen that Hull (a mechanist), 
- -
Dewey (a pragmatist), and Rappaport (a positivist) have called 
for an extension of this method to moral and social problems. 
' .$. Dewey, HWT, ch.6. 
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For convenience the view which calls for such an extension 
of scientific method in its narrower sense is called "scientism." 
This awkward word makes it possible to avoid several long 
phrases and indicates the unity on this one point of persons 
with otherwise divergent positions. A summary of just what is 
intended by scientific method in its narrower sense is often 
difficult to come by. It is more often invoked than explained. 
A useful summary by Harold Titus is here employed to give focus 
to our criticism; 
Men working in the natural sciences usually 
proceed on the basis of some or all of the 
follo~dng assumptions, postulates, or conditions: 
(1) The principle of causality. This is the 
belief that every event has a cause and that the 
same cause always produces the sqme effect. 
This principle of causality may be carried to 
a complete determinism or a complete mechanism. 
It is not necessary, however, to anply the 
principle in this extreme form. (2) The principle 
of predictive uniformity. This involves the 
assumption that a group of events will show the 
same degree of interconnection in the future as 
has been shown in the past or the present. (3) 
The principle of ob~ectivity. The investigator 
must be objective Wlth regard to the data before 
him. The facts must be such that they can be 
·experienced in exactly the same way by all normal 
persons. The aim is to eliminate al;I.. subjective 
and personal elements. (4) The principle of 
empiricism. The investigator assumes that his 
sense impressions are correct and that the test 
for truth is an appeal to the ttexperienced facts. 11 (5) The principle of parsimony. Other things being 
· equal, always ·take the simpler explanation as the 
valid one. (6) The principle of isolation, or 
segre~ation. The phenomenon to be investigated 
must e segregated so that it can be studied by 
itself. (7) The principle of control. Control is 
essential, at.least for experimentation. Otherwise, 
many factors may vary at the same time and the 
experiment cannot be repeated in the same way. .If 
the conditions change while the experiment is being 
conducted, the results may be invalid. (8) The 
principle of exact measuremen~. The results must 
be such that they can be stated in quantitative 
or mathematical terms. This, ~t least, is the 
goal of the physical sciences. 
If this is what is intended by the call to apply 
scientific method to moral and social questions, it is an 
inadequate approach on three grom1ds. First of all, this 
method cannot adequately account for the fact of moral 
obligation. Such an externalistic approach does not account 
for the moral experie~ce in its own terms. For instance, 
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rigorous application of the principle of causality and the 
principles of parsimony has led advocates of scientific method 
to reduce obligation to prudence or learned response. The 
struggle for physical survival and social approval is an 
obvious and external factor in our experience. It is amenable 
to quantitative study and statement. It does affect the way 
in which our choices are conceived. But physical existence 
and social approval are only in one dimension of what we 
struggle to preserve. Too many instances can be cited of the 
sacrifice of physical existence and socia+ approval to 
something else. This ttsomething elsett is what it is and not 
some other thing. It cannot be explained by the methods which 
have proved so useful in physics, or even in biology. 
9. Titus, LIP, 94-95. 
The criticisms of the deontologists are relevant here. 10 
These criticisms are relevant against reductionists of 
scientismic and absolutistic persuasion alike. Moral obligation 
is unique. It is not merely the mirror of a transcendent absolute; 
it is not merely an effect within a causally complete order. 
It is in the dialectical tension of obligation that we attain 
a synoptic vision of the ideal and the actual. 
In the second place, the inadequacy of scientific 
method in its narrower sense to account for moral experience 
is indicated by its unconvincingness ru1d its consequent 
inability to create moral experience. Employing Hocking's 
test of ttnegative pragmatism, n there is something profoundly 
wrong with an hypothesis which in the long run does not seem 
to work.11 It is true that many advocates of this approach 
have profound moral experiences, but they cannot account for 
these experiences by means of their own methodology. They 
inadvertently derive their norms from a dimension of experience 
which their methods cannot illumine, self-experience. 
Finally,when they are not happily inconsistent with 
their methodology, advocates of scientism are victims 
of: ( 1) vicious impersonalism, wherein the unique subjective 
10. Cf. t'he classic analysis of the ttnaturalistic 
fallacytt of identifying the good with one of its attributes 
in Moore, PE, ch.I. 
11. Hocking, MGHE, xiii-xiv, and SIG, vii. 
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dimension is systematically ignored and persons are treated 
as material instruments rather than as ends in themselves.12 
Or {2) irresponsible positivism, wherein a moral judgments 
are held to be meaningless because they are necessarily 
subjective. Mechanists and those pragmatists who do not 
end in an unconfessed practical idealism are in particular 
danger of the first alternative. Positivists are the 
frankest exponents of scientific method in its narrowest 
sense. Positivism confesses a meaninglessness to moral 
judgments which is repugnant to most pragmatists and even 
mechanists • 
. Fortunately, the scientismic assumptions need not be 
granted. We experience the tension of the ideal as well as 
the existence of the actual. And an experience has not been 
chased into a pit ·of pathology just because it is discovered 
to be essentially subjective. There is an intelligible 
structure to our subjectivity which must be explored. Surely 
we should not adopt a method which rules out such exploration 
before it is begun. Existentialists are right in seeing the 
fundamental character of our self-experience. It is unfortunate 
that some existentialists have insisted on calling that 
12. The consequences of contemporary impersonalism are 
well expounded by Meunier, PM, and Mumford, TC. Please note 
that here ttviciousn is not intended as an emotive word, but 
is used to indicate the persistence of a habit in an 
inappropriate context. 
experience irrational simply because much of it does not 
conform to scientific method in its narrowest sense. This 
error arises from an unnecessarily narrow definition of 
rationality and a confusion of the non-rational with the 
irrational.13 One can sympathize with the reaction against 
scientism without condoning irrationalism. 
C. Moral Obligation and the Demand .for Perfection. 
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Moral experience cannot be understood apart from an 
inquiry into the nature of personality. Personality is the 
pivotal concept in any valid philosophy. Against the absolutists 
it must be asserted that a ~erson is more than an intellect 
or a system of ideals. Against scientism in its varied forms 
it must be asserted that the person is not simply an effect 
of the material order. In the language of William Stern, 
the person is a unitas multiple~. 14 
The persistent idea of perfection gives important 
insight into the nature of this multiple unity. One of the 
principal factors within each person is a ttrational given, n 
an awareness of ideally possible integrations of experience. 
As Anselm reminded us, ttit is one thing for an object to be in 
13. Casserl!Y, CP, 159-160; also see 132-133. 
14. Stern, GP, 73. Note also the definition of experience 
as Hlife under cleavage and tension.tt Indebtedness to Stern at 
this point does not include acceptance of his conclusion that the 
person is psychophysically neutral. 
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the understanding, and another to understand that the object 
exists /In r~7. 11 Therefore we feel a dialectical tension 
toward the actualization of our rational given. According to 
those who hold to the absolute perfection of God there is 
nothing genuinely novel and creative in this experience, 
since the ideals which we experience are already actualized. 
In other words, absolutism holds that the experience is not 
really what it seems to be. According to scientism, the 
dialectic is either an illusion fostered by social conditioning 
or the love of security, or it is a euphemism for physical 
functions. Again, its prima facie meaning is denied. 
While we are confronted with a dialectical tension to 
actualize conceived perfections, no person ever quite achieves 
an ideally coherent (perfect) integration of his personality 
because he can never determine the data which will be presented 
to him through the senses. The· person is composed, not.merely 
of rational capacity, but of sensuous possibilities as well. 
Not only this, but each rational integration developed, each 
mechanism established, brings about the emergence of new 
freedom, new awareness, and new sensuous possibilities. 
Personality is the creative matrix of both all actuality and 
all possibility. The tension between possibility and actuality 
is moral obligation-. Moral obligation would not exist if the 
ideal were already actualized, noT would it exist if the ideal 
were impossible. Moral obligation can arise neither from Must 
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nor from Cannot. Ought is sui generis. We owe Kant a great 
debt for teaching us this so clearly. 
Coherence is the perfection of the cognitive function 
of personality. The person who is coherent actualizes the 
rational relationships which are implicit in each situation. 
Achievement of coherence does not mean that non-rational 
factors are absent, but only that no irrational factors are 
present. That is, the person who is coherent takes all the 
elements of a situation into account and understandingly relates·. 
them together. Nothing is uncontrolled, though some factors 
may continue to fall short of ideally conceivable integration. 
A situation is "controlledff if a person is aware of all of 
the pertinent relationships implied by a s1~uation, and is 
aware of the shift in those relationships implied by the 
continual influx of new data, even though the person is 
unable to actualize all of the relationships most valuable 
to the persons in the situation. Since even ideal possibilities 
are being freshly created, even coherent integrations are never 
final. The future grows out of the present and must therefore 
be taken into account, but this can never be done with complete 
finality since it is available only in possibility. 
Love is the perfection of the conative function of 
personality. Love is commitment. The loving will intends 
the most adequate conceivable integration of each concrete 
situation. Love is a necessarily distinguishable factor 
because it is possible to conceive of insight apart from 
commitment. Love and coherence interpenetrate ho11rever, and 
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it is impossible to conceive of the perfection of the conative 
or of the cognitive functions apart from one another. .A 
loving person wills coherently in spite of short run satisfac-
tions which might accrue to himself if he willed selfishly. 
To will selfishly is to choose to gratify a particular datum 
self rather than to will under obligation to the whole self. 
Each whole self includes an intuition of an ~deal of Perfect 
Personality which defines our conceptions of wholeness and 
coherence. Love wills to perfect each situation. .A loving 
person wills the highest degree of perfection possible for 
each person, whether himself or another, in each concrete act 
of choice. This commitment to wholeness is necessary for 
coherence, for a loving person's ability to put himself into 
the standpoint of the other is the clearest instance of that 
analogical thinking which is the essence of empiricism. 
There is in the experience of moral obligation both 
an absolute and a relative dimension. Failure to recognize 
this is not only the source of the confusions of absolutism 
and scientism, it is also the basis for some of the criticisms 
of self-realization, or perfectionistic, ethics. It is often 
said that self-realization is too vague a concept to be. 
ethically useful. Self-realizationists have failed to ·make 
it clear that the absolute element is obligation to the Ideal 
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of Perfect Personality, and that this gives structure to 
particular instances of obligation. The Ideal of Perfect 
Personality is approached through the coherent organi~ation 
of the data available on each actual occasion. Personality · 
is the norm of norms and guides particular acts of integration. 
We may agree with the ethical intuitionists that this structure 
of the good is so intimate a part of our awareness at all times 
that it cannot be entirely discoursively justified.15 
Specific acts of choice can be challenged and justified, but 
if a person so abandons coherence as to deny the value of 
personality he must be met in the arena of psychology rather 
than through philosophy. 
One of the clearest discriminations of these two 
dimensions of moral experience has been made by Peter A. 
Bertocci. He points out that specifically what we. are 
obliged to do is learned from and totally determined by our 
experience; that we are the kind of beings who can conceive 
of a best to which we ought to be committed is not derived 
from particular social conditioning.19 This dissertation 
extends this argument by holding that the best is always 
15. A. C. Garnett, Art. (1941), has made some interesting 
suggestions about the possibility of combining the·insights of 
the deontologistic and self-realizationistic schools in ethics. 
16. Bertocci, Art. (1945)1; also IPR, ch.lO. Professor 
Bertocci is not responsible.for the development of this idea 
made here. 
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defined with reference to an ideal selfhood. 1 7 
Absolutism is wrong in holding that moral choice can 
be governed by a simple and unchanging formula. What a person 
ought to do may differ from occasion to occasion, and in terms 
of the particular resources available to different persons.18 
Science can help us to predict and control our experience and 
must therefore be employed in discovering and perfecting value 
possibilities. 
On the other hand, scientism in its various forms is 
wrong in holding that an understanding of obligation and the 
good can wholly be derived from a description of the actual. 
Science describes the actual. Even when it advances to a 
prediction of the probable it makes evident presuppositions 
about the structure of existence and pessibility. These 
presuppositions would not be rational if they were not verified 
in experience, but we are aware of presuppositions of structure 
before we attain knovdedge of them. Metaphysics has access to 
these presuppositions because of its role as an interpretor of 
self-experience. Metaphysics describes the structure of the 
17. This dissertation cannot here defend this principle 
against what is generally taken to be the self-negating character 
of most oriental religion and philosophy, save to say that the 
author follows Mrs. Davids, BP, passim, and Nikam, Art. (1952), 
in denying this traditional interpretation. 
18. Even absolutists like Thomas Aquinas seek to provide 
for this relative dimension. Cf. the Counsels of Perfection. 
But such a device as this obscures the fact that each person is 
called to perfection and that our situations differ more 
fundamentally than Thomas realized. 
Real (all that is or can be). Therefore metaphysics brings 
together both science and value-experienne. 
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Values, obligation, and norms lie in the same continuum 
of experience. But they should never be confused. V.alues 
(whatever we. desire or prefer) are facts which may be described 
by science. Obligation is the tnesion which we .feel to value in 
correspondence with norms. Norms are possibilities which may 
be inferred from obligation as experienced through introspection. 
Norms are the structure of the valuably possible. Norms are 
those choices which would really perfect the Ideal whether we 
make them or not. The moral process is tied down at both 
ends; in the area of freedom, of obligation, of perfection, 
we are to bring the two poles of our experience together. To 
say that we are obliged to value in accordance with norms is 
to say that we should not overlook the effects of actualization 
upon other values. We infer rather than experience norms, just 
as we infer a physical world greater than our immediate 
experience. But we are aware that there are such norms before 
we begin to make inferences about them or begin to specify 
{through the experience of obligation) which of the norms it 
is valuably possible to actualize. 
We never feel obligated to actualize anything which does 
not perfect our Ideal of Perfect Personality. Science cannot 
give us nor explain to us this feeling of obligation. Science 
can clarify our thihking in regard to the effects of the 
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actualization of' a value upon. other values. If' we eh®\vse. to 
aa'tttalize a short-run value at cost to eur whole-sel£';1 sei.ence 
can aid us in this as well. Science cannot explain, iil. its 
narrower sense it cannot explore, the dimension of' ourt:_self-
experience where obligation holds together what we are and 
what we ought to be. Every person has thi$ dimens-ion _of ex-
perience whether he is capable of metaphys·ics or not~-- But 
' . 
since metaphysics has the task of keeping in focus b0tlli the 
possible and the actual (it deals with all of' the Rea:L)·, the 
interpretation of obligation is one of its most important 
tasks. And since obligation best shows the structure ef the 
Real, moral experience is the principal key to metaphysics. 
;.·,. 
__..l..i. ... '". 
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A graphic presentation of the structure of moral 
experience as here conceived may be useful: 
The Objective Dimension {WHAT we feel obliged 
to do) 
Moral Experience 
The Subjective Dimension 
(THAT we feel obliged) 
{Relative) 
Values derived from 
science and/or concrete 
experience shared with 
a society 
STRUCTURE 
(Absolute) 
Norms discovered in 
self-experience 
interpreted by 
metaphysics 
(Absolute) 
Ideal of Perfect 
Personality 1 interpreted by metaphySJ.CS 
MOTIVATION 
(Relative) 
Dialectical experience 
of perfectibility 
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Though he does not conceive the matter in the same 
personalistic fashion employed in this dissertation, Nicolai 
Hartmann has made a very useful construction of the absolute 
and relative dimensions of experience. He distinguishes the 
Ideal-Ought-to-Be, the Positive-Ought-to-Be, and the Positive-
Ought-to-Do. 
Because something is in itself a value, it does 
not follow that someone ought to do it; it does 
mean, however, ·that it Ought to ffBe, tr and 
unconditionally--irrespective of its actuality 
or even of its possibility. Accordingly, there 
is a sense in saying that universal peace among 
nations ought to ttbe. tt That has a meaning, not 
in so far as peace is actual or possible, but 
in so far as it is in itself valuable. Yet it 
would be senseless to say that a single individual 
ought to bring peace about. Conversely, it holds 
true of goods provided by nature that they ought 
to be just as. they are; yet with them there is no 
place for an Ought-to-Do. A place for that is 
not possible until someone is in need of goods 
and someone can aquir.e them by effort. 
Consequently Ought-t.o±Do is always conditioned 
by Ought-to-Be, but Ought-to-Do is not attached 
to every Ought-to-Be. I ought to do what ought 
to be, in so far as it nisrr not, and in so far 
as to make it possible is in my power. This 
double 11 i~ so far astt separates these two kinds 
of Ought. 9 
Hartmann needs to treat the idea of possibility with greater 
care. The reason he cannot do so is that he does not make 
better use of the concept of personality, the matrix of 
possibility and actuality. This metaphysical issue will be 
met in the following section. But here the pertinent issue 
19. Hartmann, ETH, I, 247-248. 
of an absolute and relative character to morality is well 
stated. Relating this statement to the argument of this 
dissertation, each person ideally ought-to-be a perfect 
person, whatever the circumstances in which he is placed. 
However, we positively ought-to-do only that which is 
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available to us in each concrete situation. T~e way that we 
achieve the ideal of our being, and of all being, is through 
the perfection of each situation. 20 The presence of an 
ought-to-do implies some best possibility. This best 
possibility is not, as Hartmann holds, independent of the doer. 
Our perception of the possibilities in a situation is itself 
one of the definitive possibilities. 
Niebuhr and Dewey are right in warning us of the 
arrogance or paralysis which can come from an obsession with 
the perfect. It can novv be seen, hoy.rever, that Niebuhr is 
wrong when he says that desire to perfect each situation in 
the light of the Perfect is inescapeably infected with anxiety 
and sinful pride. In fact, the awareness of the unending 
20. Cf. Brightman, ML, ch.9 and 10, "The Law of the 
Best Possiblel! and HThe Law of Specification.u Also see ch.l5, 
"The Law of the Ideal of Personality.n Consciously and 
unconsciously, much of this dissertation has been catalyzed by 
this book, one of Brightman's most important contributions. · 
It is as yet not adequately-recognized. Brightman, however, 
is always very careful to preserve the autonomy of ethics and 
simply sets forth the Law of Ideal Personality as a normative 
principle. We go further here in trying to show that it is 
descriptively a, fact of each consciousness. We then try to 
draw ethical and metaphysical implications from this. 
char~cter of this task is the most effective stimulus to 
:P.umili ty. De1orey is wrong when he says that the desire for 
perfection necessarily deflects us from the practical 
business of morality. In fact, the Ideal of Perfect 
Personality informs all moral practice. 
It is now obvious why metaphysical and ethical 
perfection have been discussed in such close conjunction 
throughout this dissertation. Neither can be adequately 
discussed without involving the other. Moral experience 
can be enjoyed apart from metaphysical explanation. It can 
be had in spite of bad metaphysical explanation. In this 
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sense moral autonomy holds true. But this dissertation 
argues that moral experience cannot be understood apart from 
that metaphysical dimension which seems to be implicit in 
every feeling of obligation. In its turn, metaphysics finds 
its most decisive data in moral experience. 
Idea of Perfection and the Existence and Nature 
0 
Kant held that all of the traditional arguments for 
God were simply restatements of the ontological argument, 
which he considered to be invalid. He failed to see that his 
own moral argument is in a sense also a specification of the 
21' 
ontological argument. · Or, as easily, the ontological 
21. Hartshorne, MVG, 336. 
argument receives validity as it is restated as a moral 
argument. 
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There is a vitally important core of experience 
which serves as the basis of the ontological argument. The 
chief difficulty with the argument as it was stated by Anselm 
is that it proceeds too directly to its conclusion. God is 
not just a deductive necessity; he is a practical necessity. 
To the conception that we necessarily have of Perfect Being, 
must be added the empirical ingredient of analogy. While we 
conceive of Perfect Being, we perceive imperfections. 
Perception of imperfections need not lead us to ignore the 
tension toward Perfect Being. But neither should the tension 
toward perfection lead us to leave out of account our 
perception that the ideal of perfection is not yet actualized. 
The Ideal Person which we conceive as the core of our 
consciousness and of our sense of obligation is not God. 
God is a being, not merely a concept. The intuition of the 
Ideal of Perfect Personality is shared by God. Perfection 
through existence of the Ideal of Personality motivates the 
creative activity of God; the Ideal of Personality also 
determines to a predominant extent the content and structure 
of that creative activity. In so far as we perfect ourselves 
in this divine image we do not pantheistically share in the 
being of God. Persons possess rational givens identical in 
most respects with 
being. The struct 
to all persons, but 
differently to the 
each being. 
the Ideal of 
pantheism. 
invading the privacy of another's 
of logic and mathematics is common 
structure must be applied 
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ique collocations of data possessed by 
of all persons' rational givens, 
ity, can also be shared without implying 
Descartests tatement of the ontological argument 
is more defensible of Anselm. Saying that ·the idea 
of perfection is ca sed by God brings out the analogical 
element. Thus our bligation to perfect the Ideal of 
Personality must be caused by a being no less than conscious, 
and no less than sensitive to obligation. This experience 
gives us insight the nature as well as the existence of 
God. In a strict se se, Perfect Being never exists. The 
image of the Perfect Person, however, which informs every 
experience of obliga ion must lead us to infer its eternal 
subsistence in perso This subsistence is never a 
mere subsistence. T e relation between the ideal ru1d the 
actual is so organic that one cannot be discussed without 
implication concerni Personal beings in such 
tension between the eal and the existent Gould never have 
been spawned by the rely existent, that is, by the natural 
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order as described by science.22 Persons are the only beings 
which are defined by the creative tension between the ideal 
and the actual. The only adequate cause of a person is a 
person. It seems necessary that some being should have 
existed from all eternity to serve as the ground of all 
other existence. The only being adequate to this task we 
worship as God. It is not necessary to prove that God is a 
person. The data which most decisively make such a being 
necessary are in the dimension of self-experience and could 
have no less an explanation. 
The nature of God will be clearer if we are more 
precise in our di-stinction of the role played by the rational 
given. The distinction between God and the Absolute which is 
suggested by Bradley and Hartshorne is helpful at this 
2'3 point. The Absolute subsists as God 1 s rational· given. 
God is perfectly aware of all logical possibilities at every 
given moment. God is perfectly aware of the best possible 
way in which all persons (including himself) may be perfected. 
:zz... Ferre", FR, passim, is illuminative bere in his 
discrimination of the circles of science, philosophy, and 
religion and his assessment of the "coherence of the actual." 
2~. After making this distinction, Bradley of course declares tne existence of God to be unnecessary, ETR, ch.XV. 
Also note Whitehead 1 s distinction between the "primordialtr 
and "consequent" natures of God, and the difference he finds 
between neternal objectstt and 11actual occasions," PR, 32 and 46. 
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Because they fail to make this distinction between the Ideal 
Berson as subsistent conceptual possibility and as an actual 
entity, absolutists of varied hues have spoken as if each 
advance toward more adequate selfhood involves acquisition of 
a larger share of God's being. But this is unnecessary. All 
of the arguments in support of a perfectionistic ethics and 
a coherence criterion for truth can be employed in support of 
the idea here developed, without the problem of error and 
evil involved in pantheism. 
The Absolute subsists as the totality of ideal 
possibilities. The Absolute does not exist; it eternally 
subsists. In one sense God himself is a part of the Absolute, 
even as all other persons are. In another sense the Absolute 
subs-ists as a part of God and of every other person, because 
the subsistence of ideal possibilities would be impossible 
ap~rt from existent consciousness. Conceptual possibility 
does organically involve existence. Nothing can be brought 
into existence without a predominant degree of rational 
organization. Nothing would have been possible unless some 
person were eternally and necessarily existent. There is a 
sense in which the Absolute always subsists as imperfect and 
God is always perfect. For every concrete actualization is 
always more perfect than merely conceptual possibility. 
There is a sense in which the Absolute always subsists as 
perfect and God is always imperfect. The achievement of 
purpose in any actual occasion is always less than it 
conceivably might be and, there£ore, will yet become. 
The .Absolute always subsists beyond good and evil, 
and each tragic frustration is tragic because it can be 
conceived to fit into a pattern of larger good. Few choices 
can be made which do not allow real value-possibilities to 
perish. A situation, however, which has within it actual 
existence is more perfect than one which does not. An 
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existent being, God cannot rest content with ideal harmonies. 
He feels the tragedy and strives to make actual the 
integration of evils and lesser goods into a more cohereht 
whole.24 This is never quite as perfect as God can conceive 
it to be. Yet idea and existence so interact that 
actualization enlarges conceptual possibility (the Absolute) 
even for God. The best possible choice in every situation 
is not only one which actualizes the ideal, but which also 
expands the scope of future possibility. God does evil 
(lesser good) in order to bring into existence the good. 
But God is in no sense beyond good and evil and he is never 
indif£erent to the evils which attend each creative choice. 
24. Whitehead speaks of Godts ntender care that 
nothing should be lost,tt PR, 525. But many values are lost 
despite this evident care. A reasonable religious faith is 
that the basic structure of things is increasingly personality-
.enhancing and the most coherent values abide. 
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A God capable of such tragic choice is a better God than one 
who needs to do nothing. Admission that real evil attends 
the creative process in no way implies the cosmic anti-
nomianism which is entailed in the assertion of the absolute 
perfection of God. iff.hat is argued here is that evil is real, 
but never final. God does not sin that grace might more 
abound. Moral obligation aris·e·s only at ithe Positive-Ought-
To-Do. The best possible choice is not sinful, though the 
evil attending it may be only a little less than the good. 
The love of such a God was never more powerfully 
conceived than by Plato in the Symposium and in the Timaeus. 
Because distinguished advocates of traditional absolutism, 
like Thomas Aquinas, systematically confuse God vdth the 
Absolute their conception of love becomes antisocial and 
even meaningless. In the Symposium Plato allegorically 
describes love as the child of Poverty and Plenty whose 
yearning for otherness and perfection is the birthmark of 
its complex, dialectical ancestry. A dialectical tension 
eternally draws each person toward a perfection which subsists 
as ideal possibility. In the Timaeus Plato uses this psychic 
process to gain insight into cosmology. 
It seems that the position here developed has much 
in common with Platots insight. Perfection is a vital element 
in the cosmic process, but not perfection as a static absolute 
existent; perfection is the structure of the process and the 
cause of its tension. Thus poets, lovers, philosophers, 
and all who are dedicated to love and coherence possess the 
primary data of metaphysics. Our struggle for realization 
is not merely wishful, not merely sentimentality. Nor is 
the key to metaphysics at the end.of the quest. The key to 
metaphysics is the nature of the creative and projective 
process itself. Those who dedicate themselves to it are 
creators with the Creator. 
E. The Idea of Perfection and the Nature of Freedom. 
A second area of evidence for the conception of 
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perfection here developed is our experience of freedom. One 
of the most helpful aspects of Thomas Aquinasts thought, but 
one of the most dangerous in the way in which it is formulated, 
is his conception of freedom as positive and participative. 2~ 
On the one hand, Thomas was not consistent with it, glorifying 
monastic withdrawal and the self-sufficiency of God. On the 
other hand, he tends toward pantheism when he makes God the 
perfect embodiment of all possible being and makes the 
perfection of ourselves a participation in the being of God. 
But the idea that a person perfects himself by uniting ideal 
possibility with material existence, and by fostering the 
2~. Cf. Heidegger, SZ, 199, on the double role of 
Sorge in moving man toward perfection. This passage is 
cited by Niebuhr, NDM, I, 183-184 in his argument against 
freedom as monastic withdrawal. 
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perfection of others, is an enduringly valuable idea. 
An entity cannot be perfect unless it is existent. 
An entity cannot be perfect unless it is rational. To 
glorify the ideal apart from the existent is to be incoherent. 
To speak of the existent as if it could be apart from some 
rational organization is to be incoherent. The more actual 
2:6 
a thing is the more rational it must be. 
This process is not an automatic one. No personal 
process is. Participation in every society does not conduce 
to the increase of freedom and the perfection of personality. 
No group can sustain itself which is completely irrational, 
but some groups so fail in the achievement of community 
(coherent and loving interpersonal relationship) that 
withdrawal from them i~ necessary if one's personality is 
to develop. Yet no person can develop in freedom rucld perfect 
his personality apart from any society whatever. Often he 
is driven to identify himself with the most remote ideal 
community to preserve the integrity of his personality. At 
times this identification is so complete and the connection 
with spatially and temporar].# present groups is so tenuous 
that such a person is judged to be insane. But the unsuccessful 
2:6~ Please observe that in this context this statement 
means something quite different from what similar statements 
seemed to mean for Hegel. Not all of the Real (all that is 
and can ever be) is actualized. Much of the Real (as defined 
above} is irrational. 
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sttuggle for coherence and self-realization reveals the 
structure of the process no less than the successful one. 
Again; participation in every physical process 
does not conduce to the increase of freedom and the perfection 
of personality. No physical process can continue if it is 
wholly irrational. But there are dysteleological processes 
in nature which impose such pain that consciousness is 
disintegrated rather than perfected by them. Still the 
cooperative mastery of such dysteleological processes·frees 
not only the persons who suffer but perfects all persons 
who advance the cause of rational control. Not all forms 
of labor are perfecting. However, the person who labors is 
I 
freer than the person who does not. Labor should be 
rationally designed to the capacities and possibilities of 
the persons who engage in it. We learn by doing. Work 
cooperatively shared builds not only the community which 
conduces to the freedom and perfection of persons; work 
directly serves those ends itself. 
This conception of freedom as positive and 
incarnational is verified in our experience. If we would 
think analogica~ly, empirically, we can think of God in 
similar terms. Thus our self-experience again gives us 
data which point to a personal and perfectible God. Such 
a conception explains much about the world process. God 
himself is perfected through society. The self-sufficient 
"perfection" of the being criticized in Lovejoyts Great Chain 
of Being was compromised by his act of creation. The 
infinitely perfectible Person seen here finds in each act 
of creation both the most intimate expression of his nature 
and the enablement to achieve new perfections in the future. 
The finitude of the existent is a limitation to the ideal 
expression of his will. The mastery of the existent comes 
through his willingness to limit the ideal to the actual, 
thus increasing the scope of ideal possibilities37 Again, 
the finitude of human society is a limitation to the ideal 
expression of God's will. But the perfection of human society, 
the realization of community, comes through his willingness 
to limit the ideal to the actual, thus increasing the scope 
of ideal possibilities. No means can be employed by God 
~ich contradict the ends he hopes to perfect. But 
participation in the material and social process, per se, 
expresses rather than contradicts his purposes. These means 
justify his ends because they are a part of the divine end. 
They are necessary instruments of the creation and perfection 
of personality. 
F. ·The Idea of Perfection and the Knowledge Situation. 
The third area of evidence supporting this conception 
27. Cf. Brightman, POR, 381-385, on the rel.ation between 
mechanism and purpose. 
of perfection is the knowledge situation. Perfection is 
relevant here both because of the way that the knowing 
process advances and because of the criterion of knowledge. 
The knowing process goes forward by a series of syntheses 
of subjective structure and objectively given data. It 
is literally a series of perfections. No act of synthesis 
is perfect in the abstract sense of complete incorporation 
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of all relevant data and complete consistency with all past 
knowledge constructions. There is a sense in which all data 
are relevant to all other data; therefore it ~ impossible 
that an act of knowledge should be perfectly adequate. For 
this reason coherence is our only criterion of knowledge. 
Knowledge is a process which flows on so rapidly as to 
challenge even the most rational acts of organization. But 
while the wholes into which our knowing is organized are never 
absolutely perfect, adequate knowledge is possible. Ahd each 
act of knowledge strives toward wholeness and perfection. 
Like perfectionism in ethics, the coherence 
criterion in epistemology is often criticized for being too 
vague. This criticism may be simply a quarrel with the 
nature of things as they are. That is, ~s was true of 
ethical discourse, discourse about knowledge may have at its 
core an experience which is given and cannot be discursively 
justified. 
However, the reply given above does not entirely 
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satisfy the practical question raised by use of the coherence 
criterion;. Admitting that perfect knowledge is impossible and 
that coherence (adequacy plus consistency) must be our standard, 
at what point can we feel that coherence has been reached? 
This question makes evident the metaphysical implication of 
the coherence criterion, just as obligation reveals a 
metaphysicaldimension to ethics. 
This practical question is answered and the role of 
perfection in the cognitive situation is revealed in two ways. 
(1) The coherent person judges a new experience (datum self) 
in the light of all past experiences of which we can be aware 
at a given moment of judgment. The nature of the problem 
will be one of the factors which determine the extent of the 
consideration which can be given to a judgment. We may be 
able to suspend judgment for a longer period on some scientific 
and philosophical questions than on pressing practical issues. 
It is incoherent to suspend judgment beyond necessity, but 
even practical commitments should provide for the growth of 
new data. Violence is never practical. For the irrevocability 
of violence sins against our future selves as well as against 
the other persons affected. (2) The coherent person judges 
each new experience in the light of the Ideal of Perfect 
Personality, which gives structure and integration to our 
actualized, existent personality. To leave any of our datum 
selves out of account, or to choose inconsistently with the 
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Ideal of Perfect Personality, is to be incoherent. Rationality 
and obligation are closely related. The survival and develop-
ment of the total personality (not physical survival alone) 
is the core of both. 
This claim that we have at the core of our 
consciousness an awareness of the Ideal of Perfect Personality 
of course recalls the objection classically raised by David 
Hume: 
There are some philosophers who imagine we are 
every moment intimately conscious of what we 
call our SELF; that we feel its existence and 
its continuance in existence; and are certain, 
beyond the evidence of a demonstration, both 
of its perfect identity and simplicity •••• 
For my part, when I enter most i~timately into 
what I call myself, I always stumble upon some 
perception or other, of heat or cold, light or 
shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I can 
never catch myself at anytime without a perception, 
and never can observe anything but the perception. 
When my perceptions are removed for any time, as 
by sound sleep, so long am I insens~~le of myself, 
and may be truly said not to exist. ·· 
Humets criticism is devastatingly effective against some of 
the views explored in this dissertation, particularly against 
the Platonic and Augustinian separation of soul substance 
from the world and experience. But Humets view itself 
oversimplifies the nature of both knowledge and the self 
and is therefore an ineffective objection to the view 
defended in this dissertation. His denial that the self of 
... 
which we are aware in each moment of perception nexists" 
; 
apart from particular acts of perception does not affect 
this view, for this view argues that the self of which we 
are aware is a subsistent reality. 29 This self could not 
exist alone because it is only a part, though a necessary 
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part, of that organic locus of existence we know as personality. 
Humets criticisms need not deter us from holding that 
awareness of the whole self and of the Ideal of Perfect 
Personality does give us insight into existence, and insight 
into specific acts of perception. Although the whole self 
is not a datum of experience it is a practical necessity 
(in the Kantian sense) and an object of knowledge. Particular 
acts of perception have no meaning apart from this subsistent, 
unifying conception; the rational and the existent are 
necessary to one another. And though we admit with Hume that 
personality could not emerge into existence apart from a 
body and its particular seih"sations, we need not be deterred 
from concluding that when personality reaches a certain degree 
of complexity it can be relatively independent of the physical 
grounds of its emergence. The likelihood that personality 
can survive even the shock of death is greatly strengthened 
when we add to these considerations the relation which exists 
29. Lotze, MIC, 682, deb:ines personality as the ideal 
of perfection. He holds that it is actually reached by God, 
though only approached in varying degrees by man. 
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between existence and obligation.30 
William Ernest Hocking suggests a similar integration 
of rationalism and empiricism: 
It is not a true account of knowledge to say 
that it pr_oceeds (always) from the part to the 
whole. The progress of knowledge has rather 
more in common with the development of a germcell 
than the puilding of a brick wall; something of 
the whole~pres~£t and active in that cell from 
the beginning .::5 
In reply to those who object that we can know only those 
things of which awareness can be immediately perfected, 
Hocking asserts: 
It is not accurate to say that we are unable to 
hold in a single view the many and the one, the 
appearances and the reality, the periphery and 
the center, the world and God. To some extent 
we must do this: in attending to the many we 
may not lose sight of the one, at the risk of 
losing the many also; and in attending to the 
one we may not lose sight of the ~any, at the 
risk of the vanishing of the one. J~ . 
Every induction is induced by a prior induction, 
ultimately by a total induction, or judgment 
about the whole of things,--none other than my 
whole-idea, derived from whatever knowledge of 
the whole and God my experience has built up 
for me. Every induction is at the same time a 
deduction, then,--an ttit must be so,rt parented, 
though from the background of consciousness, b.y 
an insight which in its ·origins is religious.Jj 
30. Braham, PIPT, 202-243, develops a similar 
;31.. Hocking, MGHE, 95. 
3?. Hocking, MGHE, 410n. 
3J. Hocking, MGHE, 477· 
view. 
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The particular conception of the whole-idea giving 
structtJ.re to our experience and a standard for our judgments 
which is argued for by this dissertation is less vague and 
more empirically verifiable than it is in the form set forth 
by Hocking. The whole-idea, or idea of perfection, here 
defended is the idea of personality itself. Every process 
of which we are aware is organized and interpreted by us in 
terms of our values, our subjectivity. A disinterested 
judgment is one which is r~led by a.more comprehensive 
interest. Knowing, like every other function of the person, 
is a part of the struggle for the fulfillment and preservation 
of personality (spiritual, as well as physical). In fact, 
knowledge itself is awakened only when, as Stern expresses 
it, "life is placed under cleavage and tension," or as John 
Dewey puts it, we are confronted with a nproblem situation.n;J'J+ 
Personalistic psychologists like Stern or Allport.3B: 
are not the only ones who advance data which point toward the 
perfection of personality as the stimulus to consciousness 
and knowledge. The phenomenological psychologists Donald 
Snygg and Arthur w. Combs have advanced most striking empirical 
evidence which may be interpreted as pointing to these theories .~·6. 
34· Stern, GP, especially his conception of 
rtintroception,rr 73. Dewey, HWT, ch.VI. 
55, Allport, PER, 547-558. 
J9. Snygg and Combs, IB, ch.IV and passim. 
It must be understood, of course, that Snygg and Comes are 
not motivated in their study by a desire to support these 
views, nor to advance any other metaphysics of' the self. 
But it seems significant that they speak of' the 11phenom-
enal selfn as the basic unit of psychological study. ·Ac-
cording to them, the phenomenal self tends to correspond 
to the physiological organism wfuich is the ground of its 
emergence. It can, however, be so defined as no push from 
consciousness intoler1ible aspects of the body. By dent of 
great will power a person can so define his phenomenal 
self that physical handicaps are not part of the 11real me. n 
On the other hand, the phenomenal self can be, and usually 
is, extended to include by lllae:lh..ti.fioation persons and ob-
jects quite outside our physical bodies. The phenomenal 
field is the univers~, including one,' s self, as it appears 
to that self at the moment. The phenomenal self includes 
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all those parts of the phenomenal field which the individual 
experiences as part or characteristic of himself. The basic 
hUlllan need is the preservation and enhancement of the 
37 
phenomenal self. 
Snygg and Combs 1 s use of the phrase uphenomenal 
' 
selfu is.to be conn:ll.ended. The phrase calls attention to the 
relative and shifting character of our conceptions· oi' ourselves. 
37. Snygg and Combs, IB, 57-58. See also the stimu-
lating little ... oook by .PJ;>escott.Lecky, Self-6onsistency, A 
Theory of Personali t:y:. __ A critical discussion of the present 
status· of ·.such concepts as u ego, Jt u self, 11 and rrpersonali ty, u 
is found in Bertocci, Art. (1945}:- -
The psychologists must, of course, be concerned with the 
origin and description of the content of these conceptions 
of ourselves. The concern of philosophy, particularly at 
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this point, is the ubiquity of the tendency and the structure. 
Unfortunately, Snygg and Combs are not too helpful regarding 
the philosophical implications of their data. They do not 
make clear the relationship between these self-conceptions 
(which we have called subsistent) and the whole person (which 
is an existent). Nor do they make it clear that it is the 
content of the self-conceptions which is learned and not the 
tendency and structure themselves. However, the data they 
organize ~ useful -and can be interpreted as pointing toward 
the view defended by this dissertation. 
It requires careful statement, but this conception 
of self-knowledge as the nucleus of all other knowledge can 
be related to the general nature of religion (as defined in 
the first chapter) and a rather specific conception of God. 
As the expressed conviction that our most coherent values 
correspond to Reality, religion is one of the most fundamental 
expressions of our quest for adequate selfhood. The 11 Pf1enomenal 
fieldff is determined by this quest, thus religion erupts from 
our deepest nature and needs. This, of course, does not prove 
the truth of the metaphysical proposition implied by the 
religious hypothesis. But neither is the proposition refuted 
as merelz wishful thiru(ing because we show a strong drive to 
af£irm it. Rather, the burden of proof seems to lie upon 
those who deny the objective significance of the tendency. 
Psychological analysis reveals that the projection 
of the Ideal of Perfect Personality and the organization of 
our experience in keeping with this ideal, and even the 
faith that this projection finds objective response, is a 
natural process, a process which cannot indefinitely be 
frustrated without disintegrating the personality. This 
analysis is not denied by this dissertation. We simply go 
196 
on to say that what we. normally tend to believe is really 
in basic harmony with what careful criticism reveals must be 
presupposed. The busy work of those who seek to undermine 
religion by showing its natural and even physical basis is 
really quite irrelevant, or at least relevant only against 
Platonists and Augustinians who seek to defend the ideal by 
denying its incarnation in time and matter. When taken into 
account alongside the direction of the dialectic, this .-
testimony as to origins of our belief that this world is 
really tra vale of soulmaking11 points, not to naturalism, 
but to a view adequate to account for both the ideal direction 
and the natural grounds for its emergence. 
It must be kept in mind that personality is central 
to the whole process. Only personality organically combines 
the ideal and the actual. Personalism is the philosophy which 
seeks to interpret the universe in the light of these 
inescapable experiences. In doing so it does the least 
possible violence to these experiences. If religion is a 
fundamental expression of these facts of consciousness, then 
the religious object (God) must be a person, or at least 
responsively related to personality. Any kind of responsive 
relatioh seems to imply that God is actually a person. A 
definition of him like that attempted in this chapter seems 
consistent with both the fundamental encouragement afforded 
to the development of personality and the limitations yet 
blocking its ideal perfection. 
G. Summary of the Ar__gument 
It is now possible to· summarize the results of this 
dissertation, relating the position attained to the other 
views considered. The dissertation began with a definition 
of perfection suggested by Aristotle. In essence, this 
definition was that an entity is perfect insofar as it has 
attained its end.38 The widespread use of perfection as a 
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metaphysical concept was questioned. It was seBn that, as 
traditionally conceived, perfection contradicts infinity and 
personality, which are also conceptions traditionally used 
in the West to define the ground of being. Five logically 
possible attitudes toward the definition of the ground of 
38. Aristotle, Metaphysics, l02lb. 
being as perfect may be distinguished. First, it may be 
denied that there are any ends which are not completed in 
the material order. Second, the purposes implied in the 
present space-time order may be seen as so incomplete, 
even frustrated, that it is deductively necessary that this 
imperfect order be sustained by a transcendentally perfect 
one. Third, nominalism or positivism may be developed to 
show the subjectivity of. such a concept as perfection and 
the impossibility of metaphysics altogether. Fourth, 
metaphysical concepts may be held but not defended, save 
hy_an appeal to faith or revelation. Finally, it may be 
argued that the ground of being is perfect because we do 
experience real perfections, real fruitions of purpose, 
and also the transcendent aim toward perfections which in 
their nature cannot be realized in the present space-time 
order. 
Since Thomas Aquinas confronted all of these 
possibilities and took his stand upon the fifth of them, 
he was selected as the focus of criticism. His position is 
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is of great continuing influence and it reveals the difficulties 
of maintaining an empirical position on the question. His 
difficulties chiefly arose because he never related and 
properly subordinated the concept of perfection to the more 
fundamental concept of personality. This affected Thomas's 
ethics so that he never understood the dialectical character 
" 
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of obligation, never reconciled the relative and the absolute 
dimensions of morality, and vitiated the important concept 
of love. Since it is in ethi~s that we discover the primary 
data of metaphysics, metaphysics is seriously affected also. 
Thomas applies perfection to the whole being of God, rather 
than just to Godts will and Godt_s ability to apply the 
rational given to each moment of existence. This in effect 
causes Thomas to abandon experience and the analogy of 
personality. ·He finally comes to argue for the absolute 
perfection of God on the basis of deductive necessity and 
even the a.S:~ptions of faith alone. 
Constructively, this dissertation has argued that 
our experiences of obligation, of freedom, and of knowing 
are experiences of actual and possible perfection. Analysis 
shows that the pattern and the motivation for these experiences 
is an Ideal of Perfect Personality. All being is thus related 
to perfection. Though no being is perfect, every being which 
is rational and expresses its nature strives to perfect the 
ideal in existence. It appears to be coherent to conclude 
that God, the being upon whom all other beings d~pend, is not 
different in the structure of his being from other beings. 
If we accept such a perfect-perfectible Person as the creator 
and sustainer of all the ,persons experienced in the present 
space-time order we avoid both the incoherence involved in a 
contention that purposes are insignificant or wholly ended, 
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and the self-contradictions involved in the claim that God 
is absolutely perfect. There is, furthermore, the positive 
sense of sharing in the continuing task of creation, and the 
possibility of operationally testing our philosophy in 
.creative work. 
H. Suggestions for Further Study. 
There are three directions in which these ideas can 
be extended and tested. First, further historical study is 
possible. Attention could be given to still other analyses 
of moral experience to see if the tension toward an Ideal of 
Perfect Personality is really implied in them. Other 
attempts to define God as absolutely perfect or use our 
experience of perfection as an argument for his existence 
could be studied for fresh suggestions. Kant, Hegel, and 
the other great systematic philosophers would yield new 
insights when approached from this perspective. Oriental 
philosophers should particularly be studied for ljght on this 
question. 
Second, the meaning of perfection in other dimensions 
of experience can be explored. Evidences of teleology in 
biological evolution could be tabulated and added to the 
argument of this dissertation. The ability of organisms to 
survive frustration by reorganizing again and again would 
strengthen the argument. Or, to consider an entirely different 
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kind of experience, a criticism of the idea of perfection in 
aesthetics and the relation of this to ethics and metaphysics 
would strengthen the argument of the dissertation. 
Finally, the descriptive science of psychology 
should be further consulted for experiences which cast light 
on the relation betl'lfeen the absolute and relative elements 
in our self-experience. In its present state, much of 
psychology yields little of philosophic import. But an 
empirical philosophy must make use of all the data which 
are made available. In such areas of applied psychology as 
education and counseling we should look for the role played 
by the self-concept, its origin, its variable and constant 
factors, and the way in which it is defended. If practice 
here leads us to act as if this world is a vale of soul-making, 
surely social philosophy, ethics, and even metaphysics, must 
take coherent account of the fact. One of the strongest 
evidences for the perfect-perfectible God defended in this 
dissertation is the way that this conception would end forever 
the divorce between theory and practice. 
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ABSTRACT 
• 0 
The problem of this dissertation is that of ex-
amining the idea of perfection as it has traditionally 
been used in metaphysics. The traditionally accepted 
definition of perfection was formulated by Aristotle. 
Perfection is the conformity of a thing with its end. 
The idea needs critical reevaluation for it has had Wide-
spread and crucial use, but use which has not always been 
. wise. The constructive possibilities of the idea ·should 
be explored, .for the idea of perfection holds promise as 
a point of relation between ontology and ethics. 
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Five logically possible .attitudes have been taken 
. toward the idea that all of Reality conforms to its end: 
(l) Perfection may be attributed to Reality on the basis 
of logical implication. A distinction is made between 
Appearance and Reality, and the imperfections which appear 
are used to argue for a transcendentally perfect order 
which serves as their basis. (2) Perfection may be 
attributed to the present space-time order in a sense which 
denies an intentional, purposive character to our 11 ends.u 
-
Each thing reaches its ttend11 because everything is col)t.ained 
in an order which is causally complete. (3) Perfection may 
be challenged by advocates of a revelational, super-rational 
theology. Such critics .fear that all attempts to define 
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Reality are fraught with anthropomorphism and sinful pride. 
(4) Perfection, and all other metaphysical ideas; may be 
considered merely subjective and scientifically meaningless. 
Our need to form ends is separated from the perception of 
facts. (5) Perfection of Reality may be asserted on the 
basis of the particular perfections which we experience. 
Appearance is not divorced from Reality, although it is 
recognized that Appearance is only a part of Reality. 
Natural perfections are not denied, nor ignored, but are 
used as the basis of metaphysics. 
The ontic status of perfection is of central importance 
to religious metaphysics. Religion is the expressed 
conviction that our most coherently organized ends (purposes 
or values) correspond to Reality. But a problem is here 
created. When Reality is made a religious object it often 
has infinity and personality attributed to it, as well as 
perfection. The idea of a complete correspondence between 
all of our most coherent ends and Reality seems to contra-
dict the idea of unlimited possibility and the idea of 
creative consciousness. 
On the basis of this analysis Thomas Aquinas was 
selected as the focus of criticism for the dissertation. 
Thomas's use of the idea of perfection had much to do.with 
the tradition in Western religious metaphysics still in 
effect. He confronted all of the possibilities noted above 
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and attempted to defend the fifth position. The idea of 
perfection was central to his thought concerning the 
existence and nature of God. But Thomas rejected: (l) The 
rationalistic ontologism of the Platonists. (2) The 
mechanistic materialism of the Averroists. (3) The via 
negativa of the Pseudo-Dionysius. (4) The skepticism of 
the nominalists. On empirical grounds Thomas held that 
all beings strive to attain an end. He held that God is 
the End of all ends, the Being of all beings. Therefore 
God is Perfect Being, the cause and container of all 
perfections. 
Unfortunately, though the direction of Thomas's 
argument is promising, he does not escape the contradictions 
which confront religious metaphysics at this point. He 
holds that God 1 s perfection is absolute and actualized 
throughout all of Being. This unnecessary conclusion makes 
incongruous the creativity, infinity, love, and personality 
of God. Thomas 1 s final position comes to resemble the static 
rationalism, and at times even the obscurantism, which he 
often so well criticizes. 
Though the primary purpose of the dissertation is 
an examination of the ontic status of perfection, this 
question cannot be divorced from the ethical implications 
of the idea. Conclusions as to the ontic status of perfection 
profoundly influence ethical ideas, and it is in moral 
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expel"'ience that we receive decisive insight into the 
metaphysical question. Support for these assertions is 
:found in the use which Thomas .Aquinas made of the idea of 
perf'ection in his ethics. He rejected: (1) The ascetic 
perfection by reduction and wtthdrawal advocated by the 
Platonists. (2) The denial of' an end beyond the present 
space-time order made by the .Averroists. (3) The antinomian 
tendencies of the revelational theologians. C4) The moral 
skepticism implicit in nominalism. He held that the ends 
of the moral life can and should be attained in the present 
space-time order. But our ends have an implicit quality 
of infinity and eternity which ultimately leads us to God 
as the Pa.:_t:tern, the Source, and the End of all goodness 
and happiness. 
It is unfortunate that Thomas's static metaphysics 
so seriously affected his ethics. Since he coneeived of 
God as absolute, immutable Being, all acts of freedom or 
creativity by God or man are rendered incongruous. Thomas 
is pushed into the ascetic perf'ection by reduction and 
withdrawal that he of'ten so cogently criticizes. 
Each of' the logically--possible attitudes toward 
perfection remains as a real issue today. Albert C. Knudson 
is a distinguished example of' one who endangers the rational 
and personalistic charact~r of his system by accepting the 
traditional conception of' the absolute perf'e'ction of' God. 
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Though most of those who uphold the traditional conception 
would not have it so, it really seems to rest upon an 
apriori assumption. 
Advocates of scientific method in its narrowest sense 
tend toward either mechanism or positivism. Mechanists 
still try to maintain a causally complete space-time order 
gy placing all of man 1 s ends "'1-vithin that order. Man 1 s 
attempts to achieve ends which lie beyond the space-time 
order are held to be caused by previous conditioning within 
the order, and by his efforts to preserve his material 
existence. Advocates of this view range from Hoyle, an 
astronomer, to Hull, a psychologist. Positivists and 
pragmatists, different in many ways, agree in discounting 
the quest for perfection, though their own positions 
display strong evidence of such a quest. Positivists like 
Rappaport and Wittgenstein strive for the most narrowly 
consistent ~d self-completing of systems. Pragmatists 
like Dewey waver between an idealistic recognition of the 
organic tension toward perfection, and a materialistic re-
duction of that tension. 
The via negativa is still influentially advocated 
by the neo-orthodox theologians. Reinhold Niebuhr is the 
outstanding example of one who assails perfectionists for 
their arrogance in cultivating the image of God. Niebuhr 
sees the attempts by philosophers to construct perfectly 
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coherent systems as a similar manifestation of sinful pride. 
Charles Hartshorne has made one of the most promising 
recent attempts to give empirical meaning to the idea of 
perfection. His criticism of its use is most effective. 
However, his constructive position encounters difficulties 
arising from an ambiguous treatment of personality, 
partic~larly as it is found in God. 
By way of construction, the dissertation argues that 
the key to the idea of perfection lies in moral experience. 
Moral obligation has both a relative and an absolute 
dimension. The absolute, universal dimension of obligation 
is the tension to perfect (make coincident the ideal and 
the actual) an Ideal of Perfect Personality (a conception 
of a person who achieves all of his coherently organized 
ends) • It is difficult to articulate this Ideal because it 
is an unspoken assumption of every act of consciousness, 
and because it can be stated in philosophic discourse only 
in its most abstract terms. The relative dimension of 
obligation is the content of this Ideal. The content of 
obligation never contradicts the perfection of personality 
' 
itself, but it varies according to culture, person, and 
time. Each Ideal of Perfect Personality is capable of 
infinite growth, both in conception and in the objective 
possibilities of its actualization. 
The cognitive situation reveals this process. The 
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only test of truth available to us is coherence (consistency 
plus adequacy). This test needs more careful definition 
than it often receives. An hypothesis is coherent if it 
is consistent with our whole-self (the sum of our datum 
selves) and the Ideal of Perfect Personality-which im-
plicitly gives pattern a...l"ld structure to all our judgments. 
The most trivial judgment of fact is shot through with 
valuation. We reject ideas which do not interest us or 
which leave the pattern of knowing unperfected. We struggle 
for coherence even at the cost of physical survival. 
There is ontic significance in this tension toward 
the Ideal of Perfect Personality. The significance does 
not lie as Anselm argued, in the conception of a Perfect 
Being who necessarily exists.· The Ideal of Perfect Per-
sonality is never wholly actualized, even for God. But 
it is, nonetheless, an integral part of the Real. Existent 
persona are matrices of possibility and actuality. The 
ontic significance lies in the tension which constitutes 
each matrix. As we share the task of actualizing the Ideal 
we discover the Supreme Person who sustains this process 
and participates in it with us. Freedom is incarnational 
and participative, not negative and divisive. We do not 
become a part of God or of one another as we actualize the 
Ideal, but we do increase the freedom, even the being, of 
each person, including God, as we perfect ourselves. 
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The conclusions of this study may be drawn together 
as follows: 
(1) The idea of perfection is a useful instrument for 
bringing together ethics and ontology. 
(2) The idea of perfection is of particular importance to 
religious metaphysics, since religion is an expressed 
conviction that our fundamental ends correspond to Reality. 
(3) Such equally important ideas as personality, infinity and 
creativity are· adversely affected if perfection is affirmed 
of absolutely all of God's being. 
(4) Each feeling of obligation is implicitly characterized 
by a tension to perfect an Ideal of Perfect Personality. 
This tension is misunderstood and dissipated if the Ideal 
is held to be.perfectly actualized, or if the tension is 
seen simply to arise from conditioning. 
(5) The tension toward perfection experienced in moral 
obligation, in cognition, and in expanding freedom, gives 
us our principal insight into the existence and nature 
of God. 
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